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ABSTRACT
Emerging from years of research and development, the Internet-of-Things (IoT)
has finally paved its way into our daily lives. From smart home to Industry 4.0, IoT
has been fundamentally transforming numerous domains with its unique superpower
of interconnecting world-wide devices. However, the capability of IoT is largely
constrained by the limited resources it can employ in various application scenarios,
including computing power, network resource, dedicated hardware, etc. The situation is
further exacerbated by the stringent quality-of-service (QoS) requirements of many IoT
applications, such as delay, bandwidth, security, reliability, and more. This mismatch
in resources and demands has greatly hindered the deployment and utilization of IoT
services in many resource-intense and QoS-sensitive scenarios like autonomous driving
and virtual reality.
I believe that the resource issue in IoT will persist in the near future due to
technological, economic and environmental factors. In this dissertation, I seek to
address this issue by means of smart resource allocation. I propose mathematical
models to formally describe various resource constraints and application scenarios in
IoT. Based on these, I design smart resource allocation algorithms and protocols to
maximize the system performance in face of resource restrictions. Different aspects
are tackled, including networking, security, and economics of the entire IoT ecosystem.
For different problems, different algorithmic solutions are devised, including optimal
algorithms, provable approximation algorithms, and distributed protocols. The so-
lutions are validated with rigorous theoretical analysis and/or extensive simulation
experiments.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Coming into the 50-th year after its birth1, the Internet has become just an
indispensable part of most of our lives. We rely on it for work, for leisure, and
for social activities; for making knowledge accessible to all, for building critical
infrastructures that support our lives, and even for global capitalism, freedom of
speech and digital democracy. The Internet is enabling fundamental transformations
deep within economics, science and education, communications, politics, arts, and
humanity. There has never been another invention that has such a direct yet profound
impact on all aspects of human lives.
For long, the Internet has been providing us with an abundant world of digital
services via our computing devices like servers, PCs, laptops, and mobile phones.
However, it is now prevailingly recognized that the boundary of the Internet will
not be constrained by only the computing devices. With the help of advanced and
low-power communication technologies, physical objects with little to no computing
capabilities are now remotely accessible and controllable via the Internet, comprising
what we call the Internet-of-Things (IoT). Through the interconnection of “things”, an
incredible number of amazing new applications are coming into our lives, such as smart
home, smart city, smart healthcare, smart industry, and many more. This technology
(IoT) will have an enormous impact on our society. As a piece of preliminary evidence,
1Counted from the first successful experiment of the ARPANET in Dec. 1969.
1
the annual global IoT market has reached over $700 billion in 2018, and will soon
surpass the one trillion mark in a few years (if not have already been so) [55]. But
this is just the beginning. In the end, IoT will be the key technology that enables the
merging of our digital and physical worlds.
While the big picture is bright and shining, if we take a closer look at this technology,
IoT is still in its infancy. Like when any new technology emerges, IoT is facing many
issues, challenges and concerns. These, especially the technical ones, are greatly
hindering the deployability, applicability and acceptance of this technology. Without
enumerating all the pros and cons of IoT, however, this dissertation is focused on one
of the most critical issues present: the resource issue. The core conflict here is between
the limited resources, in terms of computing, network, storage, power supply, etc.,
and the higher and higher resource demands of IoT-based applications. On one hand,
capacity of the IoT is limited by various practical factors, including technology, cost,
environmental concerns, regulations, etc. On the other hand, the fast growing IoT
applications have more and more stringent and heterogeneous resource requirements
in order to satisfy their performance goals, especially in terms of the quality-of-service
(QoS) received by their end-users. A representative example of such an application is
data analytics and utilization based on machine learning, The excessive computing
resources required by advanced machine learning algorithms have basically prevented
those from being used directly on commodity IoT devices. End-users are left with the
options of either utilizing cloud-based services provided by tech giants, which leads
to cost, reliability, security and privacy issues, or resorting to far less powerful local
algorithms that sacrifice accuracy and performance.
While in the long run, resolving such an issue relies on continuous investment into
infrastructure enhancement in IoT, such a solution will not fully resolve the issue in the
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near future. In this dissertation, let us take a different and more practical approach.
By abstracting IoT systems using mathematical models, we enable the design of
different smart resource allocation algorithms that apply in various IoT scenarios.
Such algorithms aim to enhance system performance by improving resource utilization
in the IoT, while considering various constraints posed by both the infrastructure and
the applications.
1.2 Overview
In this dissertation, we investigate the resource issue in IoT along three basic
dimensions: network, security, and economics. We start from the most fundamental
problem: network resource allocation in IoT. Here, we concern the sharing of network
resource, notably bandwidth, among different competing entities. This includes
bandwidth allocation both among multiple data traffic flows, as well as among multiple
high-level applications each with a number of flows. However, network resource
allocation is more than pure bandwidth allocation, due to other requirements of the
applications. A typical one is the sensitivity of network delay, which is very common
in real-time IoT applications such as autonomous driving and virtual/augmented
reality. Another one is the reliability of the transmission, measured by the capability
of successful transmission in face of failures in the network. A third one is the
policy requirement, where data traffic must be pre-processed by one or multiple
intermediate processing services before reaching the application and/or the end-users,
which corresponds to security checks in security-sensitive applications or data pre-
processing in big data analytics. Further, the allocation of network bandwidth is
sometimes subject to the flexible deployment of the applications themselves. We
3
consider these requirements, and devise efficient optimization algorithms for different
concrete problems that fall into this category.
We next investigate the deployment of security resources in IoT. Deploying security
functions in the edge network can greatly strengthen system security, by preventing
most attacks close to their origins and/or targets. However, due to the high cost of
edge computing power and the limited budget of the IoT operator, we need a smart
deployment algorithm that can maximize the overall security of the system subject to
the budget bound. We formulate this problem as a security risk minimization problem.
Adopting models from economical risk estimation and stochastic optimization, we
address the simultaneous minimization of expected and worst-case security risks with
tunable trade-offs.
Finally, we look into the economics perspective of IoT, specifically, how users can
make fast and secure micropayments for using IoT services. Traditional payment
methods such as online transfer require a central platform for the recording and
charging of transactions, which leads to performance bottlenecks, security concerns
and excessive service fees. Using cryptocurrencies, users and providers can distributedly
settle micropayments for the use of IoT services, with minimal (and ideally no) third
party involvement. Unfortunately, mainstream cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and
Ether are still suffering from the scalability issue and the high transaction fees coming
from the expensive blockchain operations. Instead, off-chain payment channel networks
(PCNs) can achieve fast and economical payment settlement, while still retaining a
similar level of security as the blockchain, through the use of smart contracts that
minimize blockchain operations. We investigate the fundamental payment routing
problem in PCN, aiming to improve both the payment success ratio and the routing
efficiency over existing solutions. We first consider a simple scenario where users make
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time-sensitive payment requests, and the network tries to satisfy as many payment
requests as possible. We further consider anonymous payment routing that does not
leak the user identities and/or transaction details.
1.3 Summarized Contributions
Addressing the aforementioned problems can be very challenging. Most of the
problems that we study are NP-hard, meaning that they basically do not admit
exact algorithms unless P=NP. Some problems also require fully distributed solutions
or a solution that considers extreme cases of the system. Fortunately, for most
decision making and/or optimization problems that we study, we were able to devise
efficient solutions that either closely approximate the optimal solution (within a given
bound), or converge to the optimal solution eventually. For problems that require
distributed solutions, we devise distributed protocols that always ensure the validity
of the solution based on our routing and security goals. This section summarizes our
main contributions. Note that the concrete definitions of terms used, such as problem
definitions, formulation and algorithm classes, are delegated to the corresponding
chapters.
1.3.1 Part I: Network Resource Allocation in IoT
In network resource allocation, we consider three problems concerning different
layers in the network stack. The first problem concerns the scenario where the network
provider wishes to optimize per-traffic flow routing and bandwidth allocation in terms
of network congestion minimization in the network layer. We consider different QoS
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requirements of user traffic, including transmission bandwidth and delays for real-
time IoT applications, reliability for critical IoT applications, and policy routing for
security-sensitive IoT applications. Our contribution is three-fold [153], which will be
expanded in Chapter 2:
• We define the QoS-aware and Reliable Traffic Steering (QRTS) problem, incor-
porating the bandwidth, delay, reliability and policy routing requirements all
into the same formulation.
• We prove QRTS and its optimization version OQRTS to be NP-hard.
• We propose a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for OQRTS.
Based on the previous study, we further seek to jointly optimize the hosting of
applications and the routing of data traffic in IoT, aiming at a cross-layer design
combining network layer and application layer controls. In this problem, we specifically
consider real-time applications with bandwidth, delay and reliability requirements,
while the policy routing requirement can be easily added and hence is omitted for
simplicity. An application requires one or multiple data streams from different sources
in the network. The task here is to find one or multiple host nodes for each given
application, modeled as a singleton processing unit, as well as routing and bandwidth
allocation for all the data streams directing to each application’s host node(s). Based
on the characteristics of the applications, we divide them into parallelizable and
non-parallelizable applications, with the former being able to balance processing load
across multiple instances while the latter cannot. Depending on the network scenario,
we further respectively consider scenarios both with a single application, and with
multiple simultaneous applications. Combining the two application types with the
two provisioning scenarios, we have four variants of this problem. Our contribution to
this problem is also three-fold [151], [152], which will be expanded in Chapter 3:
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• We define the Application Provisioning (AP) problem with four variants, namely
Parallelizable Single Application Provisioning (P-SAP), Non-parallelizable Single
Application Provisioning (N-SAP), Parallelizable Multi-Application Provisioning
(P-MAP), and Non-parallelizable Multi-Application Provisioning (N-MAP).
• We prove all variants of AP and their corresponding optimization versions to be
NP-hard.
• We propose FPTASs for the optimization versions of P-SAP, N-SAP and P-MAP,
respectively, and a randomized algorithm for the optimization version of N-MAP.
In the third study, we bring the problem to purely the application layer. Instead
of considering the simplified traffic patterns such as the basic traffic flow in the first
problem or the star-like data streams of a singleton application in the second problem,
we consider a complex distributed application scenario where the IoT application is
comprised of a set of IoT microservices with interdependencies. These interdependen-
cies among microservices, which define how data will flow across microservices for
this application, are modeled as a general directed acyclic graph (DAG). This is a
far more general model than a source-destination flow or a star-like application. The
microservices are distributed among different edge computing nodes in the IoT, with
each microservice having one or multiple deployed instances. Our substrate network
here is the overlay network consisting of all deployed instances of the microservices,
as well as the overlay links between these instances. The problem that we study here
is to balance the data transmission and processing load across microservice instances,
taking into account both the complex interdependencies among microservices and
the structure of the overlay network. Again, we need to consider the capacity of the
microservice instances, as well as the QoS of a given distributed application in terms
of both the transmission delay in the overlay network and the processing delay at
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these microservice instances. Our contribution to this problem is also three-fold [147],
which will be expanded in Chapter 4:
• We define both the QoS-agnostic Basic Load Balancing (BLB) problem and the
QoS-aware Load Balancing (QLB) problem for IoT microservices, taking into
consideration the complex interdependencies among microservices modeled as a
DAG, as well as the QoS requirement of any given application.
• We prove the QLB problem to be NP-hard.
• We propose an optimal algorithm for the BLB problem, based on which we
further propose an FPTAS for the optimization version of the QLB problem,
utilizing our novel decomposition of a load balancing solution into realization
graphs (to be defined in Chapter 4).
1.3.2 Part II: Robust Security Deployment in IoT
Regarding IoT security, we mainly focus on the problem of deploying security
functions within the IoT edge network. The goal of the IoT operator is to ensure
the highest level of security in the network, by deploying these security functions
to process incoming traffic into the edge network. These functions can be deployed
on distributed edge computing nodes within the edge network. Ideally, deploying
security functions at every access point can ensure the maximum level of security,
since every piece of traffic is checked by a function before entering the edge network.
Unfortunately, due to both the limited budget of the IoT operator and the limited
availability of edge computing nodes, the operator can only deploy a small number
of security functions at designated locations. To find the best deployment plan, the
operator needs to both model the security status of the system, especially in face of
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frequent system dynamics, and employ efficient optimization algorithms to find the
optimal deployment plan. Our contribution to this problem is three-fold [150], which
will be expanded in Chapter 5:
• We propose a stochastic model for the security risk of the IoT edge network.
Utilizing risk modeling techniques from economics, our model captures both the
expected security risk, and the worst-case security risk in terms of the rare cases
with the most unfavorable system dynamics.
• We formulate the robust security deployment problem minimizing the expected
and worst-case security risks, which is both stochastic and NP-hard.
• We propose an iterative algorithm to compute the optimal security deployment
plan based on the model. To improve its efficiency, we propose a novel analytical
solving technique based on the structure of this problem.
1.3.3 Part III: Micropayment Routing in Blockchain-based PCN
The ability to conduct service-to-service micropayments is the key to enable the
IoT ecosystem. PCN is a perfect match to this demand: it is automatic, with no
human intervention; it is secured by the blockchain; and finally it is fast in settling
transactions. The routing problem, however, is perhaps the most cumbersome task
in the current PCN. Due to the requirement of the underlying security protocol, a
payment route must both satisfy the balance (bandwidth) and the timelock (delay)
requirements. While this problem itself is already NP-hard as shown in Part I, PCN
routing is further complicated due to both that the network is fully distributed, and
that the balance information on channels are constantly changing with each on-going
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transaction. These have driven us to design distributed protocols to solve this problem,
instead of centralized optimization algorithms as in the previous chapters.
We address two problems associated with PCN routing. The first one is to design
a basic routing protocol, which must both satisfy all requirements including delay
and balance (concurrency) and be as efficient and low-overhead as possible. The
challenge here is to both gather instantaneous network information and make balance
reservation at the same time. We make the following contribution [149], which will be
expanded in Chapter 6:
• We formulate the PCN routing problem with both balance/concurrency and
timelock/delay requirements.
• We propose an efficient distributed protocol which probes for network information
and makes balance reservation simultaneously in a one-round process, in the
case where a single payment path can be found to satisfy the payment request.
Multiple rounds may be needed if a single path cannot satisfy the request, in
which case our protocol uses as few payment paths as possible to reduce overhead
and limit the transaction fee paid by the sender of the payment.
The messages exchanged in the proposed protocol contain sensitive information
regarding the identity and/or location of the sender and recipient of a payment, as
well as the payment value. This can be a big issue in PCN, as often times users may
wish to hide their identity and other sensitive information from external observers
when making private transactions. To remedy the privacy issue, we further propose
an anonymous probing protocol, which complements the important probing phase of
the routing protocol to provide privacy guarantee. This, combined with conventional
privacy-preserving communication solutions such as Sphinx [26] and HORNET [18],
can ensure full privacy of the transacting users during the routing process, which
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can further be used in conjunction with privacy-preserving payment protocols [80],
[81], making the entire PCN payment process privacy-preserving. Our contribution
regarding the privacy issue is summarized as follows [148], which will be expanded in
Chapter 7:
• We describe the privacy issue in distributed probing algorithms, and establish
the privacy goals.
• We propose an efficient and privacy-preserving probing protocol, which ensures
the anonymity of both the sender and the recipient, while still being able
to communicate sufficient information to establish a payment path should the
routing succeed, or to acknowledge a routing failure, without knowing in advance
which path(s) will be explored.
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12
Chapter 2
QOS-AWARE AND RELIABLE TRAFFIC STEERING FOR SERVICE
FUNCTION CHAINING IN MOBILE NETWORKS
2.1 Introduction
The recent years have witnessed a drastic growth on global mobile traffic, due to
the prevalent use of personal mobile devices and the emergence of the internet-of-things
(IoT). Billions of devices are connected via mobile networks, posing a severe challenge
to current mobile infrastructures. Moreover, the greatly abundant mobile and IoT
applications have very heterogeneous requirements, including quality-of-service (QoS),
security, availability, etc. Satisfying these requirements is difficult for current mobile
networks, largely due to their hierarchical nature: most QoS and security features are
implemented at the gateway or in the cloud, in a centralized manner. The gateway,
with the need to both serve the huge amount of traffic and provide fine-grained network
control, becomes a severe performance bottleneck of the mobile network.
There have been many efforts in addressing this performance bottleneck. The key
idea is to resolve as much traffic as possible within the mobile network, alleviating the
load on the gateway. One promising method is to deploy capacity and performance
enhancing network services, also called middleboxes, to provide in-network traffic
processing before traffic reaches the gateway. These include security components
such as firewall, intrusion detection/prevention system (IDS/IPS) and deep packet
inspection (DPI), network optimization tools such as load balancer (LB) and TCP
optimizer, network address translator (NAT), etc. Deploying network services can
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bring a lot of benefits, such as early resolution of useless or malicious traffic, load
balancing, security enhancement, etc.
Traditionally, each network service is implemented via dedicated hardware pieces,
hence can only be deployed at specific locations (most likely at the gateway) due to
cost issue. Thanks to the recent advances in network function virtualization (NFV),
many network services can now be implemented as software components hosted on
general-purpose computation platforms at the network edge, such as fog computing
nodes within the mobile network. Edge deployment of network services has several
advantages. First, this alleviates the excessive traffic load at the gateway. Second,
in-network processing can effectively reduce traffic size in many scenarios, e.g., data
preprocessing for big data analytics, or preventing distributed deny-of-service (DDoS)
attacks. Third, this reduces the delay experienced by mobile traffic, especially those
transmissions whose both end-points reside in the mobile network (e.g., machine-
to-machine communications). With the emergence of fog computing [11], network
services can be flexibly distributed in the network, which further helps in network
optimization to balance and resolve mobile traffic load.
Nevertheless, benefits often do not come without a cost. Along with the enhanced
performance and enriched flexibility, comes the increased complexity for service
function chaining (SFC). In SFC, each traffic class is assigned a service function
chain, which is a sequence of network services (also called service functions) that
the traffic needs to pass through before exiting the network. Different traffic classes
may have different service function chains, due to their various QoS, security and
reliability requirements. An important problem is to steer each class of traffic through
its required network services in the given order, wherein both routing and bandwidth
allocation need to be determined based on the traffic class’s requirements.
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In this study, we study the traffic steering problem in mobile networks. We take
a software-defined approach, where a centralized controller collects global network
information, and makes joint routing and allocation decisions for all traffic classes
together. A software-defined approach commonly achieves better routing and resource
optimization, compared to distributed or local optimization approaches. We formulate
the QoS-aware and Reliable Traffic Steering (QRTS) problem in mobile networks,
considering heterogeneous requirements of traffic classes, including QoS (throughput
and delay), reliability, security and type-of-transmission constraints, etc. Both QRTS
and its optimization version (OQRTS) are proved to be NP-hard. We then propose a
Fully-Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) for the optimization problem.
Through extensive simulation experiments, we validate that our proposed algorithm
produces near-optimal solutions, and greatly outperforms two baseline heuristic
algorithms.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to formulate the traffic steering
problem in mobile networks with QoS and reliability requirements, and prove
its NP-hardness.
• We develop a Fully-Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme for the optimization
problem.
• We evaluate the performance of our proposed algorithm via extensive simulation
experiments, which validates the near-optimal performance of our algorithm.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce existing
work related to this study. In Section 2.3, we present our network and service
model. In Section 2.4, we formally define and formulate the QRTS problem and its
optimization version, and prove that both problems are NP-hard. In Section 2.5, we
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then propose our algorithm for the problem, and analyze its performance guarantee
and time complexity. In Section 2.6, we present our performance evaluation results.
In Section 2.7, we conclude this study.
2.2 Background and Related Work
2.2.1 NFV and SFC
NFV has been recognized as one of the enabling technologies to next-generation
mobile networks [51], [84]. Various network components can be implemented via
virtualization [51], including gateway, mobility support, charging, etc. In addition,
traditional services like firewall, IDS/IPS, network optimizer and NAT, can also
be implemented in mobile networks based on operator and user demands. Recent
advances in NFV enable flexible and cost-efficient deployment of various network
services in mobile networks [39], [62], [83].
SFC is a problem arisen in network management in the presence of network services.
Gember et al. [40] proposed a network orchestration layer, in which issues such as
elastic scaling, flexible placement and flow distribution are addressed. Zhang et al. [159]
studied SFC in the view of network protocols, and proposed a heuristic solution for
SFC-aware network service placement. Bari et al. [6] studied service chain embedding
(joint traffic steering and network service placement), and proposed another heuristic
solution. Rost et al. [109] proposed the first approximation algorithm for service
chain embedding, though the approximation is not constant-ratio. For solely the
traffic steering problem, Cao et al. [13] proposed an FPTAS, which is similar to the
result reported in this study. However, their problem does not consider traffic QoS,
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hence is not NP-hard. Our problem considers the heterogeneous QoS requirements of
applications, and is NP-hard, hence an FPTAS is the best possible algorithm that
we can expect unless P=NP. Guo et al. [47] studied traffic steering with pre-defined
path sets, which are not assumed in our study. The applications of SFC in mobile
networks have been summarized in [49].
Failure of network services can be frequent and can have a large impact on the
performance of applications and services [99], hence is one of the major considerations
in this study. Rajagopalan et al. [103] proposed a Software-Defined Networking (SDN)
based replication framework for network services. Sherry et al. [114] proposed a log-
based recovery model for network services or middleboxes, which can be used to fast
recover failed network services. Fan et al. [34] and Ye et al. [144] studied the problem
of reliable service chain embedding, and proposed different heuristic algorithms based
on both dedicated backup and shared backup provisioning. Kanizo et al. [63] proposed
a network-agnostic solution for network service backups based on bipartite matching.
The above efforts all focus on providing full recovery of the failed network services.
On the contrary, we argue that this “all-or-nothing” protection is an overkill for many
applications, as shown in existing work [158]. Therefore we propose a “soft” reliability
mechanism, such that only a bounded portion of throughput is affected during an
arbitrary service failure.
2.2.2 Software-defined Mobile Networks
SDN has recently been applied to facilitate network configuration and management
in various network environments, including the mobile networks. Different usages of
SDN in mobile networks have been studied, including resource allocation in the Radio
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Access Networks (RANs) [46], traffic control in the Mobile Core Networks (MCN) [59],
topology reconfiguration [86], etc. Our approach utilizes the centralized control as in
the above, but considers its application in QoS-aware and reliable traffic steering for
SFC in mobile networks.
2.3 System Model
2.3.1 Network Topology
The SDN controller aggregates global network information. The network is modeled
as a directed graph G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes, and E is the set of
links. A mobile network consists of many heterogeneous nodes, including radio access
points (RAPs), core switches, standalone fog nodes, the central cloud, and the gateway
towards the Internet. The link set also consists of heterogeneous links, including
high-speed fronthaul/backhaul fibre, digital subscriber lines, wireless and satellite
channels, etc. Different links have different attributes including QoS, security, etc.,
and thus can carry different types of traffic. We consider two QoS parameters for each
link: bandwidth and delay. For each link e ∈ E, we denote be > 0 as its capacity, and
de > 0 as its transmission delay.
Note that either a physically centralized controller (e.g., at the mobile gateway)
or a logically centralized controller (with physically distributed controllers sharing
the global view) can be used. A hierarchical control plane is helpful in distributing
the computational load in the mobile network. Distributed implementation of our
proposed algorithm is out of the scope of this study, and hence is omitted due to page
limit.
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2.3.2 Service Functions
The mobile network is deployed with heterogeneous network services, also called
service functions, for in-network processing of user traffic. For example, signal process-
ing may be virtualized and flexibly deployed on local fog nodes or in the cloud, due
to recent advances in Software-Defined Radio (SDR) [60] and NFV. Different signal
processing steps can be virtualized into independent functions, which can be deployed
on different nodes. As modern RANs employ heterogeneous radio access technologies
(RATs), different RATs may require different types and sequences of service functions
for signal processing. On the other hand, the network can offer other network services
for enhanced security and performance on the network edge [49], including firewall,
intrusion detection, load balancer, etc. Utilizing NFV, these network services can
also be implemented as virtualized software components, and flexibly deployed on
fog nodes. Deployment of service functions at the network edge benefits from its
low latency and high location flexibility, compared to the traditional cloud-based
deployment.
Formally, we use M = {m1, · · · ,m|M |} to denote the set of service functions
provided by all nodes in the RAN. Each service function may have multiple instances,
deployed at different locations. We use Vm ⊆ V to denote the set of nodes that are
deployed with service function m ∈M , and Mv ⊆M as the set of service functions
deployed on node v ∈ V . For each service function m ∈Mv deployed on node v, we
are concerned with two attributes: bv,m > 0 as its processing capacity, and dv,m > 0
as its processing delay.
We assume available service functions have already been deployed in the network.
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Service function placement is out of the scope of this study, and will be studied in
future work.
2.3.3 Traffic Model
Traffic is aggregated and classified based on its access/exit points, QoS require-
ments, service function chain (service chain for short), types of traffic, and reliability
requirement. In mobile networks, two most important QoS attributes are band-
width and transmission delay. Denote all traffic classes (TCs) in the network as
C = {C1, · · · , C|C|}. Each TC is denoted as a 7-tuple Cj = (sj, tj, Bj, Dj,Πj, Tj, rj),
where sj, tj ∈ V denote the access and exit nodes respectively, Bj > 0 denotes the
bandwidth demand, Dj > 0 denotes the maximum delay bound, Πj denotes its service
chain, Tj denotes the per-stage traffic type for each traffic stage defined in the service
chain, and rj > 0 denotes the reliability requirement. Explanation of the reliability
requirement is deferred to Section 2.3.5.
Each TC’s service chain is defined as a sequence of service functions, Πj =
(pij1, · · · , pijκj), where each pijk ∈M denotes a service function required by the TC. The
service function chaining requirement specifies that each packet of the TC originates
from sj, passes through all required service functions in the order given in Πj, and
exits at tj. We assume each service chain contains only distinct service functions.
The chaining requirement splits transmission of the TC into (κj+1) stages: sj → pij1,
pijk → pijk+1 for k = 1, . . . , κj − 1, and pijκj → tj. Each stage of traffic may belong to a
different traffic type, and can be carried on only a subset of links. For example, in
Cloud-RANs, the uplink traffic enters the network as wireless radio signals; before
signal processing, such traffic can only be transmitted along high-speed fronthaul fibre
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which supports the Common Public Radio Interface (CPRI). On the other hand, traffic
already through some security functions can no longer be transmitted via potentially
insecure links. These are expressed in Tj = {T j1 , · · · , T jκj+1}, where T jk ⊆ E is the
subset of links that can carry the stage-k traffic of Cj.
2.3.4 Feasible Routing Graph
We first define the feasible routing paths for TCs. Given network G and a TC Cj,
a path p in G is feasible for Cj iff
1. p originates from sj and ends at tj;
2. p visits all service functions Πj = (pij1, · · · , pijκj) in the given order; and
3. p has total transmission and processing delay within Dj.
To better establish the feasibility constraints of a routing path, we construct a
per-TC routing graph Gextj = (V extj , Eextj ) from the original graph G, as shown in
Fig. 2.1. Gextj has (κj + 1) layers, each layer k corresponding to one copy of the
subgraph of G that contains all nodes in V and all links in T jk ; this enforces the traffic
type constraints. We denote vjk ∈ V extj as the copy of node v ∈ V in layer-k of Gextj ,
and ejk ∈ Eextj as the copy of link e ∈ E in layer-k of Gextj . We call link e the prototype
of ejk, denoted by proto(e
j
k); we also call e
j
k an extended link of e. Link e
j
k has the same
transmission delay de as its prototype. Further, we establish abstract links between
consecutive layers. For each service function pijk ∈ Πj, we establish an abstract link
from the copy of each node v ∈ Vpijk in the k-th layer, to its copy in the (k + 1)-th
layer. We denote this abstract link as ej,kv = (v
j
k, v
j
k+1), and let it have delay dv,pijk
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Figure 2.1: A TC’s service function chain and routing graph.
(processing delay of the instance). We use the pair (v, pijk) to denote the prototype of
link ej,kv , also denoted by proto(ej,kv ); ej,kv is thus an extended link of prototype (v, pi
j
k).
Let sj0 be node sj at layer 0 of Gextj , and tjκj be tj at layer κj of G
ext
j . We assume
that each routing graph Gextj is (s
j
0, t
j
κj
)-connected, meaning that there is a routing
path from sj0 to every node v ∈ V extj , and there is a routing path from every node
v ∈ V extj to tjκj . Nodes not satisfying this condition can be safely removed from the
routing graph, as it does not contribute to the connectivity between sj0 and tjκj .
For simplicity, we aggregate all TCs’ routing graphs into a giant one, denoted
as Gext = (V ext, Eext), where V ext =
⋃
Cj∈C V
ext
j , and Eext =
⋃
Cj∈C E
ext
j . Each TC’s
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subgraph Gextj is maximally (s
j
0, t
j
κj
)-connected in Gext, meaning that adding any node
v /∈ V extj makes it not (sj0, tjκj)-connected.
Given Gext, the feasible path set of Cj is defined as all paths from sj0 to tjκj , each
with the sum of link delays no greater than Dj. Note that the processing delays of
service function instances have already been accounted for in their extended links’
delays. We use Pj to denote the feasible path set for Cj, and let P =
⋃
Cj∈C Pj.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each TC has a disjoint feasible path set Pj .
The following notations are defined for simplicity. We denote Eν = {(v,m) |m ∈
M, v ∈ Vm} as the set of all service function instances. E = E ∪ Eν , also called
the prototype set, denotes the set of all original physical links and service function
instances. We then use Eext(e) to denote all extended links of the same prototype
e ∈ E , i.e., all links that share the same capacity bound be. We also use E(p) and
Eν(p) = E(p) ∩ Eν to denote the sets of all prototypes and only service function
prototypes, respectively, used by path p. ηp(e) denotes the number of times for which
prototype e’s extended links appear in path p. Note that ηp(e) ≤ 1 if e ∈ Eν , as each
service function chain contains only distinct service functions.
2.3.5 Reliability
Network service failures can downgrade or even halt the transmission of user traffic,
which must be tackled to assure service continuity [99]. On the other hand, it has
been revealed that the traditional “all-or-nothing” protection is actually an overkill for
many data applications [158], due to the excessive resource consumption to provide
such protection.
In this study, we follow existing work and seek a “milder” way for improving service
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availability [158]. Instead of providing full recovery, we seek to bound the amount of
throughput loss due to an arbitrary single service function instance failure (single
service failure for short). Specifically, each TC Cj ∈ C has a reliability parameter
rj ∈ (0, Bj], denoting the maximum tolerable throughput loss that Cj may suffer from
any single service failure; rj = Bj means no protection for Cj.
2.4 Problem Statement
2.4.1 Problem Description and Formulation
In this study, we study the traffic steering problem in mobile networks. Specifically,
given the network G and the set of TCs C, the network operator’s goal is to find a
subset of feasible routing paths, as well as allocate bandwidth for each path, to fulfill
the bandwidth demand of each TC, meanwhile satisfying both capacity bounds and
reliability requirements.
Definition 2.1 (Bandwidth allocation). Let P ∈ P be a subset of feasible routing
paths. A bandwidth allocation of P is defined by a mapping L : P 7→ R+, where R+
is the positive real number set. We say that L is a feasible bandwidth allocation of P
iff for each prototype e ∈ E , ∑p∈P :e∈E(p) ηe(p)L(p) ≤ be. The aggregate bandwidth of
P , denoted by b(P ), is the sum of bandwidth allocated on all paths in P :
b(P ) =
∑
p∈P
L(p).
Definition 2.2 (QRTS). Given the network G = (V,E), and the TC set C, the
QoS-aware and Reliable Traffic Steering (QRTS) problem in mobile networks
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is to find a tuple Γ = (P,L), where P ⊆ P is a subset of feasible routing paths, and L
is a feasible bandwidth allocation of P , such that
1. let Pj ⊆ P be the set of feasible routing paths of TC Cj in P , then b(Pj) ≥ Bj
for each TC Cj ∈ C; and
2. during an arbitrary single service failure, at most rj bandwidth is lost for each
Cj ∈ C.
2.4.2 Computational Complexity
Theorem 2.1. QRTS is NP-complete.
Proof. First, QRTS is in NP, as checking all constraints takes polynomial time.
Consider the special case of QRTS where there is only one TC with an empty service
chain, no link excluded from E in Tj, and no reliability requirement (rj = Bj).
Therefore, there is only one layer in its routing graph, which is the same as the original
topology. In this case, we obtain the Multi-Path routing with Bandwidth and Delay
constraints (MPBD) problem on a general graph, which has been proven NP-complete
in [85]. As a known NP-complete problem is a special case of QRTS, the theorem
follows.
2.4.3 Optimization Formulation
The QRTS problem is an NP-complete decision problem. We further define the
following optimization version of QRTS:
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Definition 2.3 (OQRTS). Given the network G = (V,E), and the TC set C, the
Optimal QoS-aware and Reliable Traffic Steering (OQRTS) problem in mobile
networks is to find a tuple Γ = (P,L), where P ⊆ P is a subset of feasible routing
paths, and L is a feasible bandwidth allocation of P , such that
1. let Pj ⊆ P be the set of feasible routing paths of TC Cj in P , then b(Pj) ≥ ξ ·Bj
for each TC Cj ∈ C;
2. during an arbitrary single service failure, at most rj bandwidth is lost for each
Cj ∈ C; and
3. ξ is maximized.
In the OQRTS problem, the network operator aims to maximize the traffic scaling
ratio ξ, defined as the minimum ratio between the aggregate bandwidth and the
demand of any TC, subject to the feasible path set, feasibility of bandwidth allocation
and reliability constraints. If an OQRTS instance has an optimal solution of ξ∗ ≥ 1,
the corresponding QRTS instance is feasible, and vice versa.
With L(p) defined as the per-path variable of bandwidth allocation, and ξ as the
minimum scaling ratio, we formulate the OQRTS problem as the following linear
program (LP):
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max ξ (2.1a)
s.t.
∑
p∈Pj
L(p) ≥ ξBj, ∀Cj ∈ C (2.1b)
∑
p∈P:e∈E(p)
ηp(e)L(p) ≤ be, ∀e ∈ E (2.1c)
∑
p∈Pj :e∈Eν(p)
L(p) ≤ rj, ∀Cj ∈ C, e ∈ Eν (2.1d)
L(p), ξ ≥ 0. ∀p ∈ P
Explanation: Objective (2.1a) is to maximize the traffic scaling ratio ξ. Con-
straint (2.1b) defines the scaling ratio for each TC: (
∑
p∈Pj L(p))/Bj ≥ ξ. Con-
straint (2.1c) enforces per-prototype capacities. Constraint (2.1d) enforces the reli-
ability for each TC Cj. Specifically, for each service instance e ∈ Eν , the amount
of traffic of Cj through e must not exceed the maximum tolerable throughput loss,
denoted by rj. By this constraint, any single function instance failure will affect at
most rj bandwidth, hence satisfying the reliability requirements.
While the above formulation is a linear program (LP), it can have an exponential
number of variables due to the potentially exponential number of feasible routing paths
in a given graph. This prevents solving the problem using standard LP techniques.
Note that since the decision problem QRTS is NP-hard, so is the optimization problem
OQRTS. In the next section, we propose our approximation algorithm for OQRTS.
2.5 Fully Polynomial-Time Approximation Scheme
In this section, we design an FPTAS for the OQRTS problem. Since the problem
is NP-hard, an FPTAS is the best algorithm one can hope for, unless P=NP.
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Definition 2.4 (FPTAS). Given a maximization problem Ω, an algorithm A is said
to be a Fully-Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme (FPTAS) for Ω, iff for any
instance of Ω with optimal objective value ζ∗, given any ω ∈ (0, 1), A can produce a
feasible solution with objective value ζ ≥ (1− ω) · ζ∗, within time polynomial to both
the input size and 1/ω.
2.5.1 Dual Analysis
We first write the dual program of (2.1). Define dual variable z(j) for Con-
straint (2.1b) with each Cj ∈ C, l(e) for Constraint (2.1c) with each e ∈ E , and ϕ(j, e)
for Constraint (2.1d) with each Cj ∈ C and e ∈ Eν , the dual program is as follow:
min
∑
e∈E
bel(e) +
∑
Cj∈C
∑
e∈Eν
rjϕ(j, e) (2.2a)
s.t.
∑
e∈E(p)
ηp(e)l(e) +
∑
e∈Eν(p)
ϕ(j, e) ≥ z(j),
∀Cj ∈ C, p ∈ Pj (2.2b)∑
Cj∈C
Bjz(j) ≥ 1, (2.2c)
z(j), l(e), ϕ(j, e) ≥ 0. ∀Cj ∈ C, e ∈ E
Explanation: Objective (2.2a) accounts for the constants in Constraints (2.1c)
and (2.1d). Constraint (2.2b) is the dual constraint for primal variable L(p). Con-
straint (2.2c) is the dual constraint for primal variable ξ. For simplicity of notations,
although ϕ(j, e) is only defined for each Cj ∈ C and e ∈ Eν , we extend its definition
to include Cj ∈ C and any e ∈ E , and explicitly let ϕ(j, e) = 0 for e ∈ E \ Eν .
Based on an observation similar to the one in [38], we have the following two
lemmas:
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Lemma 2.1. At any optimal solution of Program (2.2), Constraint (2.2c) is binding,
i.e., equality (rather than strict inequality) holds.
Lemma 2.2. At any optimal solution of Program (2.2), there exists at least one path
p ∈ Pj for any Cj ∈ C, such that Constraint (2.2b) with Cj and p is binding.
Proof. Assume that at an optimal solution, Constraint (2.2b) for any TC Cj ∈ C and
path p ∈ Pj is not binding. It is obvious that we can reduce the value of any l(e) or
ϕ(j, e) that has a positive value, by an arbitrarily small amount. The resulted solution
is still feasible, but has a strictly smaller objective value than the optimal solution,
leading to a contradiction. To prove Lemma 2.1, observe that if Constraint (2.2c)
is not binding, then we can reduce the value of z(j) for all Cj ∈ C by an arbitrarily
small amount, which will make every Constraint (2.2b) to be unbinding, leading to
the same contradiction. To prove Lemma 2.2, assume that there exists Cj ∈ C such
that Constraint (2.2b) is not binding for any p ∈ Pj, then we can increase the value
of z(j) by an arbitrarily small amount, which will make Constraint (2.2c) unbinding.
This leads to the same contradiction as above. Hence both lemmas follow.
Based on Lemma 2.2, it is now clear that at any optimal solution, z(j) =
minp∈Pj{
∑
e∈E(p) ηp(e)l(e) +
∑
e∈Eν(p) ϕ(j, e)}. In other words, z(j) is equal to the
shortest path length in Pj regarding the per-link length function ς(ε) = l(ε) + ϕ(j, ε)
for ε ∈ Eext, where l(ε) = l(proto(ε)), and ϕ(j, ε) = ϕ(j, proto(ε)), respectively.
Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 help us refine the dual program into a more concise form, remov-
ing variables z(j). Define D(l, ϕ) =
∑
e∈E bel(e)+
∑
Cj∈C
∑
e∈Eν rjϕ(j, e) (the dual ob-
jective function), and α(l, ϕ) =
∑
Cj∈C Bjδj(l, ϕ), where δj(l, ϕ) = minp∈Pj{
∑
ε∈p ς(ε)}
is the shortest path length in Pj under length function ς . The dual problem is equiva-
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lent to finding length functions l and ϕ that minimize D(l, ϕ)/α(l, ϕ):
min
l,ϕ≥0
D(l, ϕ)
α(l, ϕ)
. (2.3)
2.5.2 Primal-Dual Algorithm
Our approximation scheme is based on a similar design as in [35], [38]. The
intuitive is to greedily push flow along the dual-shortest feasible path for each TC,
meanwhile updating the lengths such that the length of each prototype increases
exponentially in the amount of its constraint violation. After a number of rounds, the
flow is distributed approximately evenly in the network. By scaling the final flow with
the bounded link lengths, we obtain a feasible solution that approximates the optimal.
The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.1.
Lines 1–2 of Algorithm 2.1 initialize the length of each prototype, where γ is
a value to be determined in Section 2.5.4. Pj and L denote the paths used by Cj
and the bandwidth allocation over all paths respectively, both initialized to empty.
After constructing the routing graph, we initialize the lengths of all extended links
the same as their prototypes. The algorithm proceeds in phases (Lines 6–19), each
phase consisting of |C| iterations (Lines 8–18). In the j-th iteration in each phase,
the algorithm pushes Bj units of flow for TC Tj, which is done in steps (Lines 10–
17). In each step, the algorithm finds the shortest feasible path p˜ for TC Tj under
length function ς, and pushes φ units of flow through p˜, where φ is defined by
the residual flow demand B′j, the bottleneck capacity mine∈E(p˜){be/ηp˜(e)}, and the
reliability requirement rj, whichever is the smallest. Since p˜ may pass through the
same prototype for multiple times, the capacity be of each e ∈ E(p) is divided by
ηp˜(e), the number of times that it appears in p˜. After updating Pj, L(p) and B′j,
30
Algorithm 2.1: Primal-Dual Algorithm for OQRTS
Input: Topology G, TCs C, tolerance ω
Output: Scaling ratio ξ, path sets {Pj}, bandwidth L
1 Initialize l(e)← γ/be for ∀e ∈ E ;
2 Initialize ϕ(j, e)← γ/rj for ∀Cj ∈ C, e ∈ Eν , and ϕ(j, e)← 0 for
∀Cj ∈ C, e ∈ E \ Eν ;
3 Initialize Pj ← ∅, L ← ∅;
4 Construct the routing graph Gext, and let l(ε)← l(e), ϕ(j, ε)← ϕ(j, e) and
cε = ce for ∀ε ∈ Eext, e = proto(ε);
5 ρ← 0;
6 while D(l, ϕ) < 1 do
7 ρ← ρ+ 1;
8 for each TC Cj ∈ C do
9 B′j ← Bj;
10 while B′j > 0 do
11 p˜← arg min
p∈Pj
{∑
ε∈p
ς(ε)};
12 φ← min{B′j, min
e∈E(p˜)
{ be
ηp˜(e)
}, rj};
13 Pj ← Pj ∪ {p˜};
14 L(p˜)← L(p˜) + φ, B′j ← B′j − φ;
15 l(e)← l(e)(1 +  · φηp˜(e)
be
) ∀e ∈ E(p˜), and l(ε)← l(e) for ∀ε ∈ Eext(e);
16 ϕ(j, e)← ϕ(j, e)(1 +  φ
rj
) ∀e ∈ Eν(p˜), and ϕ(j, ε)← ϕ(j, e) for
∀ε ∈ Eext(e);
17 end
18 end
19 end
20 ξ ← (ρ− 1)/ log1+ 1/γ;
21 L(p)← L(p)/ log1+ 1/γ for ∀Cj ∈ C, p ∈ Pj;
22 return (ξ, {Pj},L).
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the algorithm updates the per-prototype lengths l(e) and the per-TC per-function
instance lengths ϕ(j, e), in Line 15–16. The value of  is also to be determined in
Section 2.5.4. The lengths of all extended links in the routing graph are then updated
to reflect the change of lengths of their prototypes. Note that the resulting flow may
exceed the capacity of each prototype. However, as we will show in Section 2.5.4,
scaling the flow on each link by log1+ 1/γ yields a feasible solution.
2.5.3 Approximating Shortest Feasible Paths
Algorithm 2.1 relies on finding the shortest feasible path for each TC under length
function ς. However, since the feasible path set of each TC only contains delay-
bounded paths, this task is non-trivial. In fact, finding the shortest delay-bounded
path is known as the Delay Constrained Least Cost path (DCLC) problem, which is
also NP-hard [139]. Nevertheless, there exist FPTASs for the DCLC problem, which
output a path within (1 + ω′) of the shortest delay-bounded path [75], [139]. In the
next subsection, we will show that for the purpose of our algorithm, it is sufficient to
find a (1 + ω′)-approximate ς-shortest path with strictly bounded delay.
2.5.4 Algorithm Analysis
Theorem 2.2. Given G, C and ω, let ω′ =  = ω
4
, and γ =
(
1−(1+ω′)
|E|+|Eν ||C|
) 1+(1+ω′)
(1+ω′) , then
Algorithm 2.1 outputs a feasible solution that is within (1− ω) times of the optimal
solution, if the dual optimal objective value ∆ ≥ 1.
Proof. We prove by bounding the primal-dual ratio for the solutions derived in the
algorithm. The basic idea is that the primal value increases linearly with the flow
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pushed in each phase, but each link’s dual lengths increase exponentially with the
flow through it. After a polynomial number of phases, the primal-dual ratio is then
within the desired bound.
We first define some notations. For any symbol υ (including l, ϕ, φ, p˜), we use
υsρ,τ to denote its value after phase-ρ, iteration-τ , and step-s of the algorithm, υρ,τ
to denote its value after phase-ρ and iteration-τ , and υρ to denote its value after
phase-ρ. For symbols in the form of υ(l, ϕ) (including D,α, δj), we use υsρ,τ to denote
υ(lsρ,τ , ϕ
s
ρ,τ ), and similarly υρ,τ and υρ. We then have
Dsρ,τ ≤
∑
e∈E
bel
s−1
ρ,τ (e) +
∑
Cj∈C
∑
e∈Eν
rjϕ
s−1
ρ,τ (j, e)
+ φsρ,τ (1 + ω
′) · δs−1j,ρ,τ
≤ Ds−1ρ,τ + φsρ,τ (1 + ω′) · δsj,ρ,τ ,
where j = τ due to that in iteration-τ of each phase we only consider TC Cj = Cτ ;
the first inequality is because path p˜ found in each step is a (1 + ω′)-approximation
of the shortest feasible routing path; the second inequality is due to that shortest
feasible path length is monotonically non-decreasing. Summing up the flow pushed in
all steps of iteration-τ where we push Bj flow in total, we have
Dρ,τ ≤ Dρ,τ−1 + Bj(1 + ω′) · δj,ρ,τ ,
and hence
Dρ ≤ Dρ−1 + (1 + ω′)
∑|C|
j=1
Bj · δj,ρ
≤ Dρ−1 + (1 + ω′)αρ.
Let the optimal dual solution be ∆ = min
l,ϕ≥0
{D(l,ϕ)
α(l,ϕ)
}, we know that Dρ
αρ
≥ ∆. Since
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we assume that ∆ ≥ 1, we have
Dρ ≤ Dρ−1
1− (1+ω′)
∆
≤ D0(
1− (1+ω′)
∆
)ρ
≤ D0
1− (1 + ω′)e
(ρ−1)(1+ω′)
∆(1−(1+ω′)) ,
where the initial objective D0 = (|E|+ |Eν ||C|)γ due to the initial value of l(e) and
φ(j, e). The last inequality is due to (1+x) ≤ ex, where x = (1+ω′)
∆−(1+ω′) in the inequality.
Now, assume the algorithm stops at phase ρ∗, hence Dρ∗ ≥ 1 yet Dρ∗−1 < 1.
Taking it into the above inequality, we have
∆
(ρ∗ − 1) ≤
(1 + ω′)
(1− (1 + ω′)) ln 1−(1+ω′)
(|E|+|Eν ||C|)γ
.
On the other hand, by the way we update lengths l(e) and ϕ(j, e) at Lines 15–
16, each dual variable has its value increased by at least (1 + ) times when the
corresponding primal constraint is filled for once, i.e., when the flow through prototype
e ∈ E increases by be, or when the flow for TC Cj through a function instance
e ∈ Eν increases by rj, respectively. Since Dρ∗−1 < 1, we have lρ∗−1(e) < 1/be and
ϕρ∗−1(j, e) < 1/rj. Therefore, the flow after phase (ρ∗ − 1) scaled by 1/ log1+ 1/γ is
strictly feasible, which means the final scaling ratio ξ = (ρ∗− 1)/ log1+ 1/γ is feasible.
The primal-dual ratio is then bounded by
ξ
∆
≥
(1− (1 + ω′)) · ln 1−(1+ω′)
(|E|+|Eν ||C|)γ
(1 + ω′) · log1+ 1γ
.
Given the selection of , ω′ and γ, we have ξ
∆
≥ 1− ω.
For time complexity, we define O∗(f) = O(f logO(1)(L)), where f is a function of
the input size, and L is the number of values in the input (independent of each value’s
magnitude).
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Theorem 2.3. The worst-case time complexity of Algorithm 2.1 is O∗( ∆
ω3
|V ||E|(|E|+
|Eν ||C|)κ2max), where κmax = maxj{κj} is the maximum service chain length of any
TC.
Proof. As above, we have ξ
∗
∆
> ξ
∆
≥ (ρ∗−1)
∆ log1+ 1/γ
. By strong duality of linear
programming, we have ξ
∗
∆
= 1. Therefore, the number of phases is bounded
by ρ∗ ≤ d∆ log1+ 1/γe. The number of iterations is |C| times the number of
phases. In each iteration, every but the last step increases the length of at
least one l(e) or φ(j, e) by (1 + ) times, hence the number of steps exceeds the
number of iterations by at most (|E| + |Eν ||C|) log1+ 1+γ . Thus totally there are
O∗( ∆
ω2
(|C|+ |E|+ |Eν ||C|)) = O∗( ∆ω2 (|E|+ |Eν ||C|)) steps by the choices of , ω′ and
γ. Each step incurs one approximate shortest feasible path computation, which
by Xue et al. [139] is computed in O(|V extj ||Eextj |( 1ω′ + log log log |V extj |)) time in
each TC’s routing graph Gextj . Both the node set and the link set are bounded by
|V extj | = O(|V | ·κmax) and |Eextj | = O(|E| ·κmax) respectively. The theorem follows.
2.5.5 Feasibility and Demand Scaling
Theorem 2.2 relies on two facts: 1) the QRTS instance has a non-zero feasible
solution, and 2) the optimal dual objective value ∆ ≥ 1. On the other hand, the time
complexity of Algorithm 2.1 is proportional to ∆, hence it should not be too large. In
practice, these conditions may not be satisfied. Below we propose methods to tackle
these issues.
Feasibility Checking: We first propose a method to check instance feasibility.
Observe that as long as there is at least one feasible routing path p ∈ Pj for any TC
Cj ∈ C, the problem instance has a non-zero optimal objective value, as a multi-TC
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flow with 0 < ξ ≤ minj rjBj always exists. Therefore, as a feasibility check before
running the algorithm, we first run a shortest path algorithm (regarding link delays)
for each TC on the routing graph. If any TC Cj has the shortest path with delay
larger than its delay bound Dj, we return that no feasible solution exists; otherwise,
we proceed to the next step.
Demand scaling: The next step is to ensure ∆ ≥ 1; otherwise the algorithm may
not achieve the desired bound. Note that we can scale the demands of all TCs by
a common factor in order to scale ξ∗, and equivalently ∆. Hence if we can derive a
lower bound on ξ∗, we can scale all demands such that ∆ ≥ 1.
Following the method proposed by Garg and Könemann [38] and later on improved
by Fleischer [35], we derive both a pair of lower and upper bounds on ∆, by finding
the feasible routing path with maximum per-prototype capacity, denoted by p∗j , for
each TC Cj, using a binary search on the per-prototype capacity. Given a capacity
threshold b > 0, the computation first prunes all prototypes with capacity less
than b, and then find a delay-shortest path in the remaining graph; if the path
delay is bounded by Dj, we increase the threshold b; otherwise we decrease b. As
there are at most |E| distinct capacity values, the binary search takes O(log(|E|))
shortest path computations. The time complexity of finding paths for all TCs
is O(|C| log(|E|)(|E| + |V | log(|V |κmax))κmax) if the Dijkstra’s algorithm is used for
shortest path computations. When |C| is large, this can be further reduced by
computing a single round of all-pair shortest paths on the pruned original graph for
each of the binary search iterations, and then utilize the auxiliary graph in [13] to
compute the paths for all TCs.
Let bj = mine∈E(p˜j){be} be the bottleneck prototype capacity of path p∗j . Since a
flow can saturate all prototypes at its maximum, an upper bound on the single-TC
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flow value is given by |E|min{bj, rj}, taking into account the reliability requirement
of each TC. Hence an upper bound of the optimal objective value ∆ is given by
∆ = minCj∈C{b¯j/Bj}. On the other hand, given the bottleneck prototype capacity
bj, a flow that only contains path p∗j and assigns bj/(κj + 1) bandwidth to the path,
is feasible for the TC itself, as a prototype can be used for at most κj + 1 times.
Since there are |C| TCs sharing the network, bj = min{bj/(κj + 1)|C|, rj} yields a
lower bound on the throughput received by Cj . Hence a lower bound of ∆ is given by
∆ = minCj∈C{bj/Bj}.
Given these bounds, we can scale all TCs’ demands by a factor of ∆ (thus ∆ by
a factor of 1/∆), which ensures that the scaled dual optimal objective value ∆ ≥ 1.
But now ∆ can be as large as ∆˜ = ∆/∆. We then use the same technique as in [38]:
if Algorithm 2.1 does not terminate after d2 log1+ 1/γe phases, then we know that
∆ ≥ 2. In this case, we double all demands Bj (thus halving the optimal solution ∆),
and re-run Algorithm 2.1. Given the upper bound on ∆, this takes O(log(∆˜)) rounds
of demand scaling.
Combined with Theorem 2.3, we have our main theorem:
Theorem 2.4. Algorithm 2.1 (combined with feasibility checking and demand scaling)
produces a (1−ω)-approximation in time O∗( 1
ω3
|V ||E|(|E|+ |Eν ||C|)κ2max + |C||E|κmax),
and hence is an FPTAS for OQRTS.
Proof. To compute the initial bounds, it takesO(|C| log(|E|)(|E|+|V | log |V |)κmax log(κmax|V |))
time. By the values of ∆ and ∆, we have ∆˜ ≤ |E||C|κmax. Hence the number of
demand scaling rounds is O(log(|E||C|κmax)). Each round consists of at most
d2 log1+ 1/γe phases in Algorithm 2.1. By Theorem 2.3, each round runs in
O∗( 1
ω3
|V ||E|(|E| + |Eν ||C|)κ2max) time. Combining the above and omitting the
logarithm terms, the final time complexity follows.
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2.5.6 Extension to Multiple QoS Requirements
Our proposed model and algorithm can be extended to incorporate other QoS
requirements than delay, such as jitter, packet drop rate, etc. In general, assume each
TC considers up to Q additive QoS parameters. We can simply replace the DCLC
FPTAS in Section 2.5.3 with a Multi-Constrained Path (MCP) FPTAS [139]. The
resulting algorithm is able to enforce one QoS requirement strictly, while approximating
the other Q− 1 requirements within a factor of (1 + ω′), as shown in [139].
2.6 Performance Evaluation
2.6.1 Experiment Settings
We implemented the following algorithms for comparison:
• PDA: Our primal-dual FPTAS (Algorithm 2.1). The accuracy parameter ω = 0.5
by default. PDA has two variants, PDA-ND and PDA-NR, denoting the algorithms
without delay and reliability requirements respectively.
• OND: An optimal algorithm for solving the OQRTS problem without considera-
tion of TC delay constraints, obtained by solving an edge-flow multi-commodity
flow LP. This yields an upper bound on the optimal solution.
• MPBDH: A flow-based heuristic which first computes a (delay-agnostic) maxi-
mum concurrent flow for all TCs, and then keeps finding feasible (delay-bounded)
paths for each TC until no feasible path is left; extended from [85].
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• SP: A baseline heuristic that decides the traffic scaling ratio based on shortest-
path routing for each TC. As SP is a single-path routing algorithm, its solution
can never exceed the minimum reliability ratio of any TC.
We randomly generated networks for evaluation. Topologies were generated based
on the Waxman model [32]. By default, the network had 20 nodes. The network
offered 10 types of service functions, each having 3 instances randomly deployed on
nodes. Each instance had a random capacity within [50, 100] Mbps, and a random
delay within [3, 30] ms. Connectivity parameters were set as α = β = 0.6 in the
Waxman model. Each link had a random capacity within [10, 100] Mbps, and a random
delay within [1, 10] ms. In each experiment, we generated 20 TCs with random sources
and destinations. Each TC had a random service chain with length within [1, 5], a
bandwidth demand within [3, 30] Mbps, a delay bound within [125, 250] ms, and a
reliability requirement within [0.35, 0.65] of its bandwidth demand. The above were
the default parameters. In each set of experiments, we varied one control parameter
for evaluation under different scenarios.
Two metrics were used to evaluate each algorithm. The traffic scaling ratio (ob-
jective function value) evaluates the algorithm’s performance. The average running
time evaluates the algorithm’s overhead for producing the result.
We developed a C++-based simulator implementing all the above algorithms.
For OND and MPBDH, we used the Gurobi optimizer [48] to solve the LPs. Each
experiment was conducted on a Ubuntu Linux PC with Quad-Core 3.4GHz CPU and
16GB memory. Experiments were repeated for 20 times under the same settings to
average out random noises. Each experiment was repeated for 20 times under the
same setting, and results were averaged over all runs.
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2.6.2 Evaluation Results
2.6.2.1 Comparison with theoretical upper bound
Fig. 2.2 shows the comparison between PDA and OND. Note that the error bars
show the 95% confidence intervals around the mean. Since OND is delay-agnostic,
its optimal value yields an upper bound on the optimal value of OQRTS. As shown
in Fig. 2.2(a), the solution produced by PDA is extremely close to the upper bound
produced by OND, much higher than the theoretical guarantee (1− ω). Also, though
the solution degrades with looser accuracy parameter ω, the degradation is minor. The
observed optimality gap is within 1%. The running time of PDA, shown in Fig. 2.2(b),
is decreasing polynomially to 1/ω. In conclusion, a loose accuracy parameter ω, such
as no less than 0.5, is typically sufficient for practical use.
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Figure 2.2: Comparison with upper bound, with varying accuracy.
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Figure 2.3: Traffic scaling ratio with varying delay bounds, reliability requirements,
number of nodes, and connectivity parameters.
2.6.2.2 Comparison with baseline heuristics
Figs. 2.3 and 2.4 show the comparison of PDA (including PDA-ND or PDA-NR)
with the two baselines, MPBDH and SP, under various scenarios.
Figs. 2.3(a) and 2.4(a) show the objective values and running times respectively
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Figure 2.4: Running time with varying delay bounds, reliability requirements, number
of nodes, and connectivity parameters.
with varying TC delay bounds. With increasing delay bounds, both PDA and MPBDH
achieve better traffic scaling ratio. SP has consistent performance with varying delay
bounds as it only considers the shortest path. However, PDA outperforms both
heuristics drastically, with an average improvement of 5.9× compared to MPBDH and
7.9× compared to SP. The enhanced performance indeed comes with increased time
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complexity, as shown in Fig. 2.4(a). The delay bounds have limited impact on time
complexity in Fig. 2.4(a). Finally, comparing PDA and PDA-ND, the delay constraints
lead to both degraded throughput and much larger time complexity, the latter due to
the computation of a delay constrained least cost path instead of a simple shortest
path.
Figs. 2.3(b) and 2.4(b) show the objective values and running times respectively
with varying TC reliability parameter (the average ratio of maximum tolerable loss
over bandwidth demand). Increased tolerable loss results in increased traffic scaling
ratio in general, due to more bandwidth available to each TC’s traffic at each service
function instance. PDA again outperforms both heuristics in terms of throughput, with
an average improvement of 6.1× and 8.5× compared to MPBDH and SP respectively.
Comparing PDA and PDA-NR, the latter has a better throughput due to the relaxation
of the reliability requirements, and a lower time complexity due to the less number of
constraints (thus the number of dual variables) when reliability is not considered.
Figs. 2.3(c) and 2.4(c) show experiments with varying number of nodes in the
network. Increasing number of nodes leads to increased traffic scaling ratios. However,
after a certain threshold, the scaling ratio derived by PDA saturates. This is because
the number of instances of each service function remains the same, and hence the
the scaling ratios are constrained by the reliability requirements instead of the link
capacities when the number of nodes become large. The throughput achieved by PDA
surpasses MPBDH and SP significantly, with an average improvement of 3.7× and
8.2× compared to MPBDH and SP respectively. The running times increase with the
number of nodes, due to the increased number of links.
Figs. 2.3(d) and 2.4(d) show experiments with varying network connectivity, which
is controlled by parameters α and β in the Waxman model. Increased connectivity
43
leads to increased throughput. Comparisons among algorithms are similar to the
above. On average, PDA outperforms MPBDH and SP by 6.5× and 5.4×, respectively.
MPBDH performs worse than SP, again due to the increased bandwidth on infeasible
paths. The running times increase with network connectivity, due to the increase in
both the problem size and the time for finding (approximate) shortest feasible paths.
To summarize, our findings are as follows:
• Our algorithm achieves near-optimal solutions even when the accuracy parameter
is relatively loose. In general, the optimality gap is within 1%. Thus a loosely
selected accuracy parameter is sufficient for most practical uses.
• Our algorithm outperforms both baseline heuristics (MPBDH and SP) signifi-
cantly.
• The running time overhead of our algorithm is acceptable in practice, as network
planning typically happens in much longer periods, for example, once per several
hours.
2.7 Conclusions
In this study, we studied the QoS-aware and Reliable Traffic Steering problem
for service function chaining in mobile networks. We formulated the problem in a
software-defined approach, considering various requirements of different classes of
traffic, including service chaining, QoS, reliability, and type-of-transmission constraints.
The problem, along with its optimization version, was proved to be NP-hard. We
then proposed an FPTAS for the optimization problem, which produces a (1 − ω)-
approximate solution within time polynomial to the input size and 1/ω. We evaluated
our algorithm through extensive simulation experiments, which validated that our
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algorithm has near-optimal performance, and achieves much better throughput than
the baseline heuristics.
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Chapter 3
PROVISIONING QOS-AWARE AND ROBUST APPLICATIONS IN
INTERNET-OF-THINGS: A NETWORK PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Introduction
Designed to connect the digital world and the real world, the Internet-of-Things
(IoT) has been recognized as one of the enabling technologies of the next era of
computing. Numerous applications have been developed utilizing IoT functionalities,
enabling advances in a number of areas including smart cities, smart health, connected
cars, etc. It has been anticipated that the global IoT market will exceed $250B by
2020 [56].
One common type of IoT application is real-time processing applications, which
process continuous data streams generated by IoT devices for pre-processing or
analysis. These applications commonly have more stringent quality-of-service (QoS)
requirements than traditional applications, including delay, throughput, etc., in order
to ensure on-time delivery and analysis of real-time data and hence fast response
to the users. An example is real-time sports analysis applications [44], [122], which
analyze the status of live sports games, based on real-time data from cameras and/or
other sensors.
Unfortunately, current IoT infrastructures are not built specifically for real-time
processing applications. Current infrastructures use cloud computing as the underlying
computing support. While cloud computing offers abundant and inexpensive com-
puting power, it suffers from long end-to-end delay and high bandwidth usage, which
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greatly affect the performance of real-time processing applications. This situation is
further aggravated by commonly used communication technologies in IoT, such as
cellular networks and/or low-power wide-area networks (LPWANs), which offer only
limited bandwidth for transmission.
Fog computing is one of the emerging technologies aiming to address these issues
in current IoT. With fog nodes deployed near the IoT devices and end users, fog
computing can reduce both the propagational delay and the bandwidth usage. However,
ubiquitous fog node deployment is still unrealistic within the near future due to cost
issues. Combined with the limited capacity of the IoT networks, this raises the problem
of resource allocation in fog-enabled IoT. In particular, an infrastructure needs to
allocate computing and network resources to support each application with proper
QoS guarantees.
In this study, we study this problem from a network perspective, extending from
our previous conference version [151]. Given a real-time processing IoT application,
the infrastructure needs to decide both the fog node to host this application, and the
channels along which the application’s data streams will be transmitted. The channels
must satisfy the QoS requirement of the application, including both the bandwidth
demand of each data source, and the delay bound of the application. Compared to
our conference version [151], we further consider the robustness requirement of each
data source: how could the application survive an arbitrary network failure. We
propose a robustness technique where given an arbitrary network failure, either a
link, a network node or a host node, the data loss incurred on each data stream is
bounded by a portion of the total data. This, combined with existing error correction
coding schemes [25], can achieve lossless data transmission and processing for IoT
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applications, which is crucial for many critical application scenarios such as emergency
handling.
Two types of applications are considered in this study. A parallelizable application
is one that can be deployed as multiple distributed instances, possibly with certain data
restrictions. A non-parallelizable application is one that must be centrally implemented
on one host node. We further consider two provisioning scenarios: single-application
provisioning, and multi-application provisioning. Combining the two types with the
two provisioning scenarios, we have four versions of the provisioning problem. We
formally define these problems, and prove that they are all NP-hard. We then propose
fully polynomial-time approximation schemes (FPTASs) for three of the four versions,
and a randomized algorithm for the last one. To validate our algorithms, we have
conducted extensive simulations, comparing our proposed algorithms both to the
theoretical upper bound and to several heuristic solutions. It has been shown that our
algorithms achieve close-to-optimal performance, and largely outperform the heuristics
in terms of both bandwidth and delay.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the problem of IoT
application provisioning with both QoS and robustness requirements.
• We formulate four versions of the provisioning problem, and proved all of them
to be NP-hard.
• We propose FPTASs for three of the four versions, and a randomized algorithm
for the last one.
• We use extensive simulations to evaluate the performance of our algorithms
against both the theoretical bound and several practical heuristics.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we introduce
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background and related work. In Section 3.3, we present our system model. In
Section 3.4, we formally define the four provisioning problems we study, and present
their complexity result. In Sections 3.5 and 3.6, we propose our algorithms for
single application provisioning and multi-application provisioning, respectively. In
Section 3.7, we present our performance evaluation results. In Section 3.8, we conclude
this study.
3.2 Background and Related Work
3.2.1 Internet-of-Things and Fog Computing
While the concept of the “Internet-of-Things” can trace back to the last century2,
its power has barely been unleashed until recently, when several enabling technologies,
including wireless networks, cloud computing, and data science, have witnessed drastic
advances. Since then, extensive efforts have been put into IoT-related areas, including
computing architectures [11], communications [122], radio-frequency identification
(RFID) [19], etc. A survey on IoT can be found in [73].
Fog computing has been regarded as one of the key technologies that enable
IoT [11]. Extending from cloud computing, fog computing deploys geographically
distributed fog nodes in the edge network, providing computing power closer to both
the IoT devices and end users. Fog computing can improve the performance and
energy efficiency in many IoT applications, including crowdsensing [7], smart cities [41],
etc.
The limited resources in IoT and fog have urged efforts on new resource allo-
1The term dates back to a talk by Kevin Ashton in 1999 [73].
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cation methods. Zeng et al. [155] studied task scheduling and data placement to
minimize I/O time, computing time and transmission delay in fog platforms. Many
have studied workload oﬄoading in edge/fog-cloud systems with different objectives,
including power consumption [28], [136], delay minimization [28], [120], [123], quality-
of-experience [136], etc. However, most of these do not consider the complex structure
and limited capacity of the edge network; while Deng et al. [28] indeed considered
network bandwidth constraints, they assumed that the transmission of each appli-
cation’s data will not interfere with each other, which does not capture the sharing
nature of the IoT networks, and hence does not apply in many cases. Due to lack of
existing work on network resource allocation in fog-enabled IoT, we study application
provisioning from a network perspective, where we aim to guarantee the QoS of
applications in terms of both transmission delay and bandwidth.
3.2.2 Network Service Provisioning
Stepping out of the IoT and fog computing domain, some related resource
allocation problems have also been studied in different contexts, such as virtual
network/infrastructure embedding (VNE/VIE) [21] and service function chaining
(SFC) [70], [109]. The VNE/VIE problems aim to find an embedding of a virtual
service topology onto the physical topology, which respects resource capacities in the
substrate. The difference is that VIE allows virtual node consolidation while VNE
does not. While these two problems can be viewed as a generalization of ours, they
are harder to solve. To the best of our knowledge, there has yet been any non-trivial
approximation ratio for VNE/VIE on general graphs. Assumptions on topologies
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and/or service models help in providing performance bounds [162], but are commonly
too restrictive to handle the complex structures of the IoT networks.
SFC is another special case of the general VNE/VIE problems, where the virtual
topology is restricted to line graphs. In this case, certain approximation bounds can
be obtained, as shown by Rost et al. [109] and Kuo et al. [70]. In this study, we
consider a different service model than SFC, where the virtual topologies are star
graphs. We also propose solutions with non-trivial performance guarantees.
3.2.3 Robustness Applications and Networks
Robustness of computing and network services has long been studied in the
literature. There are commonly two approaches for building and/or maintaining robust
services. One is to provide fault resilience through redundancy, i.e., provisioning
redundant resources (computing, path, bandwidth, etc.) as backups to quickly recover
a service when failure happens. For example, restoration based routing, bandwidth
allocation and network embedding have been studied in [58], [101], [137], [138]. Similar
approaches have also been used for service, application and virtual machine backups,
such as [10], [63], [142], [146], [154]. Due to the need for redundancy, this approach
commonly results in excessively reserved backup resources that remain idle during
normal operations.
The second approach is to rather leverage the fault tolerance of the services
themselves, and to minimize either the fault probability or the fault impact incurred on
the services. Zhang et al. [157] modeled the fault probability of a virtual infrastructure
based on the availability of all its physical components, and sought to minimize
this probability during the embedding. Acharya et al. [1], Zhang et al. [158] and
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Yallouz et al. [140] explored bounding the impact of a failure on the overall throughput
of the system. This was termed tunable survivability in [140]. This idea was further
leveraged in [141] and [153]. Compared to the redundancy-based approach, this
approach results in much less resource consumption, yet providing reasonably good
protection in practice. We therefore take this approach in our study, specifically due
to the already scarce resources in the IoT environment.
3.3 System Model
3.3.1 Infrastructure Model
The IoT infrastructure is modeled as a directed graph G = (V , E), where V is
the node set, and E is the link set. The node set consists of both facility nodes
(general-purpose servers, fog-enabled switches/routers, etc.) and network nodes
(switches/routers). We use F ⊆ V to denote the set of facility nodes, and N ⊆ V to
denote the set of network nodes. Note that these two sets are not necessarily disjoint,
as some network nodes may also have computing capabilities [22]. Each link e ∈ E
has a capacity, denoted by ce > 0, and a transmission delay, denoted by de > 0. For
simplicity, we use Ev to denote all links adjacent to node v ∈ V , regardless of direction.
3.3.2 Application Model
An application receives continuous data from one or more data sources, and per-
forms joint analysis of all received data. We assume each source generates data in a
constant rate, e.g., a video camera generating video footages. Given the application,
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the infrastructure needs to both find a facility node to host it, and establish trans-
mission channels from each source to the host. Each application may require certain
hardware resources, e.g., video processing commonly requires strong GPU for efficient
computation. Hence in many cases, only a subset of the facility nodes can host an
application. The established channels need to satisfy at least two QoS requirements:
1) each source should receive bandwidth that meets its data generation rate, and 2)
the transmission delay of each channel should be within the delay tolerance of the
application.
Formally, an IoT application is denoted by a triple, Γ = (S,B, D), where S ⊆ V
denotes the set of data sources of Γ, B = {Bs ∈ R+ | s ∈ S} denotes the corresponding
data generation rate of each data source in S (R+ is the set of positive real numbers),
and D > 0 is the delay bound that must be enforced for transmission from each data
source. Given an application Γ, we further use FΓ ⊆ F to denote its candidate host
set, where each v ∈ FΓ satisfies the hardware requirement of Γ.
3.3.3 Basic Provisioning Model
As aforementioned, application provisioning involves both finding the host node and
data routing. Before defining the provisioning problems, we first make the following
definitions.
Definition 3.1 (Feasible path set). Given network G and an application Γ, let v ∈ FΓ
be a candidate host of Γ and s ∈ S be a data source of Γ, the feasible path set of Γ
regarding v and s, denoted by PΓv,s, is defined as the subset of all (s, v)-paths in G such
that for each path p ∈ PΓv,s, ∑
e∈p
de ≤ D. (3.1)
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We use PΓv =
⋃
s∈S PΓv,s to denote the feasible path set from all data sources of Γ to
candidate host v, and PΓ = ⋃v∈FΓ PΓv the feasible path set towards all candidate hosts
of Γ.
Definition 3.2 (Bandwidth allocation). Let P be an arbitrary set of paths in G. A
bandwidth allocation of P is defined as a mapping L : P 7→ R∗ (R∗ denotes the set of
nonnegative real numbers), where L(p) denotes the bandwidth allocated on path p for
any p ∈ P . We say that a bandwidth allocation L is feasible, iff for any link e ∈ E,∑
p∈P :e∈p
L(p) ≤ ce. (3.2)
We use b(P ) =
∑
p∈P L(p) to denote the aggregate bandwidth of L over path set P .
Before defining the expected outcome of application provisioning, we first dis-
tinguish between two types of applications. A non-parallelizable application has no
parallelism capability, hence its logic must be centrally implemented on exactly one
facility node. On the contrary, a parallelizable application can have its logic split
over multiple distributed instances, with each instance processing a portion of the
incoming data. However, implementing parallelism may require certain data splitting
restrictions to be enforced during provisioning, such as data synchronization among
data sources. An example of a parallelizable application is stateless sensor data
fusion [30], where each instance can process an arbitrary portion of the incoming data
as long as the same portion is received synchronously from every data source. We
formalize the provisioning of these two types of applications in the following.
Definition 3.3 (Provisioning scheme). Given network G and an application Γ, a
provisioning scheme is defined as a triple Π = (x, P Γx ,LΓx), where x = {xv | v ∈ F} is a
decision variable vector with xv denoting the fraction of data incoming to an instance
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of Γ on candidate host v, P Γx ⊆ PΓ is a subset of feasible paths of Γ towards each
candidate host v ∈ F with xv > 0, and LΓx is a feasible bandwidth allocation of P Γx .
We say that a provisioning scheme Π is feasible iff
1.
∑
v∈F xv = 1,
2. for ∀v ∈ F , if Γ is non-parallelizable, then xv ∈ {0, 1}, otherwise xv ∈ [0, 1],
and
3. for ∀s ∈ S and ∀v ∈ F , the aggregate bandwidth b(P Γv,s) ≥ B(s) · xv, where
P Γv,s = P
Γ
x ∪ PΓv,s is the subset of selected paths from s to v.
The last requirement of feasibility in Definition 3.3 ensures that the same portion
of data generated by all data sources are received at the same instance, which can be
used to enforce data synchronization for applications such as stateless sensor fusion.
For simplicity, we assume that the processing results are consumed locally at the
application host. However, it is trivial to add channels that transmit the results, and
hence is omitted for simplicity.
3.3.4 Robustness Model
Robustness refers to the ability of an application to provide uninterrupted service
when facing different types of failures in the physical infrastructure. Some failures
have inevitable effects in service quality, such as failures at data sources; some other
failures, however, can be avoided or at least alleviated by proper load and redundancy
management. In this study, we focus on tackling failures that can be alleviated,
including both link failures and node failures.
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As stated before, instead of using a traditional “all-or-nothing” protection, we use a
“soft” mechanism for robustness [153], [158], which ensures that each application incurs
only bounded data loss due to an arbitrary single failure in the network. Specifically,
each data source s ∈ S has a reliability parameter rs ∈ (0, 1], which denotes the
maximum tolerable data loss ratio for correct processing of the data from source s.
The idea is to ensure that the load is properly distributed such that the application
incurs no more than rs · Bs data loss from s due to any single link or node failure.
We call this approach robustness through load balancing. This can be coupled with a
proper application- or network-level coding technique [25] to achieve loss-resistance in
failure scenarios.
Given the above, we can extend Definition 3.3 to incorporate robustness. We start
with the definition of a link-robust provisioning scheme, which protects against a single
link failure:
Definition 3.4 (Link-robust provisioning scheme). Given network G and an appli-
cation Γ, a link-robust provisioning scheme is a provisioning scheme Π for Γ that
satisfies: for ∀s ∈ S and ∀e ∈ E, ∑p∈PΓx :e∈p L(p) ≤ rs ·Bs.
The idea behind Definition 3.5 is that the data loss for data source s due to a
single link failure is essentially bounded by the amount of data transmitted on all
paths through link e. Similarly, we can define a node-robust provisioning scheme:
Definition 3.5 (Node-robust provisioning scheme). Given network G and an appli-
cation Γ, a node-robust provisioning scheme is a provisioning scheme Π for Γ that
satisfies: for ∀s ∈ S and ∀u ∈ V \ {s}, ∑p∈PΓx :u∈p L(p) ≤ rs ·Bs.
The source node s of each data stream is excluded from the protection, as failure
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of the source node will cause full blockage of data transmission, and hence cannot be
alleviated through load balancing.
Before diving into the concrete problem definition, we want to highlight the
different robustness capabilities of the two types of applications. Note that node-
robustness is more difficult to achieve than link-robustness, as the former automatically
guarantees the latter. For a non-parallelizable application, only link-robustness can
be achieved. This is because a non-parallelizable application requires that its logic
to be centrally implemented, which becomes a single point of failure. In this case,
protection over node failures must be implemented in the form of redundancy rather
than load balancing, and hence is out of the scope of this study. On the other
hand, a parallelizable application can achieve node-robustness, due to its capability of
balancing load across multiple instances. In the following of this study, we use the term
“robust” to denote node-robustness for parallelizable applications, and link-robustness
for non-parallelizable applications, depending on the context. It should be noted
that rs = 1 means no protection for data source s, hence the problem we study is a
generalization of the problem studied in [151].
3.3.5 Notations
We define the following notations to facilitate illustration. V = |V| is the number
of nodes. E = |E| is the number of links. FΓ = |FΓ| is the number of candidate hosts
for application Γ, and F = |F| is the total number of facility nodes. SΓ = |SΓ| is the
number of data sources for application Γ, and S =
∑
Γ∈Γ SΓ is the total number of
data sources for a set of applications Γ.
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3.4 Problem Statement and Complexity
We separately consider the provisioning for the two types of applications: par-
allelizable and non-parallelizable. As stated before, we consider two provisioning
scenarios. In the first scenario, we consider the provisioning of a single application at a
time, which can be applied, for example, when processing arriving application requests
in an online manner. In the second scenario, we consider the joint provisioning of
multiple applications (of the same type) at the same time. This can be useful both
for batch provisioning of queued application requests, and for provisioning multiple
inter-related application components. Combining the two types of applications with
the two provisioning scenarios, we arrive at four versions of the provisioning problem,
which are formally defined in the following.
Definition 3.6 (SAP). Given network G and an application Γ, the Single-
Application Provisioning (SAP) problem is to find a feasible and robust pro-
visioning scheme Π for Γ.
Its optimization version, named O-SAP, is to find a robust provisioning scheme Π,
such that for every data source s ∈ S, its aggregate bandwidth satisfies b(P Γx,s) ≥ λ·B(s),
and the traffic scaling ratio λ is maximized.
We use P-SAP/PO-SAP to denote the corresponding problem with a parallelizable
application and node-robustness, and N-SAP/NO-SAP to denote the corresponding
problem with a non-parallelizable application and link-robustness.
Definition 3.7 (MAP). Given network G and an application set Γ = {Γ1, . . . ,ΓK},
the Multi-Application Provisioning (MAP) problem is to find a set of feasible
and robust provisioning schemes Π = {Π1, . . . ,ΠK}, where Πk = (xk, Pk,Lk) is the
provisioning scheme for Γk for k = 1, . . . , K, such that the shared capacity constraint
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is satisfied for any link e ∈ E:
∑K
k=1
∑
p∈Pk
Lk(p) ≤ ce.
Its optimization version, named O-MAP, is to find a set of robust provisioning
schemes Π for Γ, such that the minimum traffic scaling ratio λ of all applications, as
defined in Definition 3.6, is maximized.
We use Pk,s = Pk ∩PΓkxk,s to denote the subset of selected paths for data source s of
application Γk.
We use P-MAP/PO-MAP to denote the corresponding problem with parallelizable
applications and node-robustness, and N-MAP/NO-MAP to denote the corresponding
problem with non-parallelizable applications and link-robustness.
Theorem 3.1. All problems defined above are NP-hard.
Proof. Since SAP problems are special cases of the corresponding MAP problems,
it suffices to prove that P-SAP and N-SAP are NP-hard. Consider a special case
of either P-SAP or N-SAP where Γ has one data source s, one candidate host t,
and no protection (rs = 1). In this case, SAP becomes finding a set of (s, t)-paths
and a bandwidth allocation that satisfy the bandwidth demand B(s) and the delay
bound D. This turns out to be the Multi-Path routing with Bandwidth and Delay
constraints (MPBD) problem, which is NP-hard [85]. Hence SAP is NP-hard, and the
NP-hardness of the rest follows.
Due to the NP-hardness of the above problems, we seek to design approximation
schemes for the optimization problems, in order to provide as accurate judgements for
the decision problems as possible. In the following sections, we show that three over
four of the optimization problems admit FPTASs.
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3.5 Single-Application Provisioning
We start with the problem of provisioning one application at a time. Due to the
two types of applications, parallelizable or non-parallelizable, we have two versions
of this problem (PO-SAP and NO-SAP). In this section, we focus on the NO-SAP
problem, and propose an FPTAS. We leave the parallelizable case to Section 3.6,
where we propose an FPTAS for solving both PO-SAP and PO-MAP. In the rest of
this section, we omit the term “non-parallelizable” without ambiguity.
Our algorithm to NO-SAP is based on the decomposition of NO-SAP into two
subproblems: Host Designation (HD) that decides the host node of application Γ, and
Data Routing (DR) that decides the routing paths and bandwidth from each data
source to the host. For simplicity, we extend this decomposition method throughout
the rest of this study, with HD denoting determination of the decision vector x, and
DR denoting the routing process, i.e., determining P Γx and LΓx. For the NO-SAP
problem, the relationship between this problem and its DR subproblem is stated in
the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. If the DR subproblem admits a polynomial-time a-approximation algo-
rithm, so does NO-SAP.
Proof. We construct an a-approximation algorithm to NO-SAP (ANO-SAP) out of an
a-approximation algorithm to DR (ADR), as shown in Algorithm 3.1. The algorithm
iterates over all candidate hosts to find the best solution for the application, using
the a-approximation ADR. To prove Algorithm 3.1 is an a-approximation to NO-SAP,
let Π∗ = (x∗, P ∗,L∗) be an optimal solution to NO-SAP with objective value λ∗
and x∗v∗ = 1. Then (P ∗,L∗) is indeed a feasible solution of DR given host node v∗.
Let λ∗v∗ be the optimal DR solution with v∗, we have λ∗ ≤ λ∗v∗ . The DR solution
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Algorithm 3.1: Approximation Algorithm ANO-SAP
Input: Network G, application Γ
Output: Traffic scaling ratio λ, provisioning scheme Π
1 λ← 0, x← 0;
2 for each candidate host v ∈ FΓ do
3 (λv, P
Γ
v ,LΓv )← ADR(G,Γ, v);
4 if λv > λ then
5 λ← λv, x← 0, xv ← 1;
6 Π← (x, P Γv ,LΓv );
7 end
8 end
9 return (λ,Π).
picked in Algorithm 3.1 during iteration v∗, denoted by (P Γv∗ ,LΓv∗), has scaling ratio
λv∗ ≥ aλ∗v∗ ≥ aλ∗. This leads to λ ≥ λv∗ ≥ aλ∗. The lemma follows.
It remains to solve the DR subproblem, which is still NP-hard due to the same
argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Yet, the DR subproblem turns out to be
a special case of the Maximum Concurrent Flow (MCF) problem with delay bound
and robustness requirement. It is not hard to see that this is a special case of the
QoS-aware and Reliable Traffic Steering (QRTS) problem studied in [153], for which
an FPTAS exists. Combining the FPTAS proposed in [153] with Lemma 3.1 leads to
our final theorem for NO-SAP:
Theorem 3.2. NO-SAP admits an FPTAS, as shown in Algorithm 3.1 combined
with the FPTAS in [153].
3.6 Multi-Application Provisioning
In this section, we study the more general problem where multiple applications
seek to share the IoT infrastructure. Again, the problem has two versions, one for
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parallelizable applications (PO-MAP), and one for non-parallelizable applications
(NO-MAP). Note that PO-MAP is a generalization of PO-SAP, hence an FPTAS to
the former automatically yields an FPTAS to the latter. However, we do not have an
FPTAS for NO-MAP. We thus propose a randomized algorithm at the end of this
section.
3.6.1 Problem Formulation for PO-MAP
Below, we first give an exact formulation of PO-MAP. For simplicity, we use k to
denote Γk if no ambiguity is introduced. We use P =
⋃K
k=1Pk to denote the set of
all feasible paths of all applications3. We further use Pks ⊆ P to denote all feasible
paths for application k’s data source s. For consistency of notation, we define variable
x(k, v)
∆
= xkv as the fraction of application k hosted on candidate host v ∈ Fk, variable
L(p) to denote the bandwidth allocation on path p ∈ P, and variable λ still as the
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traffic scaling ratio. Then NO-MAP is formulated as follows:
max λ (3.3a)
s.t.
∑
p∈Pkv,s
L(p) ≥ Bks · λ · x(k, v), ∀k, v ∈ Fk, s; (3.3b)
∑
v∈Fk
x(k, v) = 1, ∀k; (3.3c)
∑
p∈P:e∈p
L(p) ≤ ce, ∀e ∈ E ; (3.3d)
∑
p∈Pks :u∈p\{s}
L(p) ≤ rks ·Bks , ∀k, s, u ∈ V \ {s}; (3.3e)
x(k, v) ∈ [0, 1],L(p), λ ≥ 0, ∀k, v ∈ Fk, p. (3.3f)
Explanation: Constraint (3.3b) couples bandwidth allocation with the demands,
the host designation, and the scaling ratio. Constraint (3.3c) ensures that each
application is hosted on exactly one node. Constraint (3.3d) enforces link capacities.
Constraint (3.3e) enforces the node-robustness requirement, such that the throughput
over each node u ∈ V \ {s} is bounded by rks · Bks for each data source s of each
application k.
Program (3.3) seems like a Quadratic Program (QP) due to Constraint (3.3b).
However, with a simple transformation shown below, it can be transformed into an
3W.l.o.g., if two applications have an overlapping feasible routing path, we still regard the same
path for two different applications as two different paths.
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equivalent Linear Program (LP). Define new variables y(k, v) = λ · x(k, v), we have
max λ (3.4a)
s.t.
∑
p∈Pkv,s
L(p) ≥ Bks · y(k, v), ∀k, v ∈ Fk, s; (3.4b)
∑
v∈Fk
y(k, v) ≥ λ, ∀k; (3.4c)
∑
p∈P:e∈p
L(p) ≤ ce, ∀e ∈ E ; (3.4d)
∑
p∈Pks :u∈p
L(p) ≤ rks ·Bks , ∀k, s, u ∈ V \ {s}; (3.4e)
y(k, v),L(p), λ ≥ 0, ∀k, v ∈ Fk, p. (3.4f)
It is easy to observe that Programs (3.3) and (3.4) are equivalent. However,
Program (3.4) may still have an exponential size due to the possibly exponential
number of feasible paths in a graph, and hence it cannot be solved directly using
standard LP techniques. Therefore, we next propose an FPTAS.
3.6.2 An FPTAS to PO-MAP
Our FPTAS to PO-MAP extends the ones to MCF reported in [12], [35], [38].
However, PO-MAP is more difficult than the above, due to the need for (fractional)
host designation as well as the node-robustness constraint. We first write the dual of
Program (3.4), where we define z(k, v, s) ≥ 0 as the dual variable of Constraint (3.4b)
for ∀k, v ∈ Fk, s ∈ Sk, ϕ(k) ≥ 0 as the dual variable of Constraint (3.4c) for ∀k, l(e)
as the dual variable of Constraint (3.4d) for ∀e ∈ E , and σ(k, s, u) as the dual variable
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of Constraint (3.4e) for ∀k, s ∈ Sk, u ∈ V \ {s}:
min ∆(l, σ) =
∑
e∈E
cel(e) +
K∑
k=1
∑
s∈Sk
u6=s∑
u∈V
rks ·Bks · σ(k, s, u) (3.5a)
s.t.
∑
e∈p
l(e)+
∑
w∈p
σ(k, s, w)≥z(k, v, s), ∀k, v, s, p ∈ Pkv,s; (3.5b)
∑
s∈Sk
Bks · z(k, v, s) ≥ ϕ(k), ∀k, v; (3.5c)
K∑
k=1
ϕ(k) ≥ 1; (3.5d)
z(k, v, s), ϕ(k), l(e) ≥ 0, ∀k, v, s, e. (3.5e)
Since the primal and dual are intrinsically different from the above references, we
provide our full analysis for completeness of this study, starting from the observations
below:
Lemma 3.2. Constraint (3.5b) is binding, i.e., equality holds instead of inequality
at optimality, for at least one combination of k, v, s, p, where k = 1 . . . K, v ∈ Fk, s ∈
Sk, p ∈ Pkv,s.
Lemma 3.3. Constraint (3.5d) is binding.
Lemma 3.4. For ∀k, Constraint (3.5c) is binding for at least one candidate host
v ∈ Fk.
Lemma 3.5. For ∀k,∀v ∈ Fk,∀s ∈ Sk, Constraint (3.5b) is binding for at least one
feasible routing path p ∈ Pkv,s.
Proof. Let ε be an arbitrarily small positive amount. If Lemma 3.2 is false, Con-
straint (3.5b) is not binding for every combination of k, v, s, p. Then we can reduce the
value of l(e) for an arbitrary e where l(e) > 0 by ε, and obtain a feasible dual solution
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with a strictly smaller objective value, contradicting our optimality assumption. If
Lemma 3.3 is false, then we can reduce the value of ϕ(k) for every k by ε. This will
make every Constraint (3.5c) unbinding. Then we can reduce the value of z(k, v, s)
for every combination of k, v, s, which makes every Constraint (3.5b) to be unbinding,
contradicting Lemma 3.2. If Lemma 3.4 is false for some k, then we can increase the
value of ϕ(k) by ε, which makes Constraint (3.5d) unbinding, contradicting Lemma 3.3.
If Lemma 3.5 is false for some combination of k, v, s, then we can increase the value
of z(k, v, s) by ε, which makes Constraint (3.5c) unbinding for the corresponding
k, contradicting Lemma 3.4. Therefore, we conclude that Lemmas 3.2–3.5 are all
true.
Based on Lemmas 3.2–3.5, we have the following facts.
1. At optimality, z(k, v, s) = minp∈Pkv,s{
∑
e∈p l(e) +
∑
u∈p\{s} σ(k, s, u)}, i.e.,
z(k, v, s) equals the shortest feasible routing path length in Pkv,s regarding
length functions l(·) for links and σ(k, s, ·) for nodes;
2. At optimality, ϕ(k) = minv∈Fk{
∑
s∈Sk B
k
s z(k, v, s)}, i.e., ϕ(k) equals the mini-
mum (over all possible candidate hosts v ∈ Fk) weighted (by Bks ) sum (over all
sources s ∈ Sk) of shortest feasible routing path lengths in Pk regarding length
functions l and σ.
Let ζk,v,s(l, σ) = min
p∈Pkv,s
{∑e∈p l(e) +∑u∈p\{s} σ(k, s, u)} be the shortest path length
in Pkv,s regarding length functions l and σ, and ψk(l, σ) = minv∈Fk{
∑
s∈Sk B
k
s ζk,v,s(l, σ)}
be the minimum weighted sum of shortest path lengths of all data sources of k over
any candidate host v. Further define α(l, σ) =
∑K
k=1 ψk(l, σ). Then, Program (3.5) is
equivalent to minl,σ≥0 ∆(l, σ)/α(l, σ), i.e., finding l and σ minimizing ∆(l, σ)/α(l, σ).
Our FPTAS to PO-MAP is presented in Algorithm 3.2. A bold symbol denotes
a vector of normal symbols hereafter. In the process, the algorithm keeps track of
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Algorithm 3.2: Approximation Scheme APO-MAP
Input: Network G, application set Γ, tolerance ω
Output: Scaling ratio λ, decisions y = {y(k, v)}k,v, path sets P = {P kv,s}k,v,s,
bandwidth allocation L
1 Initialize  = ω′ = ω
4
, γ =
(
1+(1+ω′)
E+(V−1)S
)1+ 1
(1+ω′) , l(e) = γ
ce
for ∀e ∈ E ,
σ(k, s, u) = γ
rksB
k
s
for ∀k, s, u ∈ V \ {s}, P kv,s = ∅ for ∀k, v, s, L = ∅;
2 ρ← 0;
3 while ∆(l, σ) < 1 do // phase
4 ρ← ρ+ 1;
5 for k = 1 . . . K do // iteration
6 η ← 1.0;
7 while η > 0 do // step
8 (p˜,φ, v˜, η˜)← PrimUpdt(G,Γ, k, l, σ, ω′);
9 if η˜ > η then
10 φ← ηφ/η˜; η˜ ← η;
11 end
12 y(k, v)← y(k, v) + η˜; η ← η − η˜;
13 for s ∈ Sk do
14 P kv,s ← P kv,s ∪ {p˜s};
15 L(p˜s)← L(p˜s) + φs;
16 end
17 l(e)← l(e)(1 + φe
ce
) for ∀e ∈ Ep˜, where Ep˜ =
⋃
s∈Sk p˜s, and
φe =
∑
s∈Sk:e∈p˜s φs;
18 σ(k, s, u)← σ(k, s, u)(1 + φu
rksB
k
s
) for ∀s ∈ Sk, u ∈ Vp˜ \ {s}, where
Vp˜ =
⋃
s∈Sk{v ∈ p˜s}, and φu =
∑
s∈Sk:u∈p˜s\{s} φs;
19 end
20 end
21 end
22 Scale L and y after phase ρ− 1 by 1/ log1+ 1/γ;
23 λ← (ρ− 1)/ log1+ 1/γ;
24 return (λ,y,P,L).
both a primal solution, denoted by variables (y,L) (note that λ can be computed
based on L), and a dual solution, denoted by the length functions (l, σ) (note that
both variables z and ϕ can be computed based on l and σ). Both solutions will be
gradually updated. Initially, each link e’s dual length is initialized to γ/ce, and each
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Algorithm 3.3: Algorithm PrimUpdt(G,Γ, k, l, σ, ω′)
Input: Network G, application set Γ, index k, length functions l and σ,
tolerance ω′
Output: Paths p˜ = (p˜s)Ts∈Sk , bandwidth φ = (φs)
T
s∈Sk , selected node v˜,
fraction of flow η˜
// path computation
1 for ∀v ∈ Fk do
2 for ∀s ∈ Sk do
3 p˜v,s ← arg min
p∈Pkv,s
{∑
e∈p
l(e) +
∑
u∈p\{s}
σ(k, s, u)};
4 end
5 end
6 v˜ ← arg minv∈Fk{
∑
s∈Sk B
k
s ζk,v,s(l, σ)};
7 p˜s ← p˜v˜,s for ∀s ∈ Sk;
// bandwidth allocation
8 Υe ← 0 for ∀e ∈ E ;
9 Υs,u ← 0 for ∀s ∈ Sk, u ∈ V \ {s};
10 for ∀s ∈ Sk do
11 for link ∀e ∈ p˜s do
12 Υe ← Υe +Bks ;
13 end
14 for node ∀u ∈ p˜s \ {s} do
15 Υs,u ← Υs,u +Bks ;
16 end
17 end
18 Υ1max ← maxe∈E{Υe/ce};
19 Υ2max ← maxs∈Sk,u∈V\{s}{Υs,u/rksBks };
20 η˜ ← 1/max{Υ1max,Υ2max}, φs ← Bks · η˜ for ∀s;
21 return (p˜,φ, v˜, η˜).
node u’s dual length (regarding application k’s data source s) is initialized to γ/rksBks .
The algorithm runs in phases (Lines 3–21), in each phase going through an iteration
for each application k (Lines 5–20). In each iteration, the algorithm tries to push
exactly Bks amount of flow for each data source s of application k. This is done in
steps (Lines 7–19), where in each step, we push the same fraction of flow (η˜) to the
same candidate host (v˜) from all data sources. This ensures that when we update the
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primal solution, the increment in variable y(k, v) is proportional to the flow pushed
to v from any data source s ∈ Sk, thus satisfying both Constraints (3.4b) and (3.4c).
This is achieved by first calling the PrimUpdt subroutine to get a feasible primal
update, denoted by (p˜,φ, v˜, η˜), and then updating the primal solution in Lines 9–16.
After primal update, the algorithm then updates the dual lengths l(e) based on the
bandwidth φe pushed along each link e, in Line 17; it also updates σ(k, s, u) based
on the bandwidth at each node, in Line 18. It stops when ∆(l, σ) ≥ 1, after which it
then scales the obtained flows to enforce the link capacity constraints in Lines 22–23.
A key building block is the PrimUpdt subroutine, which produces a primal update
for application k that will be incorporated into the current primal solution. Its
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 3.3. It starts from finding the dual-shortest feasible
path from every data source s ∈ Sk to every candidate host v ∈ Fk, denoted as p˜v,s.
The candidate host v˜ corresponding to the minimum value ψk(l) is picked, along with
the corresponding paths to v˜, denoted as p˜. Next, it derives a bandwidth allocation,
such that 1) each data source s’s bandwidth (φs) is proportional to its demand Bks ,
2) total bandwidth on every link e does not exceed e’s capacity ce, 3) the robustness
requirement is also satisfied at each node u for each application’s each data source,
and 4) the minimum ratio (η˜) between any source’s bandwidth and its demand is
maximized. This is done in Lines 8–20 of Algorithm 3.3. Node v˜, paths p˜ and
bandwidth allocation φ are then returned along with the resulting scaling ratio η˜.
PrimUpdt relies on finding the dual-shortest feasible routing paths, as in Line 12.
However, this task itself is non-trivial, as it is equivalent to the Delay Constrained
Least Cost path (DCLC) problem, which itself is NP-hard. Nevertheless, there exist
FPTASs for DCLC [139], which can output a (1 + ω′)-approximation of the dual-
shortest feasible path within time polynomial to the input size and 1/ω′. Combined
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with the selection of , ω′ and γ, we can prove that such an approximation is sufficient
for obtaining our desired performance guarantee. The performance of APO-MAP is
summarized in Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.3. Given G, Γ, and ω ∈ (0, 1), APO-MAP (with Line 3 of the PrimUpdt
subroutine replaced by a DCLC FPTAS) can compute a (1− ω)-approximation of the
optimal PO-MAP solution, within time polynomial to both the input size and 1/ω, and
hence is an FPTAS to PO-MAP.
Proof. We first prove the approximation ratio of APO-MAP, and then prove its time
complexity.
Part I (Approximation Ratio): We first assume the optimal primal objective
λ∗ ≥ 1; this assumption will be removed later on. Due to the strong duality of
LP, the optimal dual objective ∆∗ is equal to λ∗. Let (ρ, k, τ) denote step τ of
iteration k of phase ρ in the algorithm. Given a symbol used in the algorithm,
ν ∈ {l, σ, ζk,v,s, ψk, α,∆, φs, v˜, p˜s}k,v,s,e, we use νρ,k,τ , νρ,k and νρ to denote the corre-
sponding values in/after the corresponding step, iteration and phase, respectively. We
also use ν to denote ν(l, σ) if no ambiguity is introduced.
Based on the primal-dual updates, we have the following:
∆ρ,k,τ =
∑
e∈E
cel
ρ,k,τ−1(e) + 
∑
s∈Sk
φρ,k,τs
∑
e∈p˜ρ,k,τs
lρ,k,τ−1(e)
+ 
∑
s∈Sk
φρ,k,τs
∑
u∈p˜ρ,k,τs \{s}
σρ,k,τ−1(k, s, u)
≤ ∆ρ,k,τ−1 + (1 + ω′)
∑
s∈Sk
φρ,k,τs ζ
ρ,k,τ
k,v˜ρ,k,τ ,s
,
due to that each path p˜ρ,k,τs is a (1 + ω′)-approximation of the dual-shortest feasible
(s, v˜ρ,k,τ )-path, and the dual-shortest feasible path lengths are non-decreasing during
the algorithm.
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As in each iteration k, we push exactly Bks flow for ∀s ∈ Sk, we have the following
by summing up for all steps:
∆ρ,k ≤ ∆ρ,k−1 + (1 + ω′) min
v∈Fk
∑
s∈Sk
Bks ζ
ρ,k
k,v,s
≤ ∆ρ,k−1 + (1 + ω′)ψρ,kk .
Summing up for all applications (iterations), we then have:
∆ρ ≤ ∆ρ−1 + (1 + ω′)αρ.
Since we know that ∆ρ
αρ
≥ ∆∗ ≥ 1, we further have:
∆ρ ≤ ∆
ρ−1
1− (1+ω′)
∆∗
≤ ∆
0(
1− (1+ω′)
∆∗
)ρ
≤ ∆
0
(1− (1 + ω′)) exp
(
(ρ− 1)(1 + ω′)
∆∗(1− (1 + ω′))
)
,
where the last inequality is due to that (1 + x) ≤ exp(x).
The initial dual objective value is ∆0 = (E + (V − 1)S)γ given the initial l and
σ. Let ρ∗ be the last phase before the algorithm stops. We know that ∆ρ∗ ≥ 1 and
∆ρ
∗−1 < 1. Then we can bound the optimal dual objective value ∆∗ as follows:
∆∗ ≤ (ρ
∗ − 1) · (1 + ω′)
(1− (1 + ω′)) ln 1−(1+ω′)
(E+(V−1)S)γ
.
To bound the optimal primal objective value λ∗, first observe that each primal
update only increases the bandwidth on each link e by at most ce, and the bandwidth
at each node u by rksBks for application k’s data source s. Therefore, when the
flow through a link e increases by exactly ce, its dual length l(e) is increased by
at least (1 + ) times, due to the dual update in Line 17; similarly, when the flow
of (k, s) through a node u increases by rksBks , the node’s dual length σ(k, s, u) is
increased by at least (1 + ) times, due to the dual update in Line 18. Now, as
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∆ρ
∗−1 < 1, we have lρ∗−1(e) < 1/ce for ∀e ∈ E , and σρ∗−1(k, s, u) < 1/rksBks for ∀k, s, u.
Therefore, the final flow after phase ρ∗− 1 scaled by a factor of 1/ log1+ 1/γ is strictly
feasible. Since in each phase we push exactly Bks flow for each data stream, the scaling
ratio after ρ∗ − 1 phases is exactly ρ∗ − 1. Scaled by 1/ log1+ 1/γ, the scaling ratio
λ = (ρ∗ − 1)/ log1+ 1/γ is strictly feasible.
Based on these, the primal-dual ratio is bounded as follows:
λ
∆∗
≥ (1− (1 + ω
′)) · ln 1−(1+ω′)
mγ
(1 + ω′) · log1+ 1γ
.
Given our selection of , ω′ and γ, we have λ
∆∗ ≥ 1− ω.
It remains to remove our assumption that λ∗ ≥ 1. Based on [38], if we can obtain
a pair of bounds (λLB, λUB) such that λ∗ ∈ [λLB, λUB], then we can guarantee λ∗ ≥ 1
by scaling all demands by 1/λLB. Following [35], we use a path-based method to
find λLB and λUB. For each data stream (k, s), we use a binary search to find a
maximum-capacity feasible routing path p¯kv,s to each candidate host v ∈ Fk. Given v,
the search sets a threshold β, and then finds a shortest (s, v)-path (w.r.t. delay) in
Gβ, a subgraph of G that has all links in {e : ce < β} pruned. If the path has delay
no more than Dk, β is increased; otherwise it is decreased. Let b¯kv,s = mine∈p¯kv,s{ce}
be the capacity of p¯kv,s, and λ¯kv = mins∈Sk{b¯kv,s/Bks , rks}. For each k, we then select
candidate host v¯k = arg maxv∈Fk{λ¯kv}, and let λ¯k = λ¯kv¯k . Then, our upper bound is
λUB = Emink{λ¯k}, as each flow can be decomposed into up to E paths, with no
contention among each other. A lower bound is λLB = mink{λ¯k}/S, by scaling using
the maximum number of competing flows.
Part II (Time Complexity): For simplicity, we define notation O∗(f) =
O(f logO(1) L), where f is a function of the input size L. Based on [35], [38], the number
of phases is bounded by ρ∗ ≤ d∆∗ log1+ 1γ e = O∗(∆
∗
ω2
), each with K iterations, and the
total number of steps is bounded by (E+(V −1)S) log1+ 1+γ = O∗((E+(V −1)S)∆
∗
ω2
)
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plus the total number of iterations. Each step incurs one PrimUpdt call, which both
finds (approximate) dual-shortest feasible paths for every (v, s) pair, and allocates
bandwidth. According to Xue et al. [139], each path is found in O∗( 1
ω′V E) time.
Bandwidth allocation in PrimUpdt takes O(SV ) time, as each path consists of at
most V − 1 links. Combining the above, the time complexity of APO-MAP is given by
O∗(∆
∗
ω3
SFV E(E + (V − 1)S +K)).
To remove the dependency on ∆∗, we employ the demand scaling technique in [38].
If the algorithm does not stop after d2 log1+ 1γ e phases, we know that ∆∗ ≥ 2. We then
double all demands, hence halving ∆∗, and then re-run Algorithm 3.2. Now, we have
∆∗ ∈ [1, SE] after the initial scaling in Part I. Hence at most O(log2(SE)) demand
scaling rounds are needed to bring ∆∗ within [1, 2], each spending O∗( 1
ω3
SFV E(E+K))
time. Omitting the logarithm terms, the final complexity is O∗( 1
ω3
SFV E(E + (V −
1)S +K)) combined with the initial scaling. The theorem follows.
3.6.3 NO-MAP Formulation and Randomized Algorithm
We now turn to the NO-MAP problem, which is the hardest among the four
provisioning problems. Though the hardness of NO-MAP follows from that of NO-
SAP, there are O(FK) possible HD solutions in the worst case for NO-MAP, instead
of the linear number in NO-SAP. This prevents us from iterating over all possible
HD combinations as in the last section. Below, we first give an exact formulation of
NO-MAP. Similar as in the previous subsections, we define x(k, v) ∈ {0, 1} as the
indicator of whether an application k is hosted on node v ∈ Fk, L(p) ≥ 0 as the
bandwidth allocation on p ∈ P , and λ ≥ 0 as the traffic scaling ratio. Then NO-MAP
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is formulated as follows:
max λ (3.6a)
s.t.
∑
p∈Pkv,s
L(p) ≥ Bs · λ · x(k, v), ∀k, v, s; (3.6b)
∑
v∈Fk
x(k, v) = 1, ∀k; (3.6c)
∑
p∈P:e∈p
L(p) ≤ ce, ∀e ∈ E ; (3.6d)
∑
p∈Pks :e∈p
L(p) ≤ rks ·Bks , ∀k, s, e ∈ E ; (3.6e)
x(k, v) ∈ {0, 1},L(p), λ ≥ 0, ∀k, v, p. (3.6f)
Explanation: Program (3.6) basically has the same form as Program (3.3). The
only exception is Constraint (3.6e), which enforces the link-robustness requirement for
each link e instead of the node-robustness for each node u. This is because NO-MAP
cannot support node-robustness: its final selected host is always a single point of
failure when the host node fails.
Due to binary variables x(k, v) and Constraint (3.6b), Program (3.6) is a Mixed
Integer Quadratic Program (MIQP), which is generally hard to solve. However, by
relaxing the integer constraints on variables x(k, v), we arrive at an QP that has almost
the same structure as Program (3.3). We can then apply the same transformation as
from Program (3.3) to Program (3.4), which also generates an LP, in other words, the
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linear relaxation of Program (3.6). The linear relaxation is written as follows:
max λ (3.7a)
s.t.
∑
p∈Pkv,s
L(p) ≥ Bs · y(k, v), ∀k, v, s; (3.7b)
∑
v∈Fk
y(k, v) ≥ λ, ∀k; (3.7c)
∑
p∈P:e∈p
L(p) ≤ ce, ∀e ∈ E ; (3.7d)
∑
p∈Pks :e∈p
L(p) ≤ rks ·Bks , ∀k, s, e ∈ E ; (3.7e)
y(k, v),L(p), λ ≥ 0, ∀k, v, p. (3.7f)
Due to the similar structure of Program (3.7) and Program (3.4), we can basically
adopt the same method as in Algorithms 3.2 and 3.3 to obtain an FPTAS to Pro-
gram (3.7), for which the details are omitted. Based on the FPTAS, we then propose
a randomized algorithm to NO-MAP, as shown in Algorithm 3.4. It starts by solving
Program (3.7) using a modified version of Algorithm 3.3. With the fractional solution,
it then randomly selects a host v ∈ Fk with probability equal to y˜(k, v) (normalized
y(k, v)) for each application. After that, it solves the original NO-MAP program with
fixed hosts v = {vk}k to ensure solution feasibility. This turns out to be a trivial
generalization of the DR subproblem of NO-SAP, and hence can be solved using the
FPTAS in [153].
The time complexity of Algorithm 3.4 is dominated by the complexity of the
FPTAS to PO-MAP and the FPTAS for solving the DR subproblem with fixed HD.
Therefore, it also runs in time polynomial to the input size and 1
ω
. Unfortunately, the
randomized algorithm does not have a constant approximation ratio. Non-constant
performance bound can be obtained via conventional stochastic theorems such as the
75
Algorithm 3.4: Randomized Algorithm ANO-MAP
Input: Network G, application set Γ, tolerance ω
Output: Scaling ratio λ, host selections v, path sets P, bandwidth allocation
L
1 (λ,y,P ,L)← APO-MAP(G,Γ, ω);
2 for k = 1 to K do
3 y˜(k, v)← y(k, v)/∑v∈Fk y(k, v) for ∀v ∈ Fk;
4 Select v ∈ Fk with probability y˜(k, v) as vk;
5 end
6 Solve NO-MAP (Program (3.6)) with fixed HD solution v = {vk}k, with
accuracy ω;
7 return (λ, {vk}k, {P ks }k,s,L).
Chernoff bound. Such a result, however, is far from providing a realistic performance
bound that could be useful in practical settings. We thus omit the theoretical analysis
of Algorithm 3.4 for sake of simplicity.
3.7 Performance Evaluation
3.7.1 Experiment Settings
We used randomly generated topologies and applications for performance evalua-
tion. The random topologies were generated using the Waxman model [130]. Each
random topology has 20 nodes, where 20% of all nodes were randomly selected as
facility nodes. Links were created using parameters α and β in the Waxman model,
where α = β = 0.6. Link capacities were randomly generated in [10, 100] Mbps, and
delays were randomly generated in [1, 10] ms. In each experiment, we generated 5
IoT applications. An application had [3, 10] data streams, each from a different data
source. Application delay bounds were randomly generated in [15, 25] ms. For each
data stream, its bandwidth demand were randomly generated in [1, 25] Mbps. The
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default robustness (maximum tolerable data loss ratio) was 0.5 for all data streams.
We set accuracy ω = 0.5 for the approximation algorithms. Above were the default
parameters. We varied one control parameter in each set of experiments in order for
evaluation under various scenarios.
SAP Our SAP algorithm. For parallelizable appli-
cations, this is our FPTAS to PO-MAP (Algo-
rithm 3.2). For non-parallelizable applications,
this is our FPTAS to NO-SAP (Algorithm 3.1).
MAP Our MAP algorithm. For parallelizable appli-
cations, this is our FPTAS to PO-MAP (Algo-
rithm 3.2). For non-parallelizable applications,
this is our randomized algorithm to NO-MAP
(Algorithm 3.4).
ODA Optimal Delay-Agnostic algorithm. For paralleliz-
able applications, this directly solves an edge-
flow multi-commodity flow (MCF) LP. For non-
parallelizable applications, this attempts all com-
binations of application HD, and for each combi-
nation solves an edge-flow MCF LP that neglects
applications’ delay bounds. ODA yields an upper
bound on the optimal delay-bounded solution.
NS (HD) Nearest Selection HD heuristic. For each appli-
cation, this selects the host with minimum maxi-
mum delay from all data sources.
RS (HD) Random Selection HD heuristic. For each appli-
cation, a random candidate host is selected that
is within the delay bound from every data source.
GH (DR) Greedy Heuristic for DR. This works in rounds
where in each round, the delay-shortest path
with positive capacity is found for every data
stream, and then bandwidth allocation is done as
in Lines 8–20 of Algorithm 3.3; it stops when any
data stream’s shortest path exceeds the applica-
tion’s delay bound.
DA (DR) Delay-Agnostic optimal DR solution. An edge-
flow MCF LP, which neglects application delay
bounds, is solved. This yields an upper bound on
DR.
Table 3.1: Implemented Algorithms
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Our comparison algorithms are shown in Table 3.1. Note that we proposed
algorithms to solve HD and DR both jointly (SAP, MAP, ODA) and separately (NS
and RS for HD, and GH and DA for DR). In the experiments, we further decomposed
the entire MAP algorithm (Algorithm 3.4 for the non-parallelizable case) into its
subroutines for solving HD (Lines 1–5) and DR (Line 6) respectively. Each combination
of HD and DR algorithms was denoted by {HD}+{DR}, e.g., NS+GH uses NS for
HD and GH for DR.
We used the following metrics in performance evaluation. Traffic scaling ratio is the
optimization objective λ, which is the minimum ratio between the allocated bandwidth
and the demand of every data stream. Maximum delay ratio is the average ratio
between the maximum transmission delay received by any application and its delay
bound. Running time is the average running time of an algorithm in an experiment.
We developed a C++-based simulator which implements all the above algorithms.
The Gurobi optimizer [48] was used to solve the LPs. Experiments were conducted
on a Ubuntu Linux PC with Quad-Core 3.4GHz CPU and 16GB memory. Each
experiment was repeated for 50 times under the same setting, and results were taken
as the average over all runs.
3.7.2 Evaluation Results
3.7.2.1 Single-Application Scenario
We use our single application experiments to show 1) that our algorithms are
close-to-optimal through comparison with the theoretical upper bound (ODA), 2)
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Figure 3.1: Single application: objective value against accuracy parameter ω.
the impact of robustness on the provisioning performance, and 3) the impact of
parallelizability on our algorithms. The results are shown in Figs. 3.1–3.4. Note that
for a single parallelizable application, SAP and MAP are essentially the same algorithm
(Algorithm 3.2), and hence they have exactly the same performance.
Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 show the experiments in four combination scenarios: parallelizable
application with robustness, non-parallelizable application with robustness, paral-
lelizable application without robustness, and non-parallelizable application without
robustness. First, we can see that our SAP FPTASs (MAP in Figs. 3.1(a) and 3.1(c)
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Figure 3.2: Single application: running time vs. accuracy parameter ω.
and SAP in Figs. 3.1(b) and 3.1(d)) achieve objective values extremely close to the
upper bound ODA, much greater than their theoretical performance bounds ((1− ω)
times the optimal). In Figs. 3.1(b) and 3.1(d), the MAP randomized algorithm
achieves slightly worse performance than the FPTASs, yet its performance is still
pretty close to ODA and even higher than (1− ω) times the optimal (although this is
not theoretically guaranteed). On the other hand, we can observe that with decreasing
accuracy parameter ω, little changes can be observed on the objective value, while
great reduction in running time can be observed in Figs. 3.2(a)–3.2(d). This shows
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Figure 3.3: Single application: objective value vs. robustness parameter (maximum
tolerable loss ratio).
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Figure 3.4: Single application: running time vs. robustness parameter (maximum
tolerable loss ratio).
that the proved theoretical bounds are pretty conservative in practice. An empirical
setting of ω ≥ 0.5 can be used in practice to achieve close-to-optimal performance
with reasonable computational overhead.
Comparing Figs. 3.1(a) and 3.1(c) (and similarly Figs. 3.1(b) and 3.1(d)), we can
observe the impact of robustness. Enforcing robustness clearly reduces the objective
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value by great amounts. This shows that in practice, applications with robustness
requirements can find it much harder to get accommodated when the system has
limited resources. Looking at Fig. 3.2, running time increases when robustness is
removed, which is due to that the complexity depends on the objective value, matching
our previous analysis. Note that we did not use the polynomial-time demand scaling
technique in our experiments, in order to better present this correlation.
Comparing Figs. 3.1(a) and 3.1(b), we can see the impact of parallelizability when
robustness is enforced. Both ODA and SAP show that parallelizability reduces the
objective value. This is because with parallelizability, the applications were able to
enjoy the more strict node-robustness, while without parallelizability, the applications
can only achieve link-robustness; clearly the former consumes more resources, as it
guarantees the latter while providing additional protection. On the contrary, when
robustness is not enforced, we see the opposite comparison in Figs. 3.1(c) and 3.1(d).
Applications with parallelizability achieve better scaling ratios than those without.
This is because without the restriction of robustness, the parallelizable problem is now
an LP relaxation of the non-parallelizable problem, and hence the former represents an
upper bound on the latter. Looking at the running times in Figs. 3.2(a) and 3.2(b), the
time for the non-parallelizable case approximately doubles that for the parallelizable
case. This is because in the non-parallelizable case, the same formulation is solved for
two times, one for HD and one for DR; in the parallelizable case, both HD and DR
can be solved in one round. Note that Algorithm 3.1 (SAP in Fig. 3.2(b)) is much
faster than both Algorithm 3.2 (SAP/MAP in Fig. 3.2(a)) and Algorithm 3.4 (MAP
in Fig. 3.2(b)), because Algorithm 3.1 solves a formulation that has fewer variables.
Figs. 3.2(c) and 3.2(d) show similar comparisons, and the reason why the running time
of MAP does not double in Fig. 3.2(d) is that the optimal objective value decreases
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greatly due to the non-parallelizability, and hence the running time of DR solving is
dominated by the time of HD solving.
We further show in Figs. 3.3 and 3.4 the impact of different robustness parameters
on the performance. With our formulation, the objective value should increase with
the tolerable loss ratio of each application when the resources are relatively abundant,
which is validated in Fig. 3.3. Figs. 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) show the same comparison
as in Figs. 3.1(a) and 3.1(b), i.e., parallelizable applications achieve worse scaling
ratios than non-parallelizable ones due to the enforcement of node-based instead of
link-based protection. The running time basically increases with increased objective
value due to the relaxation of robustness requirement (larger tolerable loss ratio).
3.7.2.2 Multi-Application Scenario
In the following experiments, we omitted the applications’ robustness requirements,
and focused on the non-parallelizable application case which is more common in
practice. Figs. 3.5 and 3.6 show experiment results for multi-application provisioning,
with varying number of nodes, connectivity, average bandwidth demand, and accuracy
ω. First, MAP outperforms both RS+GH and NS+GH in relatively large scales.
Specifically, MAP can serve up to 2× the traffic that can be served by RS+GH or
NS+GH in a majority of the experiments. The cost of its superior performance is its
higher running time. MAP is slower than ODA mainly because the latter does not
consider application delay bounds. Also, with more applications, the running time of
MAP will soon beat that of ODA, as the former is a polynomial-time algorithm, while
the latter’s time complexity is exponential to the number of applications. The shown
trends basically match our intuition, e.g., increased nodes or links lead to increased
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Figure 3.5: Multi-application: objective value vs. number of nodes, connectivity
(α, β), bandwidth demand, and accuracy (ω).
scaling ratios and running times, while larger bandwidth demands of the applications
lead to smaller scaling ratios. In Fig. 3.6(c), the running time of MAP decreases with
the scaling ratio. This matches their correlation described in the proof of Theorem 3.3.
This correlation can be removed by the demand scaling technique illustrated in the
proof. Finally, Figs. 3.5(d) and 3.6(d) show similar results as in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 for
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Figure 3.6: Multi-application: running time vs. number of nodes, connectivity (α, β),
bandwidth demand, and accuracy (ω).
MAP, where a looser accuracy parameter ω does not lead to noticeable performance
loss, but greatly reduces its running time.
The above experiments show the superior performance of our joint algorithm
MAP. In Figs. 3.7, we further analyze its performance for HD and DR separately,
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Figure 3.7: Multi-application: HD and DR with varying delay.
where we combined MAP’s subroutines with different heuristics respectively. Shown
in Fig. 3.7(a), delay-aware DR solutions (GH and MAP’s DR subroutine) achieve
better scaling ratios with larger delay bounds, while delay-agnostic solutions do not.
Comparing different HD algorithms, MAP’s HD subroutine still achieves much better
traffic scaling ratios than either NS or RS. Interestingly, RS outperforms NS, which is
because NS can lead to congestion when a host is significantly closer to most data
sources than the others. Comparing different DR algorithms, MAP’s DR subroutine
also outperforms GH. On the other hand, since given fixed HD, the DA algorithm
is optimal for delay-agnostic DR, we can see that MAP’s DR subroutine is near the
optimal when delay bounds are large. In Fig. 3.7(b), with MAP’s DR subroutine, the
maximum delay ratio is always bounded by but close to 1, meaning it utilizes paths
of various delays, yet strictly sticks to the application delay bounds. GH also respects
the delay bounds, yet it uses shorter paths, which leads to its low traffic scaling ratios
in Fig. 3.7(a). Both ODA and DA are delay-agnostic, hence they can result in delays
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more than 2× the bounds, violating application QoS requirements. In summary, the
superior performance of the MAP algorithm comes from the advantages of both its
HD and DR subroutines, compared to the heuristic algorithms.
3.8 Conclusions
In this study, we studied the provisioning of real-time processing applications in
IoT. For each application, we considered both the QoS and the robustness requirements.
We considered two types of applications: parallelizable and non-parallelizable. For
either type, we further studied both the provisioning of a single application, and the
joint provisioning of multiple applications. We proved all four versions of the problem
NP-hard. We then showed that three of the four versions admit FPTASs. For the
last version, we proposed a randomized algorithm. We validated the advantages of
our proposed algorithms over several heuristic solutions through extensive simulation
experiments.
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Chapter 4
LOAD BALANCING FOR INTERDEPENDENT IOT MICROSERVICES
4.1 Introduction
The Internet-of-Things (IoT) has drastically grown in size and capability in the
recent years, owing to advances in broadband access networks, cloud/edge computing,
big data analytics, machine learning, etc. In the near future, the global IoT can
expand to tens of billions of devices, powering up numerous applications such as smart
city, smart home, smart health, connected vehicles, etc. The global economic impact
of IoT can be more than several trillion dollars in early 2020s [56].
Due to IoT’s rapid development, the traditional monolithic architecture is no longer
suitable for IoT applications. Instead, the microservice architecture is gaining support
from both industry and academia. The architecture is built upon loosely coupled
microservices, each with compact logic and well-defined interfaces. An IoT application
is built as a collection of microservices with inter-microservice communications. In
real deployment, an application can employ multiple instances of each microservice to
achieve elasticity and robustness.
A key difficulty in microservice management is the interdependencies among
microservices. Specifically, the input data to one microservice may depend on the
output data of other microservices. To capture this, existing works adopt a graph-
based approach, modeling an application as a directed graph where vertices represent
microservices, and edges represent data flows between microservices. Fig. 4.1 shows
an example.
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Figure 4.1: Graph representation of a smart home application.
In this study, we study an important problem in microservice management: load
balancing across microservice instances. Lower load on instances can lead to bet-
ter robustness and elasticity when facing instance failures or demand changes. Yet
microservice load balancing is a complex problem due to the interdependencies. Specif-
ically, changing the load distribution at one microservice instance could cause changes
to the load on many other microservice instances. This situation is aggravated by the
heterogeneous connectivity between microservice instances, which are distributed in
the edge network.
Existing efforts have adopted simplified models to make the load balancing problem
tractable, e.g., by abstracting the application’s processing logic as a chain of microser-
vices [90]. Such a model, however, is insufficient to capture the rich interdependencies
in modern IoT applications. In this study, we aim to provide a general solution to
load balancing for interdependent microservices. We start with a directed acyclic
graph (DAG)-based model for describing microservice interdependencies, which is
rich enough to abstract a majority of IoT applications. We then propose a linear
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program formulation for the basic load balancing problem, where the application aims
to minimize the maximum load among all instances.
The basic model neglects the quality-of-service (QoS) goal of the application, and
may result in arbitrarily large end-to-end delay when answering user requests. This
motivates us to study the more complex QoS-aware load balancing problem, where
the application aims to optimize the end-to-end QoS while satisfying a desired load
balancing goal. We first present a method to characterize the QoS of a load balancing
solution, by abstracting a realization structure for the application graph. We show
through a decomposition theorem that the realization structure can precisely represent
QoS-aware load balancing solutions. Unfortunately, the QoS-aware problem is NP-
hard. Hence we propose a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for
the problem. We show through simulation experiments that our proposed algorithm
indeed outperforms heuristic solutions in terms of QoS of the application.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• To our knowledge, we are the first to study microservice load balancing with
DAG-based interdependencies.
• We formulate both a basic and a QoS-aware load balancing problem. We prove
the latter to be NP-hard.
• We show that the basic problem can be solved optimally, while the QoS-aware
problem admits an FPTAS.
• Simulation experiments have shown that our algorithm can improve application
QoS compared to baselines.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce
background and related work. In Section 4.3, we present system model and the basic
load balancing model. In Section 4.4, we describe our QoS-aware model, a formal
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statement of the problem, and its complexity. In Section 4.5, we propose the FPTAS
for QoS-aware load balancing. In Section 4.6, we show our simulation results. In
Section 4.7, we conclude this study.
4.2 Background and Related Work
4.2.1 Microservices and Application Graph Models
The microservice architecture, originally proposed for complex business applications
in enterprises such as Amazon [131] and Netflix [132], has rapidly gained attention
in the IoT domain, where it can largely reduce the cost and complexity of building
IoT applications. With the help of distributed edge computing, a microservice-based
application can achieve a number of benefits over a monolithic application, including
robustness [68], elasticity [125], security [76], evolvability [33], and many more.
Graph-based approaches are commonly adopted to model and manage such decom-
posed IoT applications. Belli et al. [8] proposed an application architecture, which uses
the processing graph to characterize QoS and improve infrastructure usage efficiency.
Akkermans et al. [2] built a system for application orchestration based on application
graphs. Erbs et al. [31] built another graph-based distributed processing system, which,
in addition to orchestration across logical components, also considers the chronological
dependencies among components. Lee et al. [71] used tenant application graphs to
model cloud applications, and proposed bandwidth-aware application embedding in
tree-like cloud networks.
Resource allocation for application graphs can be hard due to the complex struc-
tures of such graphs. Many heuristic solutions exist without performance bound [5],
91
[50]. To address this, existing approaches used simplified graph models. For example,
Li et al. [72] and Niu et al. [90] used a chain-based model. Li et al. [72] proposed a
heuristic for bandwidth-aware application chain deployment. Niu et al. [90] proposed
a game theoretical approach to coordinate resources among competing application
chains, in order to minimize their response times. A related area considers the em-
bedding of service function chains (SFC), where similarly one or multiple chains of
service functions are to be deployed in the network. Approximation algorithms exist,
e.g., due to Cao et al. [13], Kuo et al. [70], and Yu et al. [153]. Yu et al. [151] studied a
different model where the application has a star structure, and proposed an FPTAS for
network load balancing. Yet these simplified models greatly limit the expressiveness
of this approach, and hence are not suitable for general IoT applications.
Outside of the IoT domain, there are problems with similar abstractions. An early
area of research is virtual network embedding (VNE), where a request is given as a
virtual network graph that is to be embedded on a physical network [21]. A related
area is data center virtualization, where a tenant request is also given as a graph,
which is to be embedded in the physical cloud network [157]. Since these problems are
mainly studied in the network domain, they are different from resource allocation for
application graphs. As an example, these problems commonly request that a virtual
node is mapped to one and only one physical node, while a vertex (microservice) in
an application graph can be implemented by a number of distributed instances at the
same time.
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4.2.2 Application-level Load Balancing
The load balancing problem has been studied in many different contexts, such
as parallel computing [133], web applications [14], cloud applications [94], network
load [3], [52], [121], microservices [90], etc. Due to the large body of work, we only do
a brief review on the methods used.
Many existing works are based on the principle of randomized load balancing, where
in-coming load is randomly assigned to different entities based on load information.
For example, Equal-Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) [121] is one of the most widely used
Layer-3 load balancing technique that has a lot of variants. In the computing domain,
it has also been shown that using randomized load balancing can reduce the queueing
delay at servers [145]. A drawback of the randomized approach is that it is difficult
to consider the load interdependencies among entities, hence it may result in skewed
load distributions at entities that significantly depend on others.
Contrary to randomized load balancing, deterministic load balancing can make
decisions based on many different factors, such as entity interdependencies [5], [50],
[90], QoS information [90], [151], energy consumption [94], failures and network asym-
metry [52], etc. These solutions differ from the randomized ones in that commonly
the former need global coordination to obtain system-wide information and to enforce
load balancing policies. In network, this either requires a centralized network con-
troller [52], or complex peer-to-peer information aggregation and dissemination [3].
In the computing domain, the task is easier, as most computing platforms already
employ hypervisors to make centrally coordinated decisions. Among problems with
different considerations, load balancing with complex interdependencies seems to be
one of the most difficult, where only heuristic solutions exist [5], [50].
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4.3 System Model and Basic Formulation
4.3.1 Application Model
An IoT application is built by selecting a number of microservices, and establishing
proper inter-connections between their output and input APIs. Specifically, an
application is modeled as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), denoted as G = (V,E),
where V is the set of vertices denoting microservices, and E is the set of edges
denoting direct API calls between microservices. A microservice v is called a successor
of microservice u if there is a directed edge (u, v) ∈ E; v is a predecessor of u if
the opposite edge (v, u) ∈ E exists. A microservice with no successor is called a
sink microservice. For simplicity, we use Vin(v) and Vout(v) to denote the subsets of
predecessors and successors of microservice v, respectively. G is called the application
graph (app-graph) hereafter.
The set E defines how IoT data flow across microservices. For load balancing,
it is important to capture how data are distributed at each microservice. For each
edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, a data distribution ratio re is defined, which denotes the input
data volume that microservice v would receive from u if u is fed with 1 unit of input
data. The input data of a microservice thus depends on both the external data it
directly receives, and the data distributed from its predecessors. re can be obtained
via analysis of historical measurements. An app-graph example is shown in Fig. 4.2(a).
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4.3.2 Infrastructure Model
The IoT application must be instantiated with microservice instances in the
network. For each microservice v ∈ V , we define Nv as the set of nodes (microservice
instances) that implement v. The physical connectivities between instances of a pair
of microservices (u, v) ∈ E are defined by link set Luv ⊆ Nu ×Nv. Since we only care
about connectivities between microservices that have direct API calls, the set Luv
is only well-defined for (u, v) ∈ E. The infrastructure graph (inf-graph) is denoted
as Γ = (N,L), where N =
⋃
v∈V Nv and L =
⋃
(u,v)∈E Luv. For simplicity, we let
vn ∈ V be the microservice that node n belongs to; we then use the same notation,
“predecessor/successor” of node n, to denote the corresponding predecessor/successor
microservice of vn. We further let Lin(n) or Lout(n) be the subset of links in-coming
or out-going node n, respectively, and Lout(n, v) be the subset of out-going links of
node n that point to nodes belonging to microservice v. The inf-graph is also a DAG.
We next define a number of attributes for the inf-graph. First, each node n ∈ N
has a capacity cn, which is the maximum load it can process to avoid congestion. In
stream-analysis applications, cn is commonly measured in terms of input data volume.
Second, each node may have a processing delay dn. The delay values can be obtained,
e.g., using the method outlined in [57]. Each link l ∈ L may also have a delay dl,
denoting the data transmission latency between the two instances. For a path p, its
delay is defined as the sum of node and link delays on p: d(p) =
∑
n∈p dn +
∑
l∈p dl.
The application receives input data from external sources such as IoT devices, and the
data may be fed into a certain node based on the data source locations, types of data,
frontend distribution policies, etc. We use δextn to denote the volume of external data
fed into node n, also called its external demand. A node with δextn > 0 is called a source
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node. Note that node n may also receive input data from other nodes through API
calls, which is different from its external demand, and is called the internal demand
instead. An inf-graph example is shown in Fig. 4.2(b), corresponding to the app-graph
in Fig. 4.2(a).
Note that for clarity of illustration, we use different terms for different graphs. We
use “vertex” and “edge” for entities in the app-graph. We use “node” and “link” for
entities in the inf-graph. In the next section, we will use “point” and “arc” for entities
in the realization graph, to be explained later.
4.3.3 Basic Load Balancing Model
In our scenario, an application is instantiated by allocating external and internal
demands to the microservice instances. In choosing how to instantiate the application,
its owner aims to balance the load across different microservice instances, in order to
achieve the best performance as well as to leave room for elastic scaling in the future.
As a first step, we establish a formal model for the basic load balancing problem,
which neglects the QoS requirement of the application.
Let δn be the total demand into node n ∈ N , which is the summation of both its
external and internal demands: δn = δextn + δintn . The external demand δextn is regarded
as a constant value, but the internal demand δintn depends on the demands distributed
from predecessor microservice instances of n, which in turn depends on the input
demands of the predecessor instances, their corresponding data distribution ratios,
and how they allocate their own output demands. Define f(n1, n2) as the demand
allocation from n1 to n2 if (n1, n2) ∈ L. We then have δintn =
∑
l∈Lin(n) f(l), and hence:
δn = δ
ext
n +
∑
l∈Lin(n)
f(l), ∀n ∈ N. (4.1)
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For a demand allocation function f : L 7→ R∗ (R∗ is the non-negative real number
set) to be feasible, it must satisfy the following two constraints:
1. The total demand at each node should not exceed its desired capacity multiplied
by a load factor ψ:
δn ≤ ψ · cn, ∀n ∈ N. (4.2)
2. The demand distributed from a node to all nodes of a successor microservice
should satisfy the data distribution ratio between the two microservices:
∑
l∈Lout(n,w)
f(l) = r(vn,w)δn, ∀n,w ∈ Vout(vn). (4.3)
The load factor ψ essentially specifies the maximum load of any microservice instance.
Commonly, the application would have a desired bound Ψ, such that the load on any
instance does not exceed this bound. We then define the following problem:
Definition 4.1. Given app-graph G with inf-graph Γ, and load bound Ψ > 0, the
Basic Load Balancing (BLB) problem seeks for a demand allocation function
f : L 7→ R∗, which satisfies Eqs. (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) while ensuring ψ ≤ Ψ. Its
optimization version, instead of giving a load bound Ψ, is to minimize ψ, and is named
O-BLB hereafter.
The following linear program (LP) formulates O-BLB:
min
f≥0
ψ (4.4)
s.t. (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3).
Theorem 4.1. O-BLB can be solved in O(|L|3 · L) time.
Proof. Program (4.4) is an LP with (|L|+ 1) variables. Based on [143], the LP can
be solved optimally in O(|L|3 · L) time (L is the input size).
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In Fig. 4.2(b), we also show a feasible solution to the load balancing problem.
Bold links show links with positive demand allocation, and each bold link’s allocation
is equal to the cumulative load imposed on the link. For example, link A1 →
B1 has an allocation of δ · 0.5 = 1.0, while link D1 → E1 has an allocation of
δ · (0.5 · 1.0 + 0.5 · 1.0) · 1.0 = 2.0 with the first half of demand coming from the path
A1 → B1 → D1, and the second half from A1 → C1 → D1. A clearer view of the
solution is shown in Fig. 4.2(c), which will be detailed using the real-graph abstraction
in the next section. This basic model, however, neglects the QoS of the application,
and may lead to arbitrarily long delay for serving user demands. In the next section,
we propose a novel model for characterizing QoS.
4.4 QoS-aware Load Balancing
The above outlines a basic formulation of the load balancing problem. The
model, however, merely reflects the numerical relationship between different instances,
without describing the richer structural relationship in the app-graph. It is therefore
intrinsically difficult to incorporate QoS information into the formulation. In this
section, we model the QoS of an application through a novel realization graph
abstraction.
We consider the following QoS goal of the application. In IoT, users usually ask
for a guaranteed response time to ensure timely reception and handling of IoT events,
such as traffic status or emergency events. We hence assume that the application’s
QoS goal is to bound or minimize the maximum end-to-end delay that any external
demand would experience. To characterize this, we propose the following abstraction:
Definition 4.2 (Real-graph). Given app-graph G = (V,E), inf-graph Γ = (N,L)
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Figure 4.2: App-graph (a), inf-graph (b) and a real-graph (c) of an example application
with load bound Ψ = 1. Bold links in (b) show a feasible load balancing solution with
max delay of 13, which is further shown in (c) as a single decomposed real-graph.
and a source node n ∈ N , a realization graph (real-graph) is defined as a DAG
pi = (Xpi, Api), coupled with a mapping σ : Xpi 7→ N , which satisfies that:
1) xpi with σ(xpi) = n is the only point with 0 in-degree;
2) ∀x ∈ Xpi and ∀v ∈ Vout(vσ(x)), there is exactly one y ∈ Xpi, such that σ(y) ∈ Nv,
(σ(x), σ(y)) ∈ L, and (x, y) ∈ Api.
Xpi is the set of points in pi, and Api is the set of arcs. We call xpi the root point of
real-graph pi. Real-graphs with roots mapped to source node n ∈ N are denoted by set
Πn, and real-graphs of all source nodes are denoted by set Π =
⋃
n Πn. For simplicity,
we use the same notation σ to map entities (nodes, links, paths or subgraphs) in pi to
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the corresponding entities in Γ. We also use a point x to represent the node σ(x) ∈ N
when no ambiguity is introduced. Npi ⊆ N and Lpi ⊆ L denote the subsets of nodes
and links that are mapped from some points and arcs in pi, respectively.
We now explain the intuition behind Definition 4.2. A real-graph can be viewed
as a unitary structure that realizes every possible processing path starting with a
source microservice (a microservice that has source nodes) in the app-graph. Each
path is realized by a sequence of physical instances. To do this, we start from a source
node, and recursively instantiate every successor microservice of the current node by
assigning an instance to it, until we reach the sinks. Note that in this process, we
may choose different instances of the same microservice, each as the successor of a
different predecessor instance. Hence there can be multiple points in the real-graph
mapped to the same node. We show an example of a real-graph in Fig. 4.2(c), which
will be explained later.
We can define a number of attributes for pi. First, each point/arc inherits the delay
of its mapped node/link in Γ. Second, since each point x has exactly one neighbor y
for each successor v ∈ Vout(vx), we can define the distribution ratio rx,y = r(vσ(x),vσ(y))
for (x, y) ∈ Api. We can further derive the impact ratio ρpix for each point x ∈ Xpi,
defined as the demand on x when one unit of demand is input at root xpi. This can be
computed by initially letting ρpixpi = 1, and then traversing pi from xpi, with each point
adding its own impact ratio times the distribution ratio of each out-going arc to the
impact ratio of the corresponding out-going neighbor. Similarly, the impact ratio ρpia
for each arc a ∈ Api can be computed. Then, we sum the impact ratios of all points
mapped to a node m ∈ Npi to compute the impact ratio ρpim imposed on m by pi, and
similarly the impact ratio ρpil on each link l ∈ Lpi. The unitarity of pi is guaranteed by
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assigning exactly one instance to every point’s every successor microservice; in other
words, each processing path in the app-graph corresponds to exactly one path in pi.
Based on these, we can define a source demand allocation function φ : Π 7→ R∗.
For pi ∈ Πn, the value φ(pi) denotes the external demand at the source node n that is
allocated to be carried on real-graph pi. Each node/link’s demand under pi can then
be computed by multiplying φ(pi) with the node/link’s impact ratio. We highlight
the importance of this real-graph abstraction in the following theorem, which is an
analogy to the Flow Decomposition theorem for traditional network flow:
Theorem 4.2. Any demand allocation f satisfying Eqs. (4.1) and (4.3) can be de-
composed into at most |N | + |L| real-graphs Πsel with φ(pi) > 0 for ∀pi ∈ Πsel, such
that the total demand incurred by φ on any link l ∈ L is no more than f(l).
Proof. We decompose f as follows. We first find an arbitrary real-graph pi ∈ Πn for
n ∈ N with δextn > 0, such that f(l) > 0 for ∀l ∈ Lpi. We then calculate the maximum
acceptable demand of pi as δ(pi) = min{δextn , f(l)/ρpil for ∀l ∈ Lpi}, i.e., the minimum
among δextn , and the total allocated demand on every link l that appears in pi factored
by the inverse of its impact ratio 1/ρpil . We let φ(pi) = δ(pi). We then visit every
link l ∈ Lpi, deducting δ(pi) · ρpil from f(l); we also deduct δ(pi) from δextn . After the
deduction, the remaining f and demands still satisfy Eqs. (4.1) and (4.3), since we
deduct the same amount from the lefthand and righthand sides of Eqs. (4.1) and (4.3).
Due to our calculation of δ(pi), at least one link’s allocated demand is fully taken away
during the deduction, or the total demand at a source node is deducted. We need at
most |N | + |L| steps to deduct all allocations from f . Also, we never deduct more
than the demand allocated on any link, hence any capacity constraint satisfied by f is
also satisfied by φ.
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We now prove that we can always find a pi with f(l) > 0 for ∀l ∈ Lpi, if f is feasible
and ∃n ∈ N s.t. δextn > 0. Let n be a node with δn > 0 where δn comes from either
external or internal demands. By Eq. (4.3), there exists m ∈ Nv for ∀v ∈ Vout(vn)
such that f(n,m) > 0, and hence δm > 0. Therefore, we can start from any n with
positive external demand, arbitrarily select a node m ∈ Nv with f(n,m) > 0 for each
successor microservice v of vn, and then follow this process at each selected m until
no successor to work on. This clearly generates a real-graph whenever f is feasible
and has positive external demand, which completes our proof.
Fig. 4.2(c) shows a real-graph, which is also a decomposition of the load balancing
solution shown in Fig. 4.2(b) (in practice, a solution may be decomposed into multiple
real-graphs; in our example, only one is needed). We compute both the impact ratio
and the cumulative delay for each point as shown in the figure. For example, the
point mapped to D1 has impact ratio (rAB · rBD+rAC · rCD) = 1.0. Delay is computed
as the maximum delay from the root, e.g., the delay at the point mapped to D1 is
dA1+max{dB1 , dC1}+dD1 = 9. Note that although the real-graph realizes the app-graph,
it may not be isomorphic to the app-graph, as it allows instantiating a microservice
by multiple instances, such as microservice D instantiated by D1 and D2.
Theorem 4.2 is fundamental, as it enables us to use real-graphs as a basic structure
for characterizing a load balancing solution. In other words, instead of defining a
per-link allocation function f , we can define the allocation φ over the real-graphs from
each source node, with the end-to-end delay of the application defined as the maximum
delay from the source point to the leaf points of any real-graph with positive allocation.
We can then define the QoS-aware load balancing problem. Let D be the application’s
delay bound. Define d(pi) as the maximum path delay from root xpi to any leaf point
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in pi: d(pi) = max{d(p) | p ∈ pi}. For brevity, we let Πm = {pi ∈ Π |m ∈ Npi} be the
subset of all real-graphs that include points mapped to node m.
Definition 4.3. Given app-graph G, inf-graph Γ, load bound Ψ > 0, and delay bound
D > 0, the QoS-aware Load Balancing (QLB) problem seeks for a subset of
real-graphs Πseln for each source node n, with Πsel =
⋃
n∈N Π
sel
n , and a source demand
allocation function φ : Πsel 7→ R∗, s.t.:
1) ψ ≤ Ψ,
2) for node ∀m ∈ N , ∑pi∈Πm ρpim · φ(pi) ≤ ψ · cm,
3) for source node ∀n ∈ N , ∑pi∈Πseln φ(pi) = δextn , and
4) for real-graph ∀pi ∈ Πsel, d(pi) ≤ D.
The optimization version, denoted as O-QLB hereafter, is to minimize the maximum
delay of all selected real-graphs.
Proof of the following theorem is deferred to the appendix.
Theorem 4.3. Both QLB and O-QLB are NP-hard.
4.5 Approximation Scheme Design
Due to the NP-hardness of O-QLB, we seek to develop an approximation algorithm.
Below, we first show that if all delay values are positive integers, the QLB problem
can be solved in pseudo-polynomial time. Such a problem is defined as Integral QLB
(IQLB), with O-IQLB being its optimization version to minimize maximum delay.
The pseudo-polynomial time algorithm is then used as a building block in the design
of an approximation scheme for the general non-integral problem.
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4.5.1 Pseudo-Polynomial Time Optimal Algorithm
Our pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for IQLB is based on a layered graph
technique [85], [139]. Given inf-graph Γ and an integral delay bound D, we define an
auxiliary inf-graph ΓD = (ND, LD). The node set ND = {n0, n1, . . . , nD |n ∈ N}, i.e.,
a node has (D + 1) copies each belonging to a layer. For source node n ∈ N , we let
δext
ndn
= δextn ; all other nodes have 0 external demand. Let d+nm = dn+d(n,m) be the delay
of link (n,m) ∈ L plus the delay of m. The link set LD = {(ni,mi+d+nm) | (n,m) ∈
L, i = 0, 1, . . . , D − d+nm}, i.e., each original link in L has (D − d+nm + 1) copies. Each
link copy inherits the distribution ratio of the original link. Due to page limit, we
refer the reader to [85] (p. 4, Fig. 4) for an illustrative figure of the layered graph
technique.
It is easy to see that each path or real-graph in ΓD corresponds to exactly one path
or real-graph in Γ, respectively. On the opposite direction, each path or real-graph
starting with one source node n in Γ also corresponds to exactly one path or real-graph
in ΓD (since the external demand of each source node in Γ enters at exactly one node
in ΓD). As our focus is only on paths or real-graphs starting with source nodes, we
use p or pi to denote both a path or real-graph in Γ, and its correspondence in ΓD,
without introducing ambiguity.
The intuition behind this construction is to enforce that going through a node
n or link l in Γ is equivalent to “climbing” dn or dl layers in the auxiliary inf-graph,
respectively. The processing delay of source node n is encoded such that its external
demand enters in the respective dn-th layer. Since only (D + 1) layers (from 0 to D)
present, any processing path must reach a sink node within D layers, thus bounding
the maximum delay. Formally, we have the following observation:
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Observation 1. Any path p or real-graph pi in ΓD has delay d(p) ≤ D or d(pi) ≤ D
in Γ, respectively.
Combining Theorem 4.2 and Observation 1, we are motivated to study the basic
load balancing problem on the auxiliary inf-graph, which is formulated as the following
LP:
min
f≥0
ψ (4.5a)
s.t. δn=
∑
l∈LDin(n)
f(l) + δextn , ∀n ∈ ND; (4.5b)∑D
i=0
δn≤ψ · cn, ∀n ∈ N ; (4.5c)∑
l∈LDout(n,w)
f(l)=r(vn,w)δn,∀n∈ND, w∈Vout(vn). (4.5d)
Program (4.5) is almost the same as Program (4.4), except that the capacity con-
straint (4.5c) now considers the demands entering all copies of the same node n. We
then have the following:
Theorem 4.4. IQLB can be solved in O(D4|L|3L) time.
Proof. Program (4.5) is an LP with at most D|L| variables and input size of O(DL),
and hence it can be solved in O(D4|L|3L) time. By Theorem 4.2, the feasible solution
to Program (4.5) can be decomposed into at most D(|N |+ |L|) real-graphs on ΓD. By
Observation 1, each real-graph has delay bounded by D, thus the solution is feasible
to IQLB if the optimal value of Program (4.5) satisfies ψ ≤ Ψ. Now, assume IQLB
has a feasible solution, by reversing the decomposition, we can construct a demand
allocation f that satisfies all constraints in Program (4.5). The theorem follows.
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4.5.2 Approximation Scheme for O-QLB
The basic idea of our algorithm is to find a sufficiently fine-grained discretization
of the real-valued delays, such that the discretized solution is a good approximation
of the optimal solution, and yet the time complexity is polynomial to the input size
(and the inverse of an approximation factor ). For this reason, we use a factor α
to represent the granularity of discretization. We then define the discretized delay
values given α: dαn = bα · dnc+ 1 for n ∈ N , and dαl = bα · dlc+ 1 for l ∈ L; we use
similar symbols dα(p) or dα(pi) to denote the delay of a path or a real-graph after
discretization, respectively. The discretized delays satisfy the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. For any path p in Γ, we have
α · d(p) ≤ dα(p) ≤ α · d(p) + 2|N | − 1.
Proof. The left inequality is clear. The right one is because each path has at most
|N | nodes and |N | − 1 links.
By selecting a proper factor α, we discretize the O-QLB problem to have only
integral delay values. We want to solve the resulting O-IQLB problem to obtain an
approximation to the original O-QLB problem. Let ∆O-QLB be the optimal value
to the original O-QLB problem, and let (UB,LB) be a pair of bounds such that
UB ≥ ∆O-QLB ≥ LB. We define the discretization factor as α = 2|N |−1
LB , given a
small approximation factor . Let ∆O-IQLB be the optimal value to the corresponding
O-IQLB instance. We have the following:
Lemma 4.2. α · LB ≤ ∆O-IQLB ≤ bα · UBc+ 2|N | − 1.
Lemma 4.3. α ·∆O-QLB ≤ ∆O-IQLB ≤ α · (1 + ) ·∆O-QLB.
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Proof of Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. Let (Πsel, φ) be an optimal solution to O-QLB. Since
it is also feasible to O-IQLB, with Lemma 4.1, we have
∆O-IQLB ≤ max{dα(p) | pi ∈ Πsel, p ∈ pi}
≤ α ·max{d(p) |pi ∈ Πsel, p ∈ pi}+ 2|N | − 1
≤ α ·∆O-QLB + 2|N | − 1
≤ α · UB + 2|N | − 1.
(4.6)
This implies the right inequality in Lemma 4.2, as ∆O-IQLB is always an integer due
to the discretization. From the third inequality in Eq. (4.6), we have
∆O-IQLB ≤ α · (∆O-QLB + 2|N | − 1
α
)
= α · (∆O-QLB +  · LB)
≤ α · (1 + ) ·∆O-QLB
(4.7)
Based on the left inequality of Lemma 4.1, we have the left inequality in Lemma 4.3,
which implies the left inequality in Lemma 4.2. This proves Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3.
We now talk about the implications of Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. Lemma 4.3 states
that ∆O-IQLB divided by α provides a (1 + )-approximation to the value ∆O-QLB.
Lemma 4.2 further provides a method to compute the value ∆O-IQLB, given a pair of
bounds (UB,LB) on ∆O-QLB. A bisection method can be used to search the space
[α ·LB, bα ·UBc+2|N |−1] for the delay value ∆O-IQLB, each time solving an instance of
IQLB by Program (4.5). The entire search requires O(log bα·UBc+2|N |−1
α·LB ) = O(log
|N |UB
LB )
runs, each with time complexity of O(|L|3( |N |UB
LB )
4L). To summarize, Lemmas 4.2
and 4.3 give us a method for computing a (1+)-approximation of the optimal solution
to O-QLB within time polynomial to the input size, the parameter 1/, and the ratio
UB
LB between the upper and lower bounds.
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To establish a polynomial-time algorithm, our next step is to find a pair of bounds
(UB,LB) that is within a polynomial factor of each other. This can be done by finding
a bottleneck delay that “determines” the feasibility of the problem instance. Let Γ−d
be the sub-graph of Γ where all nodes and links with delays larger than d are pruned.
We wish to find the minimum value dbot such that Γ−dbot still admits a feasible BLB
solution satisfying the load bound Ψ. Note that a source node n having delay dn > d
directly eliminates the existence of a feasible solution in Γ−d. Naturally, if the original
O-QLB instance is feasible, which can be checked by solving Program (4.4) on the
original Γ, then dbot exists. Since there are at most |N | + |L| distinct delay values,
dbot can be found also using bisection in O(log(|N |+ |L|)) iterations, each spending
O(|L|3 · L) time solving Program (4.4). We then have the following:
Lemma 4.4. (2|N | − 1) · dbot ≥ ∆O-QLB ≥ dbot.
Proof. By the definition of dbot, it follows that the QLB instance is feasible on Γ−dbot
but is infeasible on Γ−dbot with all nodes/links with delay equal to dbot removed. This
means that any feasible solution to QLB includes at least one node/link with delay no
less than dbot, which means dbot is a lower bound of ∆O-QLB. On the other hand, since
there is a feasible solution in Γ−dbot , and any path in Γ−dbot has at most |N | nodes
and (|N | − 1) links, the longest path delay in the feasible solution cannot exceed
(2|N | − 1) · dbot. Hence (2|N | − 1) · dbot is an upper bound of ∆O-QLB. This completes
the proof.
Lemma 4.4 provides us a pair of bounds UB = (2|N | − 1) · dbot and LB = dbot
with UB/LB = 2|N | − 1. Putting together the bounds with Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3, we
now have an approximation scheme for O-QLB, shown in Algorithm 4.1.
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Algorithm 4.1: FPTAS-O-QLB(G,Γ,Ψ)
1 Solve Program (4.4) on Γ to test feasibility;
2 Ascendingly sort all delay values as d = (d0, . . . , dK);
3 lo← 0, hi← K;
4 while lo < hi− 1 do
5 mi← b(hi+ lo)/2c;
6 Construct sub-graph Γ−dmi ;
7 Solve Program (4.4) on Γ−dmi for optimal load ψ;
8 if ψ > Ψ then lo← mi;
9 else hi← mi;
10 end
11 dbot ← dhi,LB← dbot,UB← (2|N | − 1)dbot;
12 Discretize delays with α = (2|N | − 1)/LB;
13 Dlo ← bα · LBc, Dhi ← bα · UBc+ 2|N | − 1;
14 while Dlo < Dhi − 1 do
15 Dmi ← b(Dlo +Dhi)/2c;
16 Construct auxiliary inf-graph ΓDmi ;
17 Solve Program (4.5) on ΓDmi for optimal load ψ;
18 if ψ > Ψ then Dlo ← Dmi;
19 else Dhi ← Dmi;
20 end
21 Do real-graph decomposition on the solution for ΓDhi ;
22 return (Πsel, φ) obtained by decomposition.
Lemma 4.5. Given any  > 0, Algorithm 4.1 outputs a (1 + )-approximation of the
optimal O-QLB solution, within O( 1
4
|L|3|N |8L log |N |

+ |L|3L log |N |) time.
Proof. The approximation ratio is due to Lemma 4.3. The dominant time complexity
comes from the two bisection searches along with an LP solving per search iteration.
The first search takes O(log(|N |+ |L|)) iterations each with O(|L|3 ·L) time complexity.
The second search takesO(log |N |

) iterations each withO( 1
4
|L|3|N |8L) time complexity.
Since |L| < |N |2, we have the final complexity by adding them together.
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4.5.3 Efficiency Enhancement
While Algorithm 4.1 runs in time polynomial to input size and 1/, it has a time
complexity as high as O(|N |12 log |N |) assuming |L| = Ω(|N |) and  is a constant.
Observe that the high complexity mainly comes from solving LPs with D|L| variables
and input size DL, where D = Dmi is in the order of |N |UBLB and UB/LB is in the order
of |N |. If we can reduce UB/LB to a constant, a reduction of order |N | can be achieved
on the program size, resulting in orders of reduction in the overall time complexity.
We use a technique called approximate testing to achieve such a reduction [85].
Specifically, we define a test procedure TESTω(D). Given ω > 0 and D > 0, we
define a new discretization factor α = 2|N |−1
ωD and discretize all delay values in Γ. We
then define an instance of IQLB as (G,Γ,Ψ, D′) where D′ = b2|N |−1
ω
c+ 2|N | − 1 and
all delay values in Γ are discretized by α. Let TESTω(D) = True if the discretized
IQLB instance (G,Γ,Ψ, D′) has a feasible solution, and TESTω(D) = False otherwise.
We then have the following lemma:
Lemma 4.6. Given any ω > 0 and D > 0, we have
TESTω(D) = True ⇒ ∆O-QLB ≤ (1 + ω) · D;
TESTω(D) = False ⇒ ∆O-QLB > D.
Proof. Assume TESTω(D) = True, then we have a feasible solution (Πsel, φ) for
discretized IQLB(G,Γ,Ψ, D′), which also translates to a feasible solution for O-
QLB(G,Γ,Ψ). Let p be any processing path in any pi ∈ Πsel, we have dα(p) ≤ D′.
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Based on Lemma 4.1, we then have
d(p) ≤ dα(p)/α ≤ D′/α
≤
(
2|N | − 1
ω
+ 2|N | − 1
)
· D · ω
2|N | − 1
= D(1 + ω)
(4.8)
Since ∆O-QLB ≤ maxpi∈Πsel,p∈pi{d(p)} (as the solution is feasible to O-QLB), we have
∆O-QLB ≤ (1 + ω) · D.
To prove the second statement, we can prove its contraposition, i.e., if ∆O-QLB ≤ D
then TESTω(D) must output True. Let pi be any real-graph in the optimal O-QLB
solution, and let p be any path in pi. Based on Lemma 4.1, we then have
dα(p) ≤ α · d(p) + 2|N | − 1
≤ 2|N | − 1
ωD ∆
O-QLB + 2|N | − 1
≤ 2|N | − 1
ω
+ 2|N | − 1.
(4.9)
This implies that dα(p) ≤ b2|N |−1
ω
c+ 2|N | − 1 since again the delays are discretized
to be integers. Therefore the optimal solution to O-QLB also translates to a feasible
solution to the discretized IQLB instance, and hence TESTω(D) must output True
based on Theorem 4.4. This completes the proof.
Based on Lemma 4.6, we can use TESTω with ω = 1 as a test procedure for
carrying out a bisection search on the pair (UB,LB). Given an initial pair with
UB/LB = 2|N |− 1 (after Line 11 of Algorithm 4.1), we insert the procedure described
in Algorithm 4.2, to obtain a pair of bounds within a constant factor of each other,
before proceeding to Line 12 of Algorithm 4.1.
Theorem 4.5. Given any  > 0, Algorithm 4.1 plus Algorithm 4.2 outputs a (1 + )-
approximation for O-QLB within time O( 1
4
|L|3|N |4L log |N |

+ |L|3|N |4L log log |N |).
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Algorithm 4.2: RefineBound(G,Γ,Ψ,LB,UB)
// Between Lines 11 and 12 in Algo. 4.1
1 while UB > 4 · LB do
2 D ←
√
UB·LB
2
;
3 if TEST1(D) = True then UB← 2 · D;
4 else LB← D;
5 end
6 return (LB,UB).
Proof. First, observe that in Lines 3–4 of Algorithm 4.2, if TEST1(D) outputs True,
then 2 · D is still a valid upper bound; if TEST1(D) outputs False, then D is still a
valid lower bound; both due to Lemma 4.6. By the choice of D, it satisfies that UBD =
2·D
LB =
√
2UB
LB in each iteration. Let β =
UB
LB , and let β[i] be the value of β after the i-th
iteration. It is clear that β[i]=
√
2β[i− 1]= · · ·=21/2+1/4+···+1/2iβ[0]1/2i≤2 · β[0]1/2i .
Therefore Algorithm 4.2 needs O(log log β[0]) = O(log log |N |) iterations, each solving
an IQLB instance with D′ = b |N |
1
c+ |N | = 2|N |. It follows that Algorithm 4.2 has a
time complexity of O(|N |4|L|3L log log |N |). Since we reduce UB/LB to be within 4
after Algorithm 4.2, the complexity of the second bisection search in Algorithm 4.1
now becomes O( 1
4
|L|3|N |4L log |N |

). Combining these with the time complexity of
the first bisection search in Algorithm 4.1, we have the claimed time complexity.
4.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present performance evaluation of our proposed algorithm with
simulation experiments. Our algorithm is denoted as QLB. We implemented two
heuristic algorithms. In the first algorithm denoted as BLB, the BLB formulation in
Program (4.4) is solved, followed by a simple decomposition as in Theorem 4.2. In the
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second algorithm denoted as QHU (QoS-aware Heuristic), we solve a modified version
of Program (4.4) where the objective is changed to minimizing the demand-weighted
sum of delays of all nodes and links, meanwhile the load factor ψ has to be bounded
by Ψ; we then use the same decomposition method. Therefore the first heuristic
corresponds to load balancing that neglects QoS at all, and the second corresponds to
a heuristic formulation where the total delay instead of the maximum delay of the
solution is minimized in the modified LP.
We used randomly generated app-graphs and inf-graphs. The app-graph was
organized as a random 5-layer DAG, with the lowest layer having 10% of the vertices
and the other layers sharing the rest. Edges were generated from lower layers to all
upper layers, with each vertex in the upper four layers having 4 in-coming edges on
average. Distribution ratios of edges were also randomly generated, such that all
out-going edges of a vertex had their ratios sum to 1. The inf-graph was generated such
that each lowest-layer microservice had only one instance, as a source node, while each
microservice in other layers had [5, 15] instances. Links were built between instances
of interconnected microservices with a base probability of 0.3, while additional links
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Figure 4.3: Running time vs. app-graph size
113
were added to ensure that each instance could find at least one out-going neighbor for
every successor microservice. Each source node had a random demand in [100, 900]
and a large capacity such that it would not be a load balancing bottleneck. For all
other nodes, capacities were generated in [10, 90]. Node and link delays were generated
in [0, 1000] ms and [0, 500] ms respectively. Finally, we assigned the load bound Ψ to
be one of the two values: it was either the optimal value ψ∗ to BLB (Program (4.4))
or 2 · ψ∗. We used them to test the delay performance in heavy- or moderate-load
scenarios respectively.
We set the accuracy parameter  = 0.5. Experiments were run on a Ubuntu PC
with i7-2600 CPU and 16GB memory. To average-out random noise, we conducted 20
random experiments under each setting and took their average.
Fig. 4.3 shows the running time of the implemented algorithms with growth in the
app-graph size. The running time of QLB is longer than the heuristics as expected.
The growth in the running time is nevertheless polynomial to the growth in app-graph
size (and hence the inf-graph size).
Fig. 4.4 shows the comparison of the delay values achieved by all three algorithms.
We show the comparisons under two settings: heavy load (Ψ = ψ∗) and moderate load
(Ψ = 2ψ∗). We note that QLB achieves the lowest delay in all scenarios, regardless
of load. The QoS-aware heuristic QHU can improve delay performance over QoS-
agnostic load balancing BLB, but cannot achieve an improvement as significant as
QLB. Comparing Figs. 4.4(a) and 4.4(b), QLB has a larger advantage in terms of delay
when the load is less (Fig. 4.4(b)). This is partly because when the load is moderate,
QLB has more room for selecting nodes and links with lower delays, and thus it can
further improve QoS. On the other hand, the results for BLB and QHU are almost
the same with different loads, since their formulations commonly generate the same
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Figure 4.4: Objective value vs. app-graph size
solutions. Differences may result from the decomposition process, which, as shown in
the results, has little impact on the QoS of the final solutions.
To summarize, our algorithm always achieves advantageous QoS performance over
the heuristics, with a polynomially bounded complexity. This supports our theoretical
analysis that QLB has guaranteed performance while both heuristics do not.
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4.7 Conclusions
In this study, we studied basic and QoS-aware load balancing across interdependent
IoT microservices. A DAG-based model was used to abstract microservice interdepen-
dencies. We proposed an LP formulation for the basic problem, which can be solved
in polynomial time. For the QoS-aware problem, we proposed a decomposition-based
model where a realization of the application is expressed as a realization graph. Since
the QoS-aware problem is NP-hard, we proposed an FPTAS, along with an efficiency
enhancement technique that achieves several orders of speed-up. Simulations showed
that our algorithm achieves enhanced QoS compared to heuristic solutions. We believe
that the proposed method, aside from making theoretical contribution to the problem
studied, more importantly provides insight in extending chain- or star-based applica-
tion models to the more general DAG-based model, which is much more expressive
and flexible in real-world scenarios.
4.8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We derive a reduction from the Partition problem to QLB,
the former of which is a well-known NP-hard problem [37]. Given a set of objects
X = {x1, . . . , xκ} and a positive integer ax for ∀x ∈ X, the Partition problem seeks for
a subset Y ⊂ X such that ∑x∈Y ax = ∑x∈X\Y ax. Given an instance X of Partition,
we construct an instance (G,Γ,Ψ, D) of QLB as follows. G = (V,E) has the vertex set
V = {v0, u1, v1, u2, v2, . . . , uκ, vκ}, and edge set E = {(vi−1, ui), (ui, vi) | i = 1, . . . , κ}.
Γ = (N,L) has the node set N = {ni | ∀vi ∈ V } ∪ {m0i ,m1i | ∀ui ∈ V }, and link set
L = {(ni−1,m0i ), (ni−1,m1i ), (m0i , ni), (m1i , ni) | i = 1, . . . , κ}. In summary, the app-
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graph is a line graph with (2κ+1) vertices and 2κ edges, and the inf-graph has (3κ+1)
nodes and 4κ links. For the attributes, all edges in E have distribution ratio of 1.
Node n0 has external demand of 2, while all other nodes have no external demand.
All ni nodes have capacity of 2, while all mji nodes have capacity of 1. All links, all
ni nodes and all m0i nodes have delay of 0, while each m1i node has delay dm1i = axi ,
for i = 1, . . . , κ. Finally, we set the application delay bound D = 1
2
∑κ
i=1 axi , and the
load bound Ψ = 1. An example is shown in Fig. 4.5.
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u2 v2 uκ vκ
1.0 1.0 1.0
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nκ-1
d=axκd=ax2d=ax1
App-graph:
Inf-graph:
Figure 4.5: App-graph values are distribution ratios. Delays of m1i nodes are shown
beside them. Double lined nodes and all links have 0 delay. All ni nodes have capacity
of 2. All mji nodes have capacity of 1. Ψ = 1. D = (1/2)
∑κ
i=1 axi .
Since the app-graph G is a line graph, every real-graph of n0 is also a line graph
from n0 to nκ, and hence its delay is precisely the sum of delays of m1i nodes included
in the path. Now, suppose instance X of Partition has feasible solution Y . Then
instance (G,Γ,Ψ, D) of QLB also has a feasible solution, which has two paths, one
taking m1i for xi ∈ Y and m0i for xi ∈ X \ Y , and the other taking the opposite
mji nodes, both having a demand allocation of 1. On the reverse direction, suppose
instance (G,Γ,Ψ, D) has a feasible solution. The solution must also contain two paths
since each mji node can only accept half of the demands coming from the predecessor
ni−1 node. A feasible solution to Partition instance X is then constructed by picking xi
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corresponding to all m1i nodes taken by one of the paths. This proves the NP-hardness
of QLB, and the NP-hardness of O-QLB follows.
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Part II
Robust Security Deployment in IoT
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Chapter 5
DEPLOYING ROBUST SECURITY IN INTERNET OF THINGS
5.1 Introduction
Despite its powerfulness and popularity, the current IoT is facing many challenges,
among which a major one is the emerging concern on IoT security and privacy. In
regard to security, the massive number of connected smart devices in IoT, which is
indeed its biggest strength, is also a huge potential threat. On one hand, providing fine-
grained security to a large number of geo-distributed devices is non-trivial, especially
given the limited resources on each of these devices. On the other hand, these massive
devices, once compromised, can be used as a powerful weapon against the system itself,
for example, by launching large-scale distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. In
fact, the digital world has already witnessed the devastating effect of such attacks in
several recent incidents [126]. Privacy becomes part of the concern when IoT-connected
devices infiltrate various private spaces, including homes, factories, and hospitals.
Enforcing security and privacy in IoT is difficult. The main reason, as aforemen-
tioned, is the limited resources (computing resource, memory, battery) on connected
devices. Due to this, IoT devices can hardly run conventional cryptographic al-
gorithms. Currently, there are two directions that deal with this issue. The first
direction is to develop lightweight yet strong-enough cryptographic algorithms for
IoT devices. Unfortunately, current advances along this direction is yet enough to
conquer the overhead issue of cryptography in constrained environments [124]. The
second direction is to oﬄoad security to the cloud [20], [161]. This is based on recent
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advances in network function virtualization (NFV), which can virtualize security
mechanisms as software components to be run on general-purpose platforms [83].
However, cloud-based oﬄoading has several drawbacks. First, cloud-based security
leaves data transmission as a major vulnerability. In other words, the traffic from IoT
devices to the cloud is unprotected, leaving room for data interception, manipulation
and injection attacks, especially when the traffic needs to traverse the Internet before
reaching the cloud. Second, cloud-based security cannot prevent saturation attacks
at the early stage, such as DDoS attacks from IoT devices. In fact, a DDoS attack
may even invalidate the cloud by saturating its bandwidth, rendering the whole
security system unusable. Third, the cloud suffers from high latency which increases
the probability of device-oriented oppotunistic attacks, for instance, the recently
revealed Meltdown and Spectre hardware attacks [54] that can affect an extremely
wide spectrum of IoT devices. The cloud is not capable of responding in real-time
to incidents on IoT devices. Last but not least, the cloud becomes a single point of
failure in the system. An attack compromising the cloud itself can have control over
all the devices, including those in private spaces like homes or factories.
Powered by fog computing, a new approach to IoT security emerges. Fog com-
puting offers in-network computing hardware in the edge network, which enables
edge oﬄoading of security mechanisms near the end devices. Hence it can largely
realize fine-grained and real-time security, while avoiding high latency, high bandwidth
usage and a single point of failure. That being said, fog-based security also has its
limitations. First of all, the cost of using fog computing is generally higher than
that of using the cloud. This is because fog nodes are commonly deployed in areas
that are already dense with other devices, and hence will have higher deployment,
operation and energy costs. Due to this, fog resources are still limited in each area,
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though much more abundant than IoT devices. Second, fog-based security still leaves
some vulnerabilities in the early stage of data transmission. The unprotected and/or
unmonitored traffic can cause various threats to the devices and the system, as we
detail in Section 5.3.2.
An ideal architecture for IoT security should jointly make use of end device-, cloud-
and fog-based security. Among these, fog-based security has the highest flexibility in
the trade-off between security and cost, and hence should be carefully optimized by
the IoT operator. In this work we focus on modeling and formulating the security
oﬄoading problem from the perspective of fog computing. Given a limited cost budget,
the operator would want to deploy security functions on distributed fog nodes, in order
to minimize the security risk experienced by the end devices. We mathematically
formulate the security risk of the system in terms of the distance from each device
to the nearest deployed security function, which is general enough to incorporate a
wide range of risk measures in practice; see Section 5.3.2. A major challenge in the
deployment problem is the dynamic nature of IoT, where both infrastructure and
demand fluctuations could happen frequently, such as device mobility, maintenance,
interference, failures, etc. To address this challenge, we propose a stochastic model
to capture the uncertainties caused by dynamics. Leveraging a relevant concept in
economics, our model can account for both the expected and the worst-case risks of
the system, which is more robust than traditional stochastic models solely based on
expectations. We then propose a novel decomposition-based framework, along with
an efficiency-enhancement technique, to achieve accurate and efficient optimization
of system security risk in the dynamic IoT environment. We evaluated our proposed
model and optimization framework in extensive simulation experiments, and the
results have shown the superb performance and efficiency of our proposed approach.
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To summarize, our main contributions are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study, quantitatively model,
and optimize the security risk in fog computing-based IoT security oﬄoading.
The problem is of both theoretical and practical importance.
• We propose a stochastic model to account for both the expected and the worst-
case security risks of the IoT system with uncertainties, which is more robust
than traditional stochastic models solely based on expectations, and is more
suitable for security-related use cases.
• We propose a decomposition-based optimization framework, along with an
efficiency-enhancement method that addresses the large overhead of stochastic
programming.
• We conducted extensive simulations which show the superb performance of our
approach compared to several other approaches.
5.2 Backbround and Related Work
5.2.1 IoT Security Challenges and Approaches
IoT security has yet attracted a lot of attentions, at least not until several recent
attacks based on IoT devices [126]. It has then been recognized that security breaches
in IoT can be as dominating and devastating as, if not more so than, any other known
type of security incidents. Since then, more efforts have been put into addressing
security challenges in IoT, which can be viewed roughly in two perspectives.
The first perspective is on protecting the IoT devices. The main challenge here
is the limited resources on IoT devices, including computing power, memory, power
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supply, etc. Currently, there are two approaches to address the resource issue. The first
one is lightweight cryptography and security, which aims to develop mechanisms that
can provide good-enough security on resource-constrained devices, such as [61], [82].
Unfortunately, the current lightweight methods still can only be deployed on devices
like smartphones or tablets, but can hardly be used on smaller devices like radio
frequency identification (RFID) tags, largely due to the stringent power constraint
on these devices [124]. Another approach is to oﬄoad security mechanisms to other
platforms, including in-network fog nodes or the cloud [20], [66], [74], [135]. This
approach addresses the overhead issue, but inevitably introduces some risk associated
with the transmission to the oﬄoaded security mechanisms, as detailed in the next
section.
The second perspective is to protect the broader IoT system rather than only
the end devices. An IoT system includes the end devices, network infrastructures
in different levels, applications and their hosting fog or cloud nodes, and users of
the IoT services. There are several challenges in this perspective, including the
huge number of IoT devices, the heterogeneous and dynamic network environment,
various requirements and characteristics of applications, etc. The de facto approach
here is cloud-based security [111], which again has several issues. The cloud is
generally far away from the IoT edge network, and hence is difficult to adapt to
the fast changing environment of IoT; it is also vulnerable to saturation attacks like
DDoS [119]. NFV [115] is a promising approach to addressing this issue, by enabling
implementation of security mechanisms as in-network software components to resolve
threats before they reach the cloud, other devices or the users.
It can be seen that both perspectives call for deployment of security mechanisms
in the network. In both cases, security can be largely guaranteed when traffic
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has passed certain security functions, while the part of transmission before is not
protected/monitored. Therefore, what we address in this study is to minimize the
risk associated with the transmission before the security functions, by deploying these
functions at optimal locations. A recent survey on IoT security is in [156].
5.2.2 Risk Management in Network Security
Traditionally, network security is mainly a 0–1 problem: a system is either secure or
insecure. Recently, however, there has been a transition to providing best-effort network
security, due to the enormous number and variety of attacks and the impractical
amount of resources to prevent them all. The goal is either to make the difficulty or
cost of launching an attack unacceptable to the attackers, or to make the probability
or potential loss of undergoing an attack acceptable to the system.
Our work follows a number of existing works along the second direction. A major
series of works have focused on modeling and optimizing network security risk using
Attack Graphs (AG) [4], [95], [113]. An AG is a graph representation of all the possible
attack paths into the system, and is used to derive various security risk measures via
Bayesian theory [95], node ranking [113], or other mathematical tools [4]. The derived
measures are then used to guide the deployment of security functions to harden the
system [29], [91]. A main drawback of the AG representation is its scalability. The
size of the AG can grow exponentially with the size of the network, and is further
increased if each node have multiple vulnerabilities. Hence it is most suitable for
simple and small-size environments like home networks, but is hardly applicable to
IoT networks with even a few hundred devices. Furthermore, AG cannot handle fast
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dynamics in the network: it needs to be modified each time a new device joins or an
old device leaves.
In face of these issues, some researchers have been seeking for simpler and more
practical security measures for large-scale and dynamic environments like IoT. Rullo,
Serra, Bertino, and Lobo [110] have proposed a novel model for security risk when
monitoring geo-distributed IoT devices in an area. They considered the robustness
of the system when facing dynamic user densities, an approach similar to what we
use to address demand and topology fluctuations in the IoT network. In this study,
we propose a security risk measure based on distances in the network, as well as an
efficient optimization framework to minimize the security risk by flexibly deploying
security functions on fog nodes.
5.2.3 Other Related Areas
Mobile Oﬄoading (MO): The idea of oﬄoading dates back to mobile cloud com-
puting, where users oﬄoad their mobile applications to the cloud [69]. Yet security
oﬄoading differs from MO in two ways. First, MO is mostly ad hoc where each user
makes its own decisions; however, security oﬄoading is centrally controlled by the
operator, who optimally coordinates the oﬄoading for all users. Second, MO does not
consider the network, since the destination is commonly the cloud. Security oﬄoading
needs to consider the edge network topology, and to minimize the risk associated with
the oﬄoading decisions.
NFV and Service Function Chaining (SFC): SFC is arisen in the context of
NFV. SFC considers the interplay between different network services or security
functions, modeling them as a chain of virtual functions. Existing work has focused
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on embedding service chains for each traffic flow [13], [70], [109]. Unfortunately,
this method is neither scalable for the massive IoT devices, nor robust to the high
dynamics. A good method should account for both the expected scenarios, and
possible unfavorable scenarios due to system fluctuations.
Security with Robustness: Our work uses a stochastic approach to ensure system
robustness. Similar methods have also been used in other security scenarios [110], [134].
Another potential approach is robust optimization, which deterministically optimizes
the worst possible performance of the system, such as [17]. This approach has two
drawbacks. First, it is hard to represent all unfavorable scenarios deterministically.
Second, it only plans for the worst possible performance of the solution, which is
commonly an overkill and wastes precious resources. A good approach should be able
to balance the expected and worst-case performances, and give operator the flexibility
to specify the desired objective.
5.3 Problem Description and Formulation
5.3.1 System Model
The IoT network is modeled as a directed graph G = (V,E). V is the set of
network nodes, including access points (APs), switches, routers, gateways, and various
fog nodes. We use F ⊆ V to denote the set of fog nodes, each being able to host
security functions. E is the set of links between nodes.
The IoT faces two types of uncertainties. The first one is demand uncertainty, which
comes from dynamics such as device deployment, maintenance, user load variation,
device and user mobility, etc. Let A ⊆ V be the set of APs of the IoT. To model
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demand uncertainty, each AP a ∈ A is associated with a random variable da ∈ R∗
(R∗ is the non-negative real number set), denoting the amount of demand at a. We
use D = {da | a ∈ A} to denote the demand uncertainty set, and dsum =
∑
a∈A da to
denote the total demand in the IoT. In practice, the demand can refer to (but is not
limited to) the number of devices, number of flows, traffic volumes, etc.
The second type is topology uncertainty due to unexpected failures, maintenance,
interference, etc. To model it, we associate each link e ∈ E also with a random
variable ye ∈ {0, 1}, where ye = 1 means e is operational, and ye = 0 means e is down.
This model is also able to account for node dynamics: if a node fails, all its adjacent
links have ye = 0. We use Y = {ye | e ∈ E} to denote the topology uncertainty set.
Let D={da} and Y ={ye} be a specific realization of the demand and topology
uncertainty sets, respectively. We define a realization of the system (called a scenario)
as Π=(D, Y ).
5.3.2 Threat Model and Defense Mechanism
In an IoT network with security oﬄoading, data is first transmitted from IoT
device to the oﬄoaded security function before heading to its final destination. Below,
we analyze the threat associated with such transmission in several scenarios:
• Highly constrained devices: these devices cannot run any cryptographic pro-
cedure, hence oﬄoad all procedures to the network. All transmitted data is
unprotected before passing the security functions, which is subject to leakage,
manipulation, injection and other types of attacks.
• Moderately constrained devices: these devices can run lightweight cryptographic
procedures such as secure computation outsourcing [20], [66], which only oﬄoads
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computation-intensive operations but keeps the data private. Yet in this case,
the data stays unprotected in device memory until encryption is complete, during
which it can be compromised by opportunistic attacks leveraging vulnerabilities
of the devices themselves, such as the recent Meltdown and Spectre hardware
attacks [54]. Probability of an attack is determined by the latency between
device and the oﬄoaded location, as the process can involve multiple rounds of
back-and-force messaging [66].
• IoT network: the operator may deploy security functions (e.g., intrusion de-
tection, firewall, deep packet inspection) to protect the system from mali-
cious/compromised devices. However, traffic not processed by certain security
functions can be a threat to the network. For example, a DDoS attack may still
overwhelm some of the nodes before being tackled by a detection and resolution
function.
It can be seen that in these various scenarios, it is essential that the operator
can flexibly deploy security functions to minimize the threats brought by the unpro-
tected/unmonitored transmission of oﬄoading. Unfortunately, the operator may have
a tight budget for deploying the functions. We next define the operator’s deployment
plan to optimize such threats.
We consider the deployment of a single type of security function to prevent a
specific type of attacks. Formally, we use binary variable set X={xv | v∈F} to denote
a deployment plan, where xv=1 means a security function is deployed at node v and
0 otherwise. Let cv ∈ R+ be the deployment cost at node v ∈ F . A deployment plan
is said to be feasible, iff it satisfies the operator’s budget b:
∑
v∈F
cvxv ≤ b. (5.1)
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Definition 5.1 (Security risk). Given network G = (V,E), the security risk of a
deployment plan X is the average distance that a unit of demand has to traverse before
reaching the nearest security function from its AP, denoted as R(X,D, Y ). In other
words, the security risk is a function of the deployment plan X and the uncertainty
sets D and Y .
In Definition 5.1, the distance is a cumulative measure that can be selected based
on different use cases. For instance, it can be as simple as the number of hops
(vulnerable links or nodes) or transmission latency (time window of possible attacks),
or as complex as the negative logarithm of the “safe” probability of traversed links or
nodes (the “safe” probability is one minus the probability that a node/link/path is
attacked; it is cumulated multiplicatively along the transmission path but is to be
maximized instead of minimized). We do not assume a specific distance measure for
sake of generality. We focus on the average distance of demands for ease of illustration,
although our approach can be trivially extended to minimizing the maximum distance
of demands. Note that the average distance is the average over demands from all
APs in a fixed scenario, rather than over all possible scenarios of the system. For
measurement over scenarios, we use both the expectation and a worst case-oriented
metric, as detailed next.
5.3.3 Measuring Security Risk with Uncertainty
Given a fixed scenario Π, measuring the security risk of deployment plan X is as
simple as finding shortest paths between AP-fog node pairs; minimizing it with flexible
deployment plans, though, is NP-hard due to a reduction from the facility location
problem [53]. Furthermore, the IoT environment is rather volatile, with uncertainties
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in both the demands and the topology. One approach is to measure and minimize
the expected risk, which reflects the average level of threat of the system. However,
such an approach is not robust enough when applied in security, as the system may
experience arbitrarily high security risk in unfortunate scenarios.
To account for the worst-case performance, we adopt the concept of Conditional
Value-at-Risk (CVaR), a risk measure widely used in economics and finance. The
concept has been applied in several security-related use cases [110], [134]. Here “risk”
refers to the investment risk an investor encounters when facing market variations,
i.e., potential loss due to unfavorable market trends. Formally, let random variable R
be the loss of an investment. The following terms are defined:
VaRα(R) = min{c |P (R ≤ c) ≥ α}, (5.2)
CVaRα(R) = E[R |R ≥ VaRα(R)]. (5.3)
Here E[·] is the expected value of a random variable. VaRα(R) (Value-at-Risk, also
called α-VaR) is the minimum value such that the actual loss will not exceed it with α
confidence, while CVaRα(R) (also called α-CVaR) is the expected loss of all scenarios
where the loss can actually exceed VaRα(R). In other words, CVaRα(R) denotes the
expected loss of the worst (1− α) percent scenarios in terms of investment loss.
Given uncertainty sets D and Y , R(X,D, Y ) is the security risk of deployment plan
X, which is also a random variable. We use R to denote R(X,D, Y ) if no ambiguity
is introduced. Next, we formally model and minimize the security risk of security
oﬄoading, utilizing the CVaR definition.
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5.4 Security Deployment with Uncertainty
5.4.1 Problem Description and Formulation
Given the network and a limited budget, the IoT operator wants to ensure system
security to the best extent. This includes both the overall system security in expecta-
tion, as well as the potential security risk in the (1 − α) percent most unfavorable
scenarios. We model these two goals as a multi-objective optimization problem as
follows:
min
X∈X
E[R], CVaRα(R), (5.4)
where X is the feasible deployment plan set satisfying Eq. (5.1).
Optimizing two objectives can be hard, as they may conflict with each other in their
own optimality points respectively. A common technique is to scalarize the multiple
objective functions into a single objective function. We scalarize Program (5.4) as the
following single-objective program:
min
X∈X
E[R] + ρ · CVaRα(R). (5.5)
where ρ is a chosen balancing parameter.
In Eq. (5.3), the formulation of α-CVaR requires the computation of α-VaR be-
forehand, which is hard to incorporate in the above program. Fortunately, Rockafellar
and Uryasev proved in [106] that the α-CVaR can be computed as follows without
knowing the α-VaR beforehand:
CVaRα(R) = min
c∈R
{
c+
1
1− αE
[
(R− c)+]} , (5.6)
where R is the real number set, and (z)+ = max{z, 0}. Therefore, Program (5.5) can
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be re-written, by incorporating Eq. (5.6), as the following program:
min
X∈X
c∈R
E[R] + ρ
(
c+
1
1− αE
[
(R− c)+]) . (5.7)
The random variable R is a function of the deployment plan X and random variable
sets D and Y . Unfortunately, writing it as a closed-form equation is also a difficult
task. Instead, we formulate it as the following program:
R(X,D, Y ) =
min
t
1
dsum
∑
a∈A
da
∑
v∈F
dista(v)ta(v) (5.8a)
s.t.
∑
v
ta(v) = 1, ∀a; (5.8b)
ta(v) ≤ xv, ∀a, v; (5.8c)
ta(v) ∈ [0, 1], ∀a, v. (5.8d)
In Program (5.8), dista(v) is a random variable, denoting the distance between AP
a and node v. It is determined by the distance metric used (number of hops, latency,
safe probability, etc.), as well as the topology uncertainty set Y . Objective (5.8a)
is to minimize the demand-weighted average security risk (distance) of all APs.
Constraint (5.8b) bounds the node selection variable ta(v). Constraint (5.8c) defines
the relationship between the deployment variable xv and the node selection variable
ta(v). Note that ta(v), which can be viewed as the probability of selecting v for AP a,
is a continuous variable in [0, 1]; its upper bound 1 is explicitly expressed in (5.8d)
for clarity, but can be omitted due to Constraint (5.8b) when solving the program. If
multiple nodes have the same minimum distance from a, the node selection can be
arbitrarily split among them without affecting the objective value.
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5.4.2 Scenario-based Stochastic Optimization
Program (5.7) is a stochastic optimization problem. Even with the characteristic
functions of D and Y , the problem is still hard to solve since R(X,D, Y ) cannot
be written in a closed form (and is not even convex as Y is discrete). A common
approach is to approximate the expectations using sampling. Specifically, N sample
scenarios are obtained from the underlying distributions of D and Y , denoted as
Π = {Π1, . . . ,ΠN}. Let Ri ∆= R(X,Di, Y i) be the security risk in scenario Πi, which
can still be expressed by Program (5.8) with the random variables replaced by the
deterministic values in Πi. The expected security risk E[R] is then approximated
by the sample average function 1
N
∑N
i=1Ri, while the α-CVaR is approximated by
min
c∈R
{
c+ 1
1−α
1
N
∑N
i=1(Ri − c)+
}
.
Program (5.7) is then approximated by the following:
min
X∈X
c∈R
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ri + ρ
(
c+
1
1− α
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
Ri − c
)+)
. (5.9)
We next re-write Program (5.9) to resolve (·)+, Ri and X . To resolve (·)+, we
introduce additional variable zi ∈ R∗ for i = 1 . . . N , and constrain the inner term
of (·)+ using zi. To resolve Ri, note that both Program (5.8) and Program (5.9) are
minimization programs, and hence can be merged. X is resolved by bringing Eq. (5.1)
into the program. We then arrive at the following Mixed Integer Linear Program
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(MILP):
min
1
N
N∑
i=1
1
d
i
sum
∑
a∈A
d
i
a
∑
v∈F
distia(v)t
i
a(v)+
ρ
(
c+
1
1− α
1
N
N∑
i=1
zi
)
(5.10a)
s.t.
1
d
i
sum
∑
a∈A
d
i
a
∑
v∈F
distia(v)t
i
a(v)− c ≤ zi, ∀i; (5.10b)∑
v
tia(v) = 1, ∀i, a; (5.10c)
tia(v) ≤ xv, ∀i, a, v; (5.10d)∑
v∈F
cvxv ≤ b; (5.10e)
xv∈{0, 1}, tia(v)∈ [0, 1], zi≥0, c∈R, ∀i, a, v. (5.10f)
In Program (5.10), note that the random variable distances dista(v) are also instanti-
ated by the deterministic distances distia(v), which can be computed beforehand for
all scenarios. There may be scenarios where an AP cannot reach all the fog nodes due
to disconnectivity. In this case, we set the distance to the disconnected nodes to a
large value, in order to prefer security function deployment at other fog nodes instead.
Program (5.10) can be solved using optimization solvers such as Gurobi [48]. Yet,
there are two reasons that Program (5.10) is extremely hard to solve in practice. First,
the program is non-convex due to integer variables xv. Second, the program size is
linear to N . To get a good approximation of the distributions of D and Y , the number
of samples needed is commonly at least thousands. An MILP of such size is largely
unsolvable in practice. Therefore, we resort to some optimization techniques, which
can drastically reduce the complexity of solving Program (5.10) to a practical level.
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5.4.3 Two-stage Optimization with Benders’ Decomposition
At a closer look, Program (5.10) can be viewed as a typical two-stage optimization
problem, with a small number of master variables but a huge number of slave variables.
In the first stage, the program seeks to fix deployment plan X, which is called the
master problem. In the second stage, given fixed deployment plan, it then computes
the security risk of all scenarios by selecting the optimal fog nodes that actually
deploy the security functions; this stage is called the slave problem. A difficulty in
solving a two-stage program is that when fixing the first-stage master solution, there
is no clue on how such decisions will affect the second-stage slave solution, until
the slave problem is actually solved. A natural choice is thus an iterative algorithm
that progressively solves both the master and the slave, until an optimal solution is
found. In this subsection, we apply a well-known algorithm of such kind: the Benders’
decomposition due to Benders [9].
Formally, Program (5.10) can be re-written as follows:
min
X,c
ρ · c+Q(X, c) (5.11a)
s.t. (5.10e),
xv ∈ {0, 1}, c ∈ R, ∀v. (5.11b)
where the slave problem Q(X, c) is given by
Q(X, c) =
min
z,t
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
1
d
i
sum
∑
a∈A
d
i
a
∑
v∈F
distia(v)t
i
a(v) +
ρ
1− αzi
)
(5.12a)
s.t (5.10b), (5.10c), (5.10d),
tia(v) ∈ [0, 1], zi ≥ 0, ∀i, a, v. (5.12b)
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An intriguing property of the slave is that it is further decomposable regarding
each scenario Πi, as there are no coupling variables or constraints over i. Hence the
slave problem can also be written as Q(X, c) = 1
N
∑N
i=1Qi(X, c), where Qi(X, c) is
the slave subproblem for each scenario Πi, defined by the inner term of the objective
function and all the constraints for the specific i in Program (5.12).
To employ Benders’ decomposition, we further need to study the dual program of
Qi(X, c), defined as follows:
∆i(x, c) =
max
λ,φ,µ
∑
a∈A
(
φi(a)−
∑
v∈F
xvµi(a, v)
)
− c · λi (5.13a)
s.t. λi ≤ ρ
1− α ; (5.13b)
φi(a)−µi(a, v)≤ d
i
adist
i
a(v)
d
i
sum
(1 + λi),∀a, v; (5.13c)
λi, µi(a, v) ≥ 0, φi(a) unbounded, ∀a, v. (5.13d)
In Program (5.13), dual variables λ, φ and µ correspond to primal con-
straints (5.10b), (5.10c) and (5.10d), respectively.
Given the above, the key idea of Benders’ decomposition is to, instead of considering
all constraints as a whole, progressively add constraints (also called cuts) that may
help in approaching the optimal solution in an iterative manner, thus avoiding to
consider the large number of constraints together. The algorithm starts with a feasible
master solution (e.g., with all xv = 0 and c = 0 in our problem), a pair of lower and
upper bounds LB = −∞ and UB =∞, and the master problem that contains only
the master constraints (in our case, Constraint (5.10e) is the only master constraint).
In each iteration, the algorithm first solves the dual slave problem given the current
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master solution. It then updates the master problem by adding cuts based on the
dual slave problem solution. The updated master problem is then solved to optimality
to obtain a new master solution. Note that although the master problem is still an
MILP, it has a much smaller size compared to the original, and hence can be efficiently
solved using a standard solver. The LB and UB are updated based on the master and
slave solutions, respectively. The whole algorithm is shown in Algorithm 5.1.
Algorithm 5.1: Benders’ Decomposition for Program (5.10)
Input: Network G, scenarios Π, quantile α, tolerance 
Output: Deployment plan X
1 X ← {xv = 0| v ∈ F}, c← 0, LB← −∞, UB←∞;
2 while UB− LB >  do
3 Solve dual slave problem ∆i(x, c) for ∀Πi;
4 if ∆i(x, c) is unbounded then
5 Get unbounded ray (λ˜, φ˜, µ˜);
6 Add feasibility cut to the master problem:
N∑
i=1
(∑
a∈A
(
φ˜i(a)−
∑
v∈F
xvµ˜i(a, v)
)
−cλ˜i
)
≤0;
7 else
8 Get optimal point (λ∗, φ∗, µ∗);
9 UB← min{UB,∆(x, c)};
10 Add optimality cut to the master problem:
σ≥
N∑
i=1
(∑
a∈A
(
φ∗i (a)−
∑
v∈F
xvµ
∗
i (a, v)
)
−cλ∗i
)
;
11 end
12 Solve master problem min{σ + ρ · c | cuts, x ∈ X};
13 LB← σ + ρ · c;
14 end
15 return X.
In the algorithm, an unbounded ray (λ˜, φ˜, µ˜) in Line 5 is essentially a direction
(in other words, a solution vector) to which the dual objective value goes to infinity.
If the dual slave problem is unbounded, the primal slave problem is infeasible, and
hence a feasibility cut is added in Line 6 to drive the master problem back into the
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feasible domain. If the dual slave has an optimal solution, the optimal dual point is
incorporated into the master by adding an optimality cut, which drives the algorithm to
search for master solutions with higher objective values. By adding cuts progressively,
the algorithm avoids considering all the slave constraints together, but instead only
considers those “promising” constraints that are likely to be active in the optimal
solution. This can drastically reduce the overhead, especially for scenario-based
optimization where a huge number of scenarios are considered. The UB is updated
as the best feasible solution ever found, while the LB is updated when a new master
solution is obtained. Optimality can be claimed when LB and UB converge.
5.4.4 Speeding-up Per-iteration Optimization
Even with the decomposition technique, Algorithm 5.1 is not efficient enough. The
main reason is that it needs to solve a large number of dual slave linear programs
(LPs) in each iteration, which is a slow process due to the cubical complexity for
solving LPs [143]. In this subsection, we revisit the dual slave subproblems ∆i(x, c)
in (5.13), and show that they can be solved analytically due to their special structure.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the dual slave problem is feasible and
bounded, i.e., the corresponding primal slave problem is also feasible and bounded.
Note that the primal problem is infeasible (hence the dual is unbounded) only when
some AP is disconnected from any fog node in a certain scenario, which can be detected
in the shortest path pre-computation phase. In the disconnected case, the security
risk is ill-defined, as the AP cannot even communicate with the Internet. To tackle
this, one way is to simply assign a uniform distance for all fog nodes, meaning that in
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this scenario it has no effect on the node selection. The primal problem cannot be
unbounded (security risk is lower bounded by 0).
For scenario Πi and AP a, let via[1] and via[2] be the two fog nodes with xv = 1 and
with the minimum distances from a, and let distia[1] and dist
i
a[2] be the corresponding
distances respectively (with distia[1] ≤ distia[2]). Also let δia = d
i
a/d
i
sum. We then have
the following optimal solution:
λi=

ρ
1− α if
∑
a
δiadist
i
a[1] ≥ c
0 otherwise
(5.14a)
φi(a)=δ
i
adist
i
a[2](1 + λi) (5.14b)
µi(a, v)=

δia(dist
i
a[2]−distia(v))(1+λi) if v = v
i
a[1]
or xv = 0
0 otherwise
(5.14c)
The following theorem states the optimality of the above solution, whose proof is
delegated to the appendix.
Theorem 5.1. If the dual slave problem has bounded optimal value, Eq. (5.14) is an
optimal solution to Program (5.13), and can be computed in linear time.
5.5 Performance Evaluation
5.5.1 CVaR vs. Expectation
In this subsection, we show simulation results on comparing the expected case and
the worst case up to a small tail probability. Our topology is in Fig. 5.1(a), which is
based on the IoT framework in [89]. The topology had four types of nodes representing
different street blocks: residential (R), work (W), business (B) and entertainment (E).
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Figure 5.1: Simulation on designated topology.
Each node was both an AP and a fog node with uniform cost. The operator had a
30% budget over the sum of fog node costs. The scenarios were generated from a
3-month time period sliced into 15-minute intervals. Each link had an independent
reliability of 99%. Depending on time and day of week, demand at each node was
drawn from a Gamma distribution Γ(a, b) where a is the shape and b is the scale, as
shown in Table 5.1.
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Mon. – Fri. Sat. & Sun. Other (Sleep)
8am–6pm 12pm–6pm 6pm–10pm
R Γ(0.5, 1.5) Γ(0.5, 1.5) Γ(0.5, 0.5) Γ(0.5, 3.0)
W Γ(0.5, 2.0) Γ(0.5, 0.2) Γ(0.5, 0.2) Γ(0.5, 0.8)
B Γ(0.5, 0.5) Γ(0.5, 2.0) Γ(0.5, 1.0) Γ(0.5, 0.3)
E Γ(0.5, 0.2) Γ(0.5, 0.5) Γ(0.5, 2.5) Γ(0.5, 0.1)
Table 5.1: Probability Distribution of Demands
We compared between using Algorithm 5.1 with a large enough ρ value (where only
CVaR is considered) and with ρ = 0 (where only the expectation of risk is considered).
We varied the quantile α to see the CVaR of different confidence levels. For example,
a large quantile α = 99% means we only look at the 1% most unfavorable scenarios,
while α = 0% means that we are looking at all the scenarios in CVaR, which by
definition is equivalent to the expectation itself. To solve the MILP master problem,
we used the Gurobi solver [48].
Fig. 5.1(b) shows the optimal solutions (with error tolerance of  = 10−5, same
hereinafter) obtained by Benders’ decomposition. The quantile (1−α) is the percentage
of scenarios included in the computation of CVaR. We can see that optimizing CVaR
and optimizing expectation indeed achieves different solutions in most of the cases.
With increase in (1− α), more scenarios are included in the CVaR, hence the CVaR
value approaches the mean. However, with (1−α) = 1%, there is a great difference in
minimizing CVaR (ρ = 100k) and minimizing expectation (ρ = 0), where the CVaR
of security risk can be almost 1.5× larger in the latter case than in the former. This
suggests that in security systems where a few worst cases need to be carefully tackled,
it is important to apply CVaR-aware optimization to account for the worst-case
performance rather than for the average case alone.
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5.5.2 Optimality and Efficiency
Next, we used randomly generated network to show how our proposed algorithm
was able to achieve vast speed-up compared to the brute-force approach. Each topology
had 30 nodes, and was generated using the Waxman model [32] with parameters
α = β = 0.3. We randomly picked half of the nodes to be APs, and ψ of the nodes to
be fog nodes where ψ ∈ [0, 1] is the fog node ratio. Deployment costs were generated
uniformly from [10, 100], while the operator had a budget of 50% of the sum of costs. In
total 10k scenarios where generated for each experiment. Link reliability was uniformly
99%. The demands at APs were generated from an Erlang(1, 2) distribution. We set
quantile α = 95%. To average out noise of topology randomization, we generated 20
different topologies for each experiment setting, and took the average over all runs.
Simulations were conducted on a Linux PC with 3.4GHz Quad-Core CPU and 16GB
memory.
Fig. 5.2 shows the results of our algorithm over a brute-force algorithm. BENS is
our proposed algorithm with our analytical model, while BENS-LP is our proposed
algorithm with dual slave LPs solved by the Gurobi solver [48]. Brute-force algorithm
ITER iterates over all possible deployment plans X∈X , and returns the best solution
found after all iterations or after a running time limit of 1800 seconds; ITER returns
the optimal solution unless exceeding the time limit. Fig. 5.2(a) shows the optimality
of our algorithm. Note that when the fog node ratio exceeds 0.7, ITER could not
iterate over all possible solutions in the time limit, and hence returns suboptimal
solutions. Fig. 5.2(b) shows the overall running times. Our BENS algorithm is the
fastest in most cases. ITER is faster than BENS when the fog nodes are few, but
then its time grows and quickly tops-up the pre-set time limit of 1800 seconds, due
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Figure 5.2: Simulation results with varying number of fog nodes over total nodes.
ITER (optimal algorithm) exceeds the time limit (1800 s) when the fog node ratio is
0.7, and hence is terminated before finishing all iterations.
to the exponential increase in the solution space. Comparing BENS and BENS-LP,
the former achieves a drastic speed-up. We further plot the average master and
slave solving times per iteration in Figs. 5.2(c) and 5.2(d), respectively. It can be
seen that BENS and BENS-LP do not differ much in master solving time. However,
BENS achieves several orders of speed-up in slave solving time, further validating the
effectiveness of our analytical model. Finally, an interesting finding is that, although
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the master problem is an MILP, it actually solves faster than the slave problem, due
to its small size compared to the large number of scenarios.
5.5.3 Comparison with Fast Baseline Heuristics
In the last set of experiments, we show the performance of our algorithm compared
to fast heuristics. For this comparison, we used a synthesized dataset derived from
real IoT device traces collected in the Dartmouth College [67]. The original dataset
contained the location data of over 600 APs and the connectivity data of over 13000
user devices for more than 5 years. We synthesized the dataset as follows. First, we
aggregated APs based on buildings, and regarded each building as a single AP. Second,
we further divided buildings into street blocks based on a publicly available map of
the campus. Due to lack of campus network topology, we adopted a topology where
each building’s AP is directly connected to a central node within each block, and all
blocks are connected in a ring topology. All block nodes and 10% of the buildings
were selected as fog nodes, with deployment costs of 100 and 10, respectively. Finally,
since the entire data set contains many intervals that have unstable and erroneous
measurements, we only used a one-year subset of data (09/2002–08/2003) that is
relatively stable according to the collectors [67].
To characterize the demand distribution, we regarded the user connectivity data
as samples from the underlying realistic distribution. We used 4 months of data
(09/2002–12/2002) as training set, and the next 8 months of data (01/2003–08/2003)
as the test set, both sliced into intervals of 15-minute length. We used the training
data to deploy the security functions, and then calculated the security risks of the
deployed security functions on both the training set and the test set. The number of
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devices were aggregated and averaged over every 15-minute interval for each building
AP. All links had 99% reliability. We again set ρ to a large value, and let α = 95%.
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Figure 5.3: CVaR of risk on synthesized Dartmouth data.
Fig. 5.3 shows the training and testing security risks using the synthesized data.
We compared our proposed algorithm to two heuristics: RNDA and GRDY. RNDA is
a random algorithm which randomly picks fog nodes to deploy the security function,
until the budget is exceeded. GRDY is a greedy algorithm which iteratively selects
fog nodes that result in the maximum reduction in the objective function, until the
budget is exceeded. From the figure, we can see that our algorithm outperforms both
GRDY and RNDA. The greedy heuristic generally achieves better performance than
RNDA, but may result in poor performance with certain budget values such as a
budget of 200. Also, it is interesting to see that an optimal training solution may not
be optimal on the test set. For example, when the budget increases from 275 to 300,
the training CVaR of BENS (the optimal) decreases, but the test CVaR increases.
This is commonly due to changes in the underlying distribution, and should be tackled
by periodically re-optimizing the deployment decisions based on new inputs.
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5.6 Discussions and Future Work
Advanced deployment and risk measurement: Our current distance-based risk
measure can be extended to more complex cases. For example, each link may have
a routing capacity and each security function may have a processing capacity in
practice. In this case, demands may be split over multiple paths and/or security
functions if some are overloaded. Also, different links and/or nodes may have different
contributions to the security risks, as some may be more vulnerable to others. These
considerations can mostly be integrated with minimal modifications into our CVaR-
based and scenario-based optimization framework. Derivation of efficient solutions in
these more complex cases is delegated to our future work.
Further optimization speed-ups: The proposed algorithm uses the basic Benders’
decomposition, with the only speedup being the problem-specific analytical model for
the dual slaves. Other techniques may also improve the efficiency of Benders’ decompo-
sition, such as enhanced cuts [24], the three-phase method [24], trust regions [78], etc.
While these techniques can hardly beat the speed-up achieved by our analytical model
(and most of them are not trivially compatible with our analytical model), they are
helpful in general when our model and framework are extended to other more complex
cases as aforementioned. An orthogonal technique is to employ parallelization in each
iteration, which is natural through the dual slave decomposition in our algorithm.
5.7 Conclusions
In this study, we studied the security risk associated with oﬄoading security from
IoT devices to fog or cloud nodes in the network. To maximize system security
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and robustness, the operator would want to deploy in-network security functions
to minimize the security risk of all users, given various scenarios including varying
demands and network failures. We made the following contributions. First, we
proposed a stochastic model for uncertainties in IoT. Second, we used an economic
model (CVaR) to capture the worst-case security risk of the system, in addition to
the conventional expectation-based model. Third, we developed a decomposition-
based optimization framework for optimizing both the expected security risk and
the its CVaR in scenario-based stochastic programming. We then enhanced the
framework with an analytical model tailored to drastically reduce its optimization
overhead. Finally, we showed, through simulations, that the proposed model well
captures system security risk up to a small tail probability, and that the proposed
framework achieves optimal security deployment with limited overhead compared to
other algorithms.
5.8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 5.1. For simplicity, we omit subscript i, since the dual slave sub-
problem is independent for each scenario. We call a node active if it has xv = 1 in
the current iteration, otherwise it is inactive. First, for any inactive node v, we can
assume that µ(a, v) takes an arbitrarily large value to enforce Constraint (5.13c), as
it has a zero coefficient in the objective function. For each AP a, a node v can have
a positive µ(a, v) only when the corresponding Constraint (5.13c) is binding, i.e.,
equality holds instead of inequality at any optimal point, for this node; otherwise,
the objective value can be solely increased by decreasing µ(a, v) without violating
Constraint (5.13c). We claim that there is at most one active node v with positive
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µ(a, v); if multiple active nodes have positive µ(a, v), then we can reduce φ(a) along
with all the positive µ(a, v)s by a small amount, reducing objective value without
violating Constraint (5.13c) for any node. Further, we claim that the node with
positive µ(a, v) must be the one and only one active node v∗ who has the minimum
distance from a; if more than one node has the same minimum distance, they must all
have µ(a, v) = 0. Otherwise, say if an active node v′ with non-minimum distance has
a positive µ(a, v′) and the corresponding Constraint (5.13c) is binding, then clearly
µ(a, v∗) > µ(a, v′) > 0, because dista(v∗) < dista)(v′). Then we have two positive
µ(a, v) values, which conflicts with the above. In the case of a single minimum-distance
active node v∗ = via[1], both φ(a) and µ(a, v∗) can take positive values up to the
values specified in Eq. (5.14), without violating Constraint (5.13c) for the second
minimum-distance node, via[2]. We pick the upper bounds to motivate the master
problem to search for new solutions in each iteration.
Now, for the inactive nodes, though they can take arbitrarily large values, we pick
their lower bounds, such that reducing any µ value in this class will lead to constraint
violation. This gives Eq. (5.14) for xv = 0. This choice is for simplicity of the equation,
but can also help in numerical stability in practice.
Based on the above, we know that in the optimal solution, the first term of the
objective function is always equal to ξ(1 + λ) where ξ =
∑
a δadista[1]. Then, it is
clear that the λ value is based on the comparison between ξ and c. If ξ ≥ c, we set λ
to the maximum value ρ
1−α as bounded by Constraint (5.13b); otherwise, we set λ to
0. This completes the proof.
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Part III
Micropayment Routing in
Blockchain-based PCN
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Chapter 6
COINEXPRESS: A FAST PAYMENT ROUTING MECHANISM IN
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED PAYMENT CHANNEL NETWORKS
6.1 Introduction
Ever since the invention of Bitcoin by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 [88], we have well
witnessed the blooming of thousands of altcoins4, which (along with Bitcoin) jointly
support a digital payment market with over $800B of capitalization at its peak5. It is
envisioned that, in addition to the digital world where digital payments already prevail,
sectors such as banking, international trading, manufacturing, healthcare, taxation
and many more will also enjoy extensive benefits from this trend. Furthermore, the
underlying blockchain technology has inspired (and will continue to do so to) numerous
innovations, fundamentally transforming the business models of internet-of-things,
supply chain, auditing etc., and even exerts political and human right influences with
applications in governance transparency, democratic voting and freedom of speech.
However, current mainstream cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum,
although achieving strong security through decentralization, bear some severe limita-
tions that greatly hinder their applications in our daily life. A significant one is the
scalability issue brought by the requirement of global consensus and the large-overhead
of security assurance through expensive consensus algorithms. Both Bitcoin and
Ethereum employs the Proof-of-Work consensus algorithm, which can only generate
1Altcoin refers to cryptocurrencies that are alternative to Bitcoin.
2Data is based on CoinMarketCap (https://coinmarketcap.com/).
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blocks in a pre-specified speed, and each block can only include a limited number of
transactions to avoid centralization. As a consequence, the Bitcoin blockchain can
only process up to 7 transactions per second (tps) [97], while the number for Ethereum
is around 15 tps [23], compared to over 45000 peak tps handled by Visa [97].
Facing this issue, there have been extensive efforts on improving blockchain
scalability in several orthogonal directions. Among them, a promising proposal is
to construct off-chain payment channels, which carry out transactions with minimal
involvement of the blockchain itself. Specifically, users build peer-to-peer (P2P)
channels with pre-deposit funds, and transfer values by re-adjusting fund allocation
on the channels for each on-going transaction. Each transaction is protected by a
smart contract, such that any non-cooperative behavior will be punished by granting
all fund on the channel to the counter-party. In such a scenario, all transactions via
a channel are stacked, and will be jointly published to the public blockchain upon
channel expiration. Therefore the involvement of expensive blockchain operations
is limited to only channel establishment, close-out, and the rare events of dispute
arbitration in case of non-cooperative behaviors.
It has been envisioned that a distributed network comprised of these payment
channels, namely a payment channel network (PCN), can take most of the transactions
off-chain, hence drastically reducing payment overhead and increasing scalability of
the payment system [97]. Both leading cryptocurrencies are actively seeking the
deployment of PCNs alongside their main blockchains; see Section 6.6. However,
PCN has its own problems to be addressed. Maintaining a payment channel basically
requires locking a certain amount of funds within the channel for an extended amount
of time. Hence each normal user only has the capability to maintain a small number
of channels with closely related parties. When paying to an arbitrary recipient in
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the world, most likely an indirect payment is needed, which spans multiple channels
in the network. Such indirect payments can cause a number of problems. First,
one or multiple payment paths from sender to recipient need to be provisioned
before the payment starts. In network terminology, the payment must be routed
before going through. Second, a contract is needed to guarantee non-repudiation at
each intermediate node. Other issues include denial-of-service attacks, privacy, node
availability, transaction fees, etc.
In this study, we investigate routing for indirect payments in PCN. PCN routing
has a number of distinct characteristics, which renders it intrinsically different from
routing in traditional computer networks. First, PCN routing focuses on finding
routes with sufficient capacity (fund) to serve a payment, rather than finding the
shortest transmission paths as in traditional network routing. Second, PCN routing is
fully distributed, as no central administrative operator exists in PCN; even if such
an operator exists, it would not be trusted by any user, since its existence already
defeats the spirit of decentralization that has set the foundation of cryptocurrencies.
Third, PCN routing is more sensitive to dynamics in the network, due to the unique
property of payment channels that the fund in a channel is commonly consumptive
and non-recoverable unless other events happen; see Section 6.2. Last but not least,
privacy plays an important role; minimizing privacy leaks of the payer/payee (and
possibly the involved nodes) can be a priority task in certain scenarios.
In face of these challenges, we propose CoinExpress, a routing mechanism that
efficiently finds “express lanes” for cryptocurrency-based digital payments in PCNs.
As a first step in PCN routing, CoinExpress focuses on high-performance and efficient
payment routing, while leaving the privacy issue as an orthogonal enhancement to be
addressed in the next chapter. We make the following contributions:
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• We investigate important design goals of routing in PCN, and propose a practical
model for PCN routing based on network flow and concurrent flows.
• We propose a distributed approach for PCN routing, which, in addition to
finding routes that fulfill the payment, providing guarantee to the timeliness
and availability regarding user’s payment deadline and the expiration times of
the underlying channels, respectively.
• We have shown, through simulations, that CoinExpress not only achieves superior
payment successful ratio, but also drastically reduces overhead over existing
work.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we introduce the
background of PCN and routing, and state the design goals. In Section 6.3, we present
our system model. In Section 6.4, we propose our distributed PCN routing design,
and describe the detailed algorithms for each involved party in routing. In Section 6.5,
we show performance evaluation results of our design compared to a state-of-the-art
PCN routing scheme and other baselines. In Section 6.6, we review existing work in
related areas. In Section 6.7, we conclude this study.
6.2 Background and Overview
6.2.1 System Overview
A PCN consists of several components, as shown in Fig. 6.1(a). Their detailed
functions are explained below.
In PCN, a user is identified by a unique account address, usually also the public
key of the account. A payment channel can be viewed as a temporary joint account
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payment to B for forwarding. Each hop forwards payment. If intermediate node D wants to steal the
payment by not forwarding the payment, C will then publish this situation to the public blockchain,
who will judge on D’s dishonesty and grant all funds on channel C→D to C as a punishment to D.
Assuming all parties are honest, no blockchain operation is involved.
A
B
C
D
E R
H
Secret
Hash
H
Send hash H
 Forward payment with H
Backward confirmation with R
H
H
H
R
R
R
R
4 min
2 min
1 min
3 min
H
HTLC:
(b) For request A→E, recipient E generates secret R and its hash H, and sends H
to A. A encodes H and deadline 4 minutes into its contract with B, such that B
cannot spend the payment without providing R to A within 4 minutes. Each node
forwards payment similarly, and employs a decreasing deadline. Upon reception,
E will provide R to D to spend D’s payment, while D and so forth will do the
same to previous hops, until A receives R.
Figure 6.1: PCN overview and Hashed TimeLock Contract (HTLC)
155
between two users, whose balance is divided by the two parties and the division can be
adjusted based on agreement of both users. A channel is established by both parties
each depositing a certain amount into the joint account. The total deposit amount is
called the channel capacity, which defines the maximum amount of value that can be
transferred via this channel. A unidirectional channel only allows monotone balance
adjustments, while a bidirectional channel allows adjustments in both directions.
In PCN, a transaction is essentially a channel balance update agreed upon by
both parties. A channel is protected by multi-signature smart contracts, which ensure
validity, non-equivocality and non-repudiation of the on-going transactions. When one
party publishes obsolete balance history to reverse settled transactions or to double-
spend, the contract guarantees that the dishonest party is punished by granting all
its remaining channel balance to the other party. This economically prevents an
adversary from utility gain via dishonest behaviors.
A payment from sender to recipient is performed via a number of transactions
in different channels, organized as either a payment path or a payment flow. A
direct payment can be made between two parties who share a channel, and is settled
immediately after the corresponding transaction is completed. If two parties do not
share a channel, an indirect payment is needed, which requires balance updates on
multiple channels. This, however, can lead to issues if an intermediate node denies
performing a subsequent transfer after receiving a preceding one, or the recipient
denies receiving the payment.
Hashed TimeLock Contract (HTLC) [97] is introduced to solve the multi-hop
problem, as shown in Fig. 6.1(b). An HTLC consists of both a hash lock and a
time lock. In the hash lock, recipient generates a random value R with hash value
H, and sends H to the sender. Sender, as well as any intermediate node, includes
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H in the transaction contract, such that the transferred fund is spendable by the
transferee only when the secret R used to generate H is provided to the transferor.
This ensures non-repudiation of transfer reception, as no one can spend its received
amount without acknowledging the reception. In the time lock, each transaction is
restricted by a completion deadline, such that if the transferor does not receive R by
the deadline, the transferred fund will be refunded to the transferor. In an indirect
payment, each forward hop employs a decreasing deadline, taking into account the
time for completing its own balance update as well as the time the two parties wish
to wait to tolerate delay fluctuations in other hops. Any non-cooperative behavior
will cause the corresponding transaction to be published on the public blockchain,
which will grant all funds in the channel to the counter-party as a punishment to
the non-cooperative party. By employing a sequence of time-outs in the opposite
direction of the payment path, it is guaranteed that no transferee or recipient can
hold up a channel until any preceding channel expires (in which case it can repudiate
the reception and steal the fund).
From the above discussion, the key in performing a successful indirect payment is
to find a route with sufficient balance, in the form of a path or a set of paths (a flow),
such that an end-to-end time lock can be established in each path that respects the
expiration time of each channel in the path. Next, we elaborate a number of unique
challenges of routing in PCN, and a set of desired design goals of any routing solution.
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6.2.2 Challenges in Routing Design
At a first glance, routing in PCN is just a variant of the widest path problem or
the maximum flow problem, for which many efficient algorithms exist. Unfortunately,
the problem is not as simple as it seems due to many practical constraints.
First, due to the time lock in HTLC, each payment path needs to satisfy a sequence
of time delay constraints. For example, the last hop’s channel expiration time needs
to be lower bounded by the cumulative update and transmission delay of all hops
in the path; the second last hop’s expiration time needs to be lower bounded by the
same cumulative delay plus the backward delay of the last hop; so on and so forth.
Moreover, a user may require fast payment settlement, by specifying a deadline before
which the payment needs to be settled. For the payment flow problem, it is well-known
that the Multi-Path routing with Bandwidth and Delay constraints problem (MPBD)
is NP-hard, corresponding to our routing problem that only considers the last hop’s
expiration time.
Second, the remaining balance on each directional payment channel is non-
interfering monotone. Here, a directional payment channel refers to either a unidi-
rectional channel, or one direction of a bidirectional channel. For each directional
payment channel, its remaining balance is consumed after each transaction. Non-
interfering monotonicity means that unless the channel is explicitly interfered with,
e.g., is recharged via external funding or opposite-direction transactions, the consumed
balance cannot be used by other transactions on the same direction. We use the term
monotonicity for abbreviation.
One consequence of channel monotonicity is the unpredictability of balances in
the network, which is due to the highly dynamic nature of the network. The available
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balance of each channel is constantly changing with every transaction. Thus it is
impractical or even impossible for every node to keep track of the real-time balances
of all channels in the network, especially when modern payment networks typically
scale to billions of nodes [97], [104]. To find a route with sufficient balance, the sender
could either estimate channel balances based on empirical data, but with a high risk of
payment failure due to estimation inaccuracy, or actively probe for available balances,
which incurs probing overhead.
Moreover, high network dynamics and channel monotonicity can cause concurrency
issues. When multiple concurrent payments compete on one or more channels, they
may block each other from progressing. In the worst case, deadlocks could happen,
locking up funds on all involved channels [80].
6.2.3 Design Goals
Addressing these challenges require routing mechanisms that satisfy a set of design
goals, which we elaborate below.
• Timelock-compatibility: In an HTLC-guarded PCN, a major requirement
of payment routing is to ensure that a feasible end-to-end time lock can be
successfully established along each path, which guarantees the commitment of
honest processing at any involved node.
• Distributedness: The routing mechanism must not rely on a centralized
trusted party. Centralized routing is subject to single point of failure upon
external attacks, and hence cannot be trusted by users. Instead, nodes need to
communicate with each other and conduct local computations to find routes for
payments.
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• Concurrency: A routing mechanism should be non-blocking in that at any
time, at least one payment can progress without waiting for concurrent payments.
• Goodput: The mechanism should maximize system goodput, measured by the
number or total value of successful payments in a given time window. This is
not equivalent to maximizing system throughput, which is the total value that
can be delivered in the period. A partially fulfilled payment is viewed as failed
if the recipient does not receive the full amount within the deadline.
• Efficiency: First the mechanism should minimize the routing and payment
latency incurred by users. In more time-sensitive scenarios, the mechanism
should guarantee payment settlement within a user-specified deadline. Second,
the mechanism should only incur limited overhead on both the end-points and
the intermediate nodes.
• Privacy: The mechanism should preserve secrecy of various information in the
network, which is distinguished into the following types:
– Sender/Recipient Privacy: An adversary should not be able to determine
the sender/recipient of any payment between non-compromised parties.
– Value Privacy: An adversary should not be able to learn the exact value
of any payment. Moreover, the adversary should learn as little information
as possible about the range of value of any payment.
– Path Privacy: An adversary should not be able to learn the path(s) of any
payment, other than the nodes it has already compromised.
– Channel Balance Privacy: An adversary should not be able to learn the
exact balance of a payment channel at any given time, unless the channel
connects to a node it has already compromised.
– Channel Load Privacy: An adversary should not be able infer the load on
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a payment channel connecting non-compromised nodes, from sources such
as the settlement delay of the channel.
As a first step, in this study we aim to achieve the first five goals: timelock-
compatibility, distributedness, concurrency, goodput and efficiency. We address privacy
preservation as a separate and orthogonal task in the next chapter.
6.3 System Model
6.3.1 Network Model
A distributed PCN is modeled as a weighted directed graph G = (V,E). V is the
set of nodes, i.e., users each of whom has established at least one payment channel with
a peer user. E is the set of links. A link denotes either a unidirectional channel from
one user (the transferor) to another (the transferee), or one direction of a bi-directional
channel between two users.
Each link has several attributes. First, each link e ∈ E has a channel capacity ce,
denoting the total amount of value deposit into the underlying payment channel by
both parties. Second, each link e ∈ E also has a current balance be. For a unidirectional
channel (represented by a single link in G), the capacity ce is the maximum amount
of value that the transferor can send to the transferee before the channel expires,
while the balance be is the remaining amount of value that the transferor can send.
For a bidirectional channel (two collateral links in opposite directions between two
users), the two links have the same capacity, equal to the sum of their balances, i.e.,
b(u,v) +b(v,u) = c(u,v) = c(v,u). A link e always has be ≤ ce. For simplicity, we assume the
set E only contains links with positive balances at any time. A link with zero balance
161
is temporarily removed from the graph (i.e., the views of the nodes it connects), until
its balance gets recharged by new deposits or payment transactions on the opposite
direction.
Payment through a channel is not instant. First, each channel needs to complete
arriving payments sequentially. Second, it requires time for the two parties to agree
on the balance update, which is the forward processing time of the current hop.
Third, due to the time lock in HTLC, the channel further needs to release the locked
transferred value after receiving acknowledgement from the next hop, which requires
a certain amount of waiting plus backward processing time. For simplicity, we omit
the transmission delay between parties, which can be incorporated into the forward
and backward processing times. We use d1e to denote the forward wait time plus the
forward processing time of a link e, and d2e to denote the backward wait time plus the
backward processing time, at any given time. We let de = d1e + d2e. Each link further
has an expiration time ηe, denoting the time when the underlying channel becomes
unavailable. For a payment via e to be successful, it must settle before the channel
expires.
We assume that each user only has local knowledge on all its in-coming and
out-going links, including their capacities, expiration times, as well as instantaneous
balances and delays. Each sender/recipient additionally knows the other party’s
address, but does not know the other party’s location in the network. In general,
each node may have rough estimation of the overall network status based on local
information, but cannot know the instantaneous balance or delay of any remote link,
due to network asynchrony and dynamics.
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6.3.2 Payment Model
A payment request is denoted by a quintuple R = (s, t, a, st, dl), where s and t are
the sender and recipient respectively, a is the amount to be paid, and st and dl are
the start time and deadline respectively. Let P be the set of all paths in the PCN. A
payment request R is realized by a payment plan, i.e., a set of paths PR ∈ P , where
each p ∈ PR is an (s, t)-path in the network. Each path p ∈ PR is associated with a
payment value, denoted by vp. For a payment plan PR to be successful, it needs to
satisfy the following conditions:
• PR is feasible, iff for any link e ∈ E where PR(e) ⊆ PR is the set of paths
through e, we have ∑
p∈PR(e)
vp ≤ be. (6.1)
• PR is available, iff for any p ∈ PR and e ∈ p, let p+e ⊆ p be links including and
after e in p, then we have
st+
∑
e∈p
d1e +
∑
e∈p+e
d2e ≤ ηe. (6.2)
• PR is timely, iff for any path p ∈ PR, we have
st+
∑
e∈p
de ≤ dl. (6.3)
• PR is fulfilling, iff ∑
p∈PR
vp ≥ a. (6.4)
Based on the above definition, a payment plan that is feasible, available, timely
and fulfilling is able to transfer a amount of value from sender s to recipient t within
the deadline dl, and we call it a realizing payment plan for request R. In this study,
we are interested in finding a realizing payment plan for each payment request, while
satisfying as many design goals as possible.
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6.4 Dynamic Routing Design
Most existing bandwidth-aware routing algorithms cannot be applied in our sce-
nario, due to the frequently changing link balances and delays. A naive approach
is to empirically estimate the channel statuses and route accordingly, yet such an
approach is subject to poor accuracy and can lead to low goodput. We propose
CoinExpress, a novel probing-based dynamic routing mechanism. In CoinExpress, the
sender probes for channel statuses before payment, and reserves balances in advance.
CoinExpress is fully distributed, adaptive to network dynamics and concurrent, and
achieves high goodput. Unfortunately it does not provide privacy guarantee, which
we aim to address in future work.
It should be noted that due to the availability and timeliness constraints, the
problem of finding a realizing payment plan is NP-hard, even when the sender has
full knowledge of the network. With only the timeliness constraint, the problem is
equivalent to the MultiPath routing with Bandwidth and Delay constraints problem
(MPBD), which has been proved to be NP-hard in [85], and the best centralized
algorithm one can expect is an expensive fully polynomial-time approximation scheme
(FPTAS) [85]. Instead, our approach is a distributed algorithm derived from the
Ford-Fulkerson algorithm for maximum flow [36], and applies a locking technique to
resolve concurrency among multiple simultaneous requests. Before diving into our
algorithm, we first define some basic concepts on network flow.
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6.4.1 Network Flow Preliminaries
To avoid ambiguity, we use balance to replace the term capacity that is commonly
used in flow networks. For simplicity, for u, v ∈ V such that (u, v) /∈ E, we assume
b(u,v) = 0.
Definition 6.1 (Network flow). Given network G with balances {be}, source s and
destination t, an (s, t)-flow is defined as a mapping f : V ×V 7→ R∗, with the following
properties:
1) Flow conservation: for ∀v ∈ V, v 6= s, t,
∑
(u,v)∈E
f(u, v) =
∑
(v,u)∈E
f(v, u);
2) Balance constraint: f(u, v) ≤ b(u,v).
We define b(f)=
∑
(s,v)∈E f(s, v)−
∑
(v,s)∈E f(v, s) as the flow value of f .
Definition 6.2 (Concurrent network flows). Given network G and a set of flows
F = {f}, we say that the flows are concurrent iff they satisfy the joint balance
constraint:
∑
f∈F f(u, v) ≤ b(u,v).
Definition 6.3 (Residual network). Given network G with balances {b(u,v)}, and
a flow f , the residual balance bf(u,v) of each pair of u, v ∈ V is defined as follows:
bf(u,v) =

b(u,v) − f(u, v) + f(v, u), (u, v) or (v, u) ∈ E;
0, otherwise.
The residual network Gf regarding f is the network with the residual balances.
Note that the residual network may contain more links than the original one, due
to the addition of backward links (v, u) when only the forward link (u, v) exists in
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the original network. For simplicity, we assume that each flow contains no loop with
positive flow value, hence f(u, v) and f(v, u) cannot both be positive for ∀u, v ∈ V .
For completeness, we show the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm in Algorithm 6.1.
Algorithm 6.1: Ford-Fulkerson max-flow algorithm [36]
Input: network G = (V,E), source s, destination t
Initialize : start with an empty flow f and Gf = G
1 repeat
2 Find (s, t)-path p in Gf with positive balance fp;
3 Add p to f , and update Gf ;
4 until no augmenting (s, t)-path can be found ;
5 return f .
6.4.2 Dynamic Routing Design
To apply the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm, we need to address several challenges. The
first one is to transform Algorithm 6.1 into a distributed algorithm where each node
only has local knowledge. Second, the timeliness and availability constraints need to
be taken into account. Third, the concurrency issues needs to be tackled to ensure no
harmful racing between concurrent requests. We address these in the following.
Our CoinExpress algorithm is jointly shown in Algorithms 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. Note
that when we say “send a message along a link e”, we essentially mean one party
sending message to the other through a secure communication channel, rather than
actually sending fund through the payment channel.
Our algorithm employs a distributed breadth-first-search (BFS) to search for
augmenting paths. For the request, each node maintains a local view of the residual
network, with residual balances initialized to the initial link balances. In each round,
the sender sends a forward probe ρ = (R, β, δ,Π) to each neighbor who has a link e with
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Algorithm 6.2: Sender algorithm
Input: local links of G, request R = (s, t, a, st, dl)
Initialize : empty flow f , residual balances {bfe}
1 while b(f) < a do
2 for any out-going link e of s such that bfe > 0 do
3 Construct probe ρ = (R,min{a− b(f), bfe}, d1e, [(e, ηe, d2e)]) ;
4 Send ρ along e;
5 end
6 Wait for current-round confirmation for time Tconf;
7 if confirmation γ = (R, p, β) is received from e then
8 if bfe ≥ β then
9 Add path p to f with value β;
10 Update residual bfe ;
11 else
12 Send cancellation κ=(R, p, β, cancel) via p;
13 end
14 else
15 Send cancellation along all paths;
16 Retry within time T ;
17 end
18 end
19 return flow f with b(f) = a.
positive residual balance from the sender, with starting balance β = min{a− b(f), bfe}
and delay δ = d1e; the parameter Π is an ordered list of all links, their expiration times
and their backward delays along the path, and is initialized as Π = [(e, ηe, d2e)]. Each
node, upon reception of the probe, also sends out a probe along each out-going link e
with positive residual balance (except to the receiving neighbor), with updated probe
ρ′ = (R, β′, δ′,Π′) where β′ = min{β, bfe}, δ′ = δ′+d1e and Π′ = Π ‖ (e, ηe, d2e) (‖ means
appending). When the recipient receives a probe, first it checks for the timeliness
constraint, i.e., whether st+ δ+
∑
e∈p d
2
e ≤ dl; second, it checks for availability of each
link, i.e., whether st+ δ +
∑
e∈p+e d
2
e ≤ ηe. If either check fails, the recipient drops the
probe and waits for the next one. Otherwise, the recipient returns a confirmation
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γ = (R, p, β) backward along p, to confirm the new augmenting path p and flow value
β. Each node then updates its residual balances, and waits for the next round. The
algorithm stops when the sender has collected sufficient flow value for the request. If
the recipient cannot find an augmenting path in the current round, it informs the
sender, who cancels all reserved flows and retry later. If the sender does not receive
confirmation within Tconf of sending the probe, it also cancels all flows and retry later.
There are two things worth mentioning. First, the asynchrony of the network can
affect the algorithm’s performance. Ideally, we want each node to forward the probe
that has the lowest cumulative processing time, in order to better meet the timeliness
and availability constraints. However, such a probe may not be the first to reach an
intermediate node or the recipient; probes from paths with longer processing times but
shorter transmission delays may arrive first. To account for this, each intermediate
node can wait for a certain period τ after receiving the first probe of the current
round, before forwarding the probe with the lowest cumulative delay ever seen; the
recipient can also wait before making a decision on path selection. The choice of τ
is subject to each node’s estimation of the network status, as well as the urgency of
the request. On the other hand, probes may arrive out-of-order (w.r.t. rounds) in
asynchronous networks. The sender can attach a round number rnd in each probe.
Each node should discard probes in earlier rounds after a probe with higher rnd is
received, because the recipient has already made a decision on the augmenting paths
in the previous rounds.
The second thing is about concurrency. When multiple requests are jointly probing
in the residual network, they may steal each other’s flow by pushing flow through
backward links that have reversed flow of other requests, a problem defined as capacity
stealing by Rohrer et al. [107]. To address this, we apply their locking technique.
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Algorithm 6.3: Intermediate node algorithm
– Forward direction operation:
Input: probe ρ = (R, β, δ,Π), incoming link ein
Initialize : request list R, flow fR, residuals {bfe (R)}, current BFS round last
hop elast(R)
1 if R /∈ R then
2 Add R to R, and create empty flow fR and bfe (R);
3 end
4 for any out-going link e 6= ein such that bfe (R) > 0 do
5 Update probe ρ = (R, β, δ,Π) such that
β = min{β, bfe (R)},
δ = δ + d1e, and
Π = Π ‖ (e, ηe, d2e) (‖ means appending);
6 Send ρ to neighbor along e;
7 Store last hop: elast(R)← ein;
8 end
– Backward direction operation:
Input: confirmation γ = (R, p, β), incoming link e
9 if residual balance bfe (R) ≥ β then
10 Add path p to fR with value β;
11 Update residual bfe (R) based on Eq. (6.5);
12 Send γ backward along link elast(R);
13 else
14 Send cancellation κ=(R, p, β, cancel) to t along p;
15 end
– Cancellation operation:
Input: cancellation κ = (R, p, β, cancel)
16 Cancel previous update of β of residual balance;
17 Send κ to next hop along p;
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Algorithm 6.4: Recipient algorithm
– Upon receiving probe:
Input: probe ρ = (R, β, δ,Π)
1 Form path p from list Π;
2 if δ +
∑
e∈p d
2
e > dl − st then drop ρ and wait;
3 for e ∈ p do
4 if δ +
∑
e∈p+e d
2
e > ηe − st then drop ρ and wait;
5 end
6 Construct confirmation γ = (R, p, β);
7 Send γ backward along p;
8 For subsequent probes of the same round who also pass Lines 2–5, save them
into ρlist until a next-round probe is received;
– Upon receiving cancellation:
9 if there is subsequent probe in ρlist then
10 Pop the next probe ρ with path p and value β;
11 Construct confirmation γ = (R, p, β);
12 Send γ backward along p;
13 else
14 Inform sender s of the failure.
15 end
Specifically, each node maintains a residual network for each request R, with flow fR
and residual balances bf(u,v)(R) for u, v ∈ V . For each (u, v), the amount fR(v, u) is
locked for request R only, while the rest bf(u,v)(R)− fR(v, u) can be shared by other
requests. Therefore the residual balance in the concurrent case is defined as
bf(u,v)(R)=

b(u,v)−
∑
R′∈R
fR′(u, v)+fR(v, u),
if (u, v) or (v, u) ∈ E;
0, otherwise.
(6.5)
When a new augmenting path goes through a link with locked balance, it first consumes
the locked balance before consuming any remaining link balance, thus allowing other
requests to come through. Another race condition that may happen is when two or
more requests find augmenting paths that share the same link simultaneously, in which
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case their joint augmented flow may exceed the link balance. In this case, each node
will serve confirmations in a first-come first-serve (FCFS) manner; when a subsequent
confirmation arrives that cannot be served, the node will send a cancellation to reverse
all updated residual capacities at intermediate nodes and inform the recipient. The
recipient can then select another path to augment, or if no path can be found, inform
the sender to either initiate a new round of BFS or abort and retry later.
Hence, the only race condition that may happen is when multiple requests are
simultaneously confirming paths that block each other, in which case each path’s
confirmation is cancelled. The algorithm resolves this by two methods. First, the
recipient can select another path to confirm, until all received paths are simultaneously
blocked by others, which is very rare under normal network conditions. Second, in
the rare event of all paths being blocked, the recipient will inform the sender, who
will cancel its reserved balances on all confirmed paths to let pass other requests,
meanwhile employing random back-off to retry in a later time (before its start time).
In summary, through flow locking, each request will enjoy dedicated balance once
enough confirmations are received. Therefore no single request will block the network
from progressing at any stage of the actual payments.
6.4.3 Discussions
Here we highlight a few things that should be considered when implementing the
above mechanism.
Criterion for path selection: In the proposed mechanism, the sender initiates each
probing round, while the recipient is responsible for selecting paths to confirm in
each round. One thing that may affect the algorithm’s performance is the criterion
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of selecting paths to confirm. In general, selecting short paths over long paths can
reduce payment settlement time. On the other hand, selecting paths with larger
balance can reduce the number of paths per payment, hence reducing the number of
routing rounds, as well as the overhead and transaction fees during actual payment.
Choosing the right criterion depends on the specific quality-of-service requirement
of the actual use cases [128]. For example, requests with larger amounts may prefer
widest paths to avoid long waiting time for routing and large fees, while smaller and
more time-sensitive requests may prefer shortest paths to reduce settlement time.
Flooding avoidance in large networks: In large-scale networks, using BFS can
lead to large flooding overhead. A common alleviating technique is to limit the hop
count of each probe, i.e., encoding a time-to-live (TTL) field in the message. The
sender specifics the maximum TTL in the initial probe. Each node, upon reception of
a forward probe, deducts the TTL by 1. If the TTL of a probe becomes 0, it will be
dropped by the node that receives it. Advanced techniques can be employed to find
the best TTL value to use in practice [16].
6.5 Performance Evaluation
6.5.1 Experiment Settings
To realistically evaluate our distributed mechanism, we developed a simulation
tool based on network simulator ns-3 [92]. The tool was developed as an application
module in ns-3, which agrees with the actual standing of PCN protocol in real-world
networks.
We used mesh topologies between users to model a PCN overlay network, where
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each node is connected to its PCN neighbors via direct communication links. Users
were deployed in randomly generated Watts-Strogatz graphs [129]. The number of
nodes varied from 50 to 250. Each node had a degree of 10, and each link had a
re-wiring probability of 0.2 in the Watts-Strogatz model. We generated bi-directional
payment channels with a uniform capacity of 100. However, each channel’s initial
balances on both directions were uniformly divided. Each channel’s settlement times
were uniformly generated in [10, 50] seconds. Since our approach guarantees path
availability, we assumed an arbitrarily large expiration time for all channels, to
simulate the PCN in a static period of time; we focused on the timeliness constraint
in our evaluation. We considered the transmission delays between nodes, which were
uniformly generated in [50, 200] ms. The data rate of the communication links were
100 Mbps.
In each simulation, we generated 1000 Poisson arriving requests between random
nodes with mean arrival of 30 seconds. Requests had amounts uniformly generated in
[25, 75]. We allowed 5 minutes for routing before the payment start time, and also a
5 minute payment deadline after start. Requests not routed before start time were
cancelled and aborted.
6.5.2 Comparison Algorithms
CoinExpress has two versions: CnExp-W with widest path selection, and CnExp-S
with shortest path selection.
We compared our algorithm to a state-of-the-art routing algorithm proposed by
Rohrer et al. [107], which is based on the push-relabel algorithm for network flow.
Before heading to the results, we first elaborate on a few issues of their algorithm.
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First, their algorithm is delay-agnostic. Unlike our augmenting path algorithm where
path lengths can be easily bounded, the push-relabel algorithm cannot encode delay
information during flow updates. Second, their algorithm requires an additional step
of flow decomposition after obtaining a flow, which incurs extra overhead and routing
time. Our algorithm directly derives payment paths during probing. Later on, we also
show that their algorithm results in an excessive number of paths using a standard flow
decomposition (Edmonds-Karp algorithm). This greatly increases system overhead
during the payment process, and leads to high transaction fees in pay-for-use PCNs.
We denote their algorithm as PR-A, which stands for Push-Relabel in delay-
Agnostic mode. For reference, we also implemented PR-D (Push-Relabel in Delay-
aware mode), where we enforced strict delay bound to paths generated by the standard
flow decomposition. In addition, two more baselines were implemented: WP for
one-round widest path routing, and SP for one-round shortest path routing. Both
baselines used confirmation after probing to assure non-blockingness.
6.5.3 Performance Metrics
All algorithms achieve timelock-compatibility (except PR-A), distributedness and
concurrency. We therefore mainly evaluated the goodput and efficiency of the algo-
rithms. The following metrics were used:
• Acceptance ratio: number of accepted payments over all submitted requests.
• Average accepted value: the average amount of values of each accepted
payment.
• Payment delay: the average payment delay of each accepted payment.
174
• Routing time: the average time consumed for routing for each accepted
payment.
• Number of messages: the average number of network-wide messages for
successfully routing a payment.
• Number of paths: the average number of payment paths for each accepted
payment.
6.5.4 Evaluation Results
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Figure 6.2: Goodput (higher the better): acceptance ratio and average accepted value
against number of nodes.
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6.5.4.1 Goodput
Fig. 6.2 shows the acceptance ratios and average accepted values of the algorithms.
From Fig. 6.2(a), CoinExpress algorithms achieve almost the highest goodput, except
when compared to PR-A. This is because PR-A does not consider the timeliness
constraints, hence although it achieves higher acceptance ratio, most accepted pay-
ments will fail due to deadline violation, as shown later. CnExp-W achieves slightly
better goodput than CnExp-S, because the latter in general needs more paths due to
each path carrying less value, where there may not be sufficient number of paths in
some cases. All algorithms (except PR-A) has decreasing acceptance with increasing
nodes. This is because although the nodes increase, the rewiring probability does
not, which means longer paths between arbitrary node pairs. In other words, less
paths that satisfy the timeliness constraints exist. PR-A has increasing acceptance
because it neglects the deadlines. When enforcing timeliness on PR-A, we get the
PR-D algorithm, which has extremely low acceptance. Less than 1% of the payments
can be successfully settled using PR-D. Hence we neglect PR-D in the rest of our
analysis due to insufficient samples for average analysis. The overhead of PR-D is
very similar to PR-A, as their only difference is in the flow decomposition, which has
a low overhead compared to the push-relabeling process.
In Fig. 6.2(b), our algorithms not only accept more payments, but also accept
payments with larger amounts, compared to WP and SP. CoinExpress achieve near-
optimal average accepted values (the average is 50 based on our experiment setting),
very close to the delay-agnostic PR-A algorithm.
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Figure 6.3: Timeliness and efficiency (lower the better): average payment delay,
routing time, number of messages, and number of paths. In (a), dotted line DL shows
the uniform 5-minute deadline for all payment requests.
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6.5.4.2 Timeliness and Efficiency
Fig. 6.3 further shows the timeliness status and efficiency metrics of the compared
algorithms. First, in Fig. 6.3(a), we can observe the important timeliness measure
of the algorithms. We can see that all algorithms except PR-A respect timeliness
constraints (below DL). PR-A can result in payment delays of 8× the deadline, severely
violating users’ fast payment requirements.
Fig. 6.3(b) shows the routing time of the algorithms. PR-A has extremely long
routing times compared to the other algorithms. This may be a little counter-intuitive:
Push-Relabel is regarded as a faster algorithm for maximum flow than Ford-Fulkerson.
The reason is that here we are interested in finding a fulfilling flow rather than a
max-flow, in which case Push-Relabel is slower due to its non-greedy pushing of flow in
each step. Meanwhile, all others algorithms employed the flooding avoidance technique
by setting a fixed TTL, hence their efficiency grows very slowly with increasing network
size, demonstrating the great scalability of our algorithms.
Fig. 6.3(c) further shows the routing overhead in terms of the total number of
routing messages per request. We can see that PR-A has a much larger overhead than
CoinExpress, not to mention WP and SP. One reason is the flooding avoidance tech-
nique, which greatly restricts the overhead of our algorithms; however, Push-Relabel
is hard to employ such techniques, resulting in large overhead for flow operations.
Fig. 6.3(d) shows the average number of payment paths output by each algorithm.
As a baseline, both WP and SP have only one path. We can see that both CnExp-W
and CnExp-S result in very few payment paths, typically around 2–3. Meanwhile,
PR-A can result in as many as 25 different payment paths for a single payment.
This reflects two things. First, this further explains why the routing overhead of
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CoinExpress is much lower than PR-A: our algorithms require much fewer paths to
be probed. Second, our algorithms have much lower payment overhead by employing
only a few paths, which can result in much lower transaction fees in practice.
To summarize, our algorithm achieves very impressive acceptance goodput per-
formance compared to all algorithms that consider user timeliness constraints, while
achieving much lower overhead than the state-of-the-art Push-Relabel routing.
6.6 Related Work
6.6.1 Blockchain Scalability
Since the invention of blockchain in Bitcoin [88], extensive efforts have been
devoted to improving the scalability of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. Existing
efforts can be divided into on-chain solutions and off-chain solutions. On-chain
solutions focus on improving scalability by modifying existing blockchain design. A
few promising techniques include increasing block size, using lightweight consensus
algorithms, sharding [77], using Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) instead of chain
to store blocks [98], etc. Increasing block size directly increases a blockchain’s
capability to store and process more transactions, yet its direct threat is the fear of
centralization. Lightweight consensus, such as Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) [65]
or Practical Byzantine Fault-Tolerance (PBFT) [15], can greatly reduce overhead and
increase scalability over the original Proof-of-Work (PoW) algorithm in Bitcoin and
Ethereum. However, they either sacrifice decentralization (e.g., DPoS) or require trust
relationship between users (e.g., PBFT). Sharding alleviates the scalability issue by
dividing transactions into shards that are stored and processed at different nodes [77].
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Block DAGs use weaker consensus where each transaction is only confirmed by a few
instead of all up-coming blocks, which lowers block security.
Off-chain solutions seem more promising in solving blockchain scalability with
limited compromise to its decentralization and security. One approach is to run
multiple parallel blockchains that support cross-chain communications. Currently, the
difficulty in this direction lies in the design of cross-chain communication protocols.
Exchange-based protocols are the most popular at present, which uses one or multiple
chains as cryptocurrency exchanges that bridge between all other chains; for example,
see [117]. The problem is that the exchanges can be more vulnerable to attacks,
which may endanger the entire exchanging system. Another proposal is a hierarchy
of blockchains organized as a blockchain tree, where child chains are supervised and
secured by parent chains [96]. It does not solve the attacks on chains, but instead
constrains the loss due to attacks to the local chain only.
PCN is possibly the only mechanism that are totally off-chain for now. Here, most
transactions are carried in the off-chain payment network, and does not involve the
blockchain at all. The only involvement of the blockchain is either when opening or
closing the channels, or when parties are non-cooperative in channel updates, when the
blockchain is used as arbitration. Through protocols such as HTLC, PCN guarantees
almost the same security as the original blockchain, while dramatically increasing its
scalability. Moreover, PCN technology is among the most mature over all the above,
since the leading two cryptocurrencies are already on the edge of deploying PCN for
their global chains: the Lightning Network for Bitcoin [97], and the Raiden Network
for Ethereum [102].
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6.6.2 PCN and Routing
The PCN concept originates from the credit/payment networks in economics and
finance [27]. Early credit networks do not have blockchains, hence they commonly rely
on the trust relationship between peers to establish and maintain channel states [27].
Ripple [104] and Stellar [118] are among the first to employ blockchain technology
in credit networks. Much like in PCN, routing in credit networks can only be
done in a distributed manner due to decentralization. Malavolta et al. [79] studied
privacy-preserving routing in credit networks, where they designed a landmark-based
routing scheme for privacy-preserving distributed routing. This idea is extended by
Roos et al. [108] to provide enhanced routing capability. However, landmark routing
assumes a small set of trusted landmark users who controls the entire routing process,
an assumption that is commonly not true, and if true can lead to centralization of the
P2P network. For PCN, Prehodko et al. [100] first proposed a beacon-based routing
scheme in the Lightning Network, borrowing from existing ideas in mobile ad hoc
networks. Their proposal is a path-based routing scheme, and does not guarantee the
fulfillment of the payment. Rohrer et al. [107] proposed a distributed push-relabel
algorithm for PCN routing with guaranteed concurrency.
Aside from the routing problem, some related efforts in PCN include automatic
channel re-balancing [64], privacy-preserving contracts [45], [80], etc. In general, PCN
is a promising area of research, where extensive efforts are in need to address its
performance, security and privacy issues.
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6.7 Conclusions
In this study, we studied the routing problem in PCN. We distinguished a number
of important design goals for PCN routing, and proposed a mathematical model to
capture these goals. As a first step, we designed a distributed routing mechanism,
which achieved all but the privacy goals. We showed through extensive simulations
that the proposed mechanism achieves outstanding goodput performance and very
small overhead compared to the state-of-the-art routing design. In our future work,
we will further address the privacy issue in PCN routing, as well as other possible
issues.
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Chapter 7
P4PCN: PRIVACY-PRESERVING PATH PROBING FOR PAYMENT CHANNEL
NETWORKS
7.1 Introduction
Blockchain is a cryptographic mechanism that achieves security through decentral-
ization. Designed to implement a distributed ledger, blockchain ensures data security
through the consensus of distributed blockchain maintainers, so that no one can
manipulate the ledger data without breaking a significant portion of the maintainers.
Security of the blockchain largely depends on the size of the maintainer set. For
this reason, cryptocurrency has been introduced both as a killer application and as
the incentive mechanism, driving the general crowd to participate in maintaining
the blockchain. Since the invention of the blockchain, thousands of cryptocurrencies
have been developed, supporting numerous novel applications such as smart contract,
supply chain, etc. The total capitalization of the cryptocurrency market tops at over
$800B, with even far more implicit economic impact in all business sectors.
As a basic functionality of cryptocurrency, however, digital payments are encoun-
tering a seemingly conflicting situation. On one hand, our conventional centralized
financial infrastructure is efficient enough to handle billions of transactions every day,
but suffers from the intrinsic financial risks and the lack of security and transparency.
On the other hand, blockchain enhances security and eliminates the financial risk,
at the cost of severely degraded efficiency and scalability due to the need for global
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consensus. This issue has drawn significant interests from both the academia and the
industry.
The payment channel network (PCN) has emerged as a very promising solution to
this problem, which combines the blockchain technology with the conventional credit
network in economics [79], [87]. Specifically, users establish peer-to-peer channels
with deposits, and transfer funds by adjusting the deposit allocation on the channels.
Honest transactions are thus stacked in each channel, while only the final results are
published onto the blockchain when the channels are closed. For security, each channel
is protected by an on-chain smart contract, such that a dishonest off-chain behavior will
be punished through on-chain arbitration. Therefore, expensive blockchain operations
are limited to the establishment, close-out, and rare dispute arbitration for each
off-chain channel. A well-connected network of payment channels can enable off-
chain transactions for most payment scenarios, drastically improving the efficiency
and scalability of the blockchain itself. Bitcoin and Ethereum, the two leading
cryptocurrencies, are both deploying PCNs to scale their main blockchains [97], [102].
At its core, a PCN relies on routing to find payment paths with sufficient fund
balances, and employs a multi-hop payment contract to secure indirect payments
through the network [97]. The biggest challenge for PCN routing is the distributed
and dynamic nature of the PCN, where channel balances are constantly changing
with each on-going transaction. To improve routing success, many algorithms have
employed probing-based techniques, which actively gathers up-to-date information
from the network before making routing decisions [116], [127], [149]. It has been
shown that probing-based solutions lead to significantly improved routing success rate
compared to algorithms based on static or periodically updated information [116],
[127].
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A practical concern of digital payment users is the privacy of their transac-
tions. Due to the transparency of the blockchain, it is intrinsically difficult to ensure
strong anonymity for on-chain transactions. As a result, existing privacy-preserving
blockchains only ensure pseudonymity of the transactions but not unlinkability [112].
PCN has a natural advantage over the blockchain for privacy, as most transactions
are stacked within channels without being published. With the newly developed
privacy-preserving payment contracts, information such as the identity and location
of transacting users, as well as the transaction value, can be hidden from external
adversaries and curious intermediate nodes [81], [93], [160]. Yet this does not solve the
whole problem, as such information may also be leaked in the routing process. For
example, many routing algorithms, such as the Spider network [116], Flash [127] and
CoinExpress [149], rely on probing to improve routing performance over algorithms
based on static information [79], [108], but does not have the anonymity properties of
the latter ones.
In this study, we aim to resolve this one last piece of puzzle for privacy-preserving
PCN. We propose P4PCN, an anonymous path probing protocol for probing-based
routing algorithms, which can be combined with the privacy-preserving payment
contracts to construct a full protocol stack for privacy-preserving payments through
the PCN. Compared to existing anonymous communication protocols such as onion
routing [42], the biggest challenge for anonymous path probing is that the sender
may not know the path(s) that the probe will traverse in advance. This violates the
conventional requirement of knowing all the public keys of nodes on the path in
anonymous communications, rendering all such protocols inapplicable, including but
not limited to [18], [26], [42]. We address this by designing a novel cryptographic
protocol. The key idea is to allow each intermediate node to both derive a symmetric
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key with the sender, and encrypt the queried data as well as necessary information
for later decryption at the recipient, at the same time. A core technique in our
construction is the Universal Re-encryption protocol used to re-encrypt the probe
at each hop [43], while the symmetric key derivation is inspired by Sphinx [26] and
HORNET [18]. Our protocol is both lightweight and scalable. We validated its
efficiency and scalability via implementations and contrast experiments against a
naive construction based on the hybrid universal mixing (HUM) protocol in [43].
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• To our best knowledge, no existing work has studied or addressed the anonymous
probing problem in networking. We are the first to study and address this
problem.
• We design a cryptographic protocol for anonymous probing that preserves sender
and recipient anonymity, and ensures the integrity and confidentiality of queried
data.
• We thoroughly analyze the security of our protocol, and validate its efficiency
and scalability through implementation and contrast experiments.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 7.2 presents our system
model and security goals. Section 7.3 presents the detailed design of our protocol.
Section 7.4 presents the security analysis of our protocol. Section 7.5 presents our
performance evaluation results. Section 7.6 discusses how this protocol affects the
routing algorithm design, as well as other potential applications of this protocol.
Section 7.7 concludes this study.
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7.2 System Model and Security Goals
7.2.1 System Model
We consider a fully distributed PCN denoted by G = (V,E), where V is the set
of user accounts that constitute the network, and E denotes the set of directional
payment channels between nodes. Each channel e ∈ E is associated with a set of
channel status attributes, attre = {balancee, delaye, expiratione, feee, . . . }. Due to the
dynamic nature of the network, some of the attributes, notably the balance of each
channel, are constantly changing with on-going payment requests and transactions.
As a result, each node only has up-to-date information regarding all the channels
adjacent to it, while it has no knowledge of the instantaneous channel status of any
remote channel.
A payment request is comprised as (src, dst, val), where src and dst are the sender
and recipient respectively, and val is the amount to be transferred. Some requests may
have additional constraints, for example, a deadline dl, a fee budget cost, etc. Due
to the primary constraint on val as well as these secondary constraints, the sender
commonly needs to gather instantaneous information from the network to decide on
its actual payment paths. Both information gathering and path selection are part
of the payment routing process. If a guaranteed payment success is preferred, the
sender can also reserve the balances on the path(s) until the payment is done, to avoid
concurrency issues [149].
In this study, we primarily focus on the information gathering process, which we
call path probing. In path probing, the sender sends out probing messages to gather
information from network nodes. Each node attaches the queried information onto
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the probe, and then forwards the probe to one or multiple next hops, until each
probe reaches the intended recipient. Note that since the sender has no knowledge
of the remote channels, we assume that the actual choice of next hops is at the
discretion of each forwarding node. For example, a node may either choose a simple
broadcast-based method [149], or guide the selection of forwarding nodes with its local
information, such as in imbalance-aware routing [116] or coordinate-based routing [108].
For generality, we do not rely on a specific probing algorithm, and assume that each
node v independently decides the set of neighbors Nv to forward a received probe. We
use datav to denote the data that node v attaches to an on-going probe. Based on
the request, datav may contain balance, congestion, delay, fee, etc. Each node reports
data of the same length ldata.
7.2.2 Threat Model
Existing probing-based routing algorithms do not consider the privacy of the sender
and/or the recipient. For example, CoinExpress [149] explicitly involves the sender
and recipient nodes in its probes. In this study, we focus on an adversary who tries to
infer the payment patterns of senders and/or recipients in the network. For example,
observing a sender sending out a probe that passes through several (corrupted) nodes,
an adversary can link this action with a future anonymous payment transaction that
goes through the same set of nodes. The popularity of a recipient may also be inferred
by observing how many probes are targeting a recipient during a period.
We consider a local adversary that controls a subset of nodes by either inserting
malicious nodes or compromising existing nodes. We assume the non-existence of a
global adversary that can observe all network traffic, as all communications between
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peers are conducted via secure and anonymous channels. The adversary can access all
the stored secrets and past communications on the compromised nodes, but cannot
access such information on non-compromised nodes. For any privacy-concerning
user, we assume that the adversary cannot compromise (or does not know if it has
compromised) all the adjacent nodes of the user; otherwise, the sender/recipient’s
privacy can be trivially broken since the adversary can access all the user’s in-
coming/out-going channels. Note that this assumption realistically holds in PCNs
that support private channels [105]. The goal of the adversary is to undermine user
privacy instead of launching denial-of-service attacks. Defense against denial-of-service
attacks is mainly through detection and prevention, which is out of the scope of this
study.
7.2.3 Security Goals
We expect our protocol (or any other anonymous probing protocol) to fulfill the
following security goals.
• Correctness: Correctness means that a cryptographic protocol correctly imple-
ments all the functions of a normal non-cryptographic protocol. In our probing
problem, this means that 1) each node (both intermediate node and recipient)
can identify its role regarding a received probe, 2) each intermediate node is able
to attach queried information onto the probe, and 3) the recipient can obtain
all the attached information from the probe.
• Data Integrity: The adversary cannot break the integrity of the queried
data attached by a non-compromised node without being detected by the
sender/recipient.
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• Data Confidentiality: The adversary cannot access the information attached
by a non-compromised node, except for the knowledge that it already has access
to, e.g., statuses of channels adjacent to a compromised node.
• Sender Privacy: For any payment request between non-compromised users,
the adversary cannot infer the identity or location of the sender. It also cannot
decide if a non-compromised node is the sender of any request.
• Recipient Privacy: For any payment request between non-compromised users,
the adversary cannot infer the identity or location of the recipient. It also cannot
decide if a non-compromised node is the recipient of any request.
• Sender-Recipient Privacy: The adversary cannot decide whether there is
any on-going request between any users.
7.3 Protocol Design
7.3.1 Preliminaries
Let G be a cyclic group of prime order q (with length lkey), satisfying the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. Let g be a published generator of G. We omit
writing the modulus operation for brevity. We use the symbol ⊥ to denote an empty
string, group element or identifier of an arbitrary size. The following cryptographic
primitives are used in our protocol:
• E(pk,m): encryption of message m with public key pk.
• D(sk, ξ): decryption of ciphertext ξ with private key sk.
• PRG(s): a secure pseudorandom generator with key s.
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• MAC(k,m): the Message Authentication Code (MAC) of message m under key k,
with length lMAC.
• HM(·), HE(·): two cryptographic hash functions.
7.3.2 Universal Re-encryption (URE)
Universal Re-encryption (URE) is a cryptographic protocol for mixnets proposed
by Golle et al. [43]. In plain words, URE enables mix nodes to re-encrypt an encrypted
message without knowing the public key used for encryption. The original construction
of URE was built upon the ElGamal cryptosystem, utilizing the homomorphic property
of ElGamal. Let (x, y = gx) be a private-public key pair for ElGamal encryption
where x is the private key. The ciphertext of message m ∈ [1 . . . q−1] is ξ = E(y,m) =
(m · yk, gk) where k ∈ [1 . . . q − 1] is a secret random number, and the decryption
algorithm runs as m = D(x, ξ) = ξ[0] · (ξ[1]x)−1. Given two ciphertexts E(pk, a) and
E(pk, b) encrypted under the same key pk, the ElGamal cryptosystem satisfies that
E(pk, a)× E(pk, b) = E(pk, a× b) for a group operator ×. Based on this, a ciphertext
in the URE protocol has two components, E(pk,m) and E(pk, 1), where the latter can
be used to re-encrypt the former without knowing the public key initially used to
encrypt it.
Note that the task of the original URE protocol is the opposite of ours. The
original URE aims to anonymously transmit a message from sender to receiver through
a sequence of known mix nodes, such that no mix node has the knowledge of the
sender, the receiver, or any node other than itself and its neighbors on the route. The
message itself stays fixed and encrypted through the entire transmission. In our task,
not only the path that a probe will traverse is undetermined before probing, but each
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intermediate node also needs to attach data (local channel information) queried by
the sender. Each node’s data must be kept secret so that other nodes cannot infer
whether this node is on the probed path or not. On the other hand, each node needs
to provide enough information for the sender/recipient to decrypt the attached data.
To address these, we must modify the original URE protocol to fit our needs.
7.3.3 Anonymous Probing with Unknown Paths
Our insight is that, besides using URE for re-anonymization as in mixnets, we
can also use part of the URE protocol to carry out a Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
(DHKE) with each node that the probe traverses. The derived key can then be
used to encrypt the attached data of the intermediate node, while the node can
provide necessary DH-value to help the recipient decrypt the encrypted data. To
ensure anonymity, decryption-related information and the data are encrypted within
a reversed onion: each node wraps a layer of encryption over the received payload
plus the newly attached DH-value and data. The recipient gradually derives all the
symmetric keys, and uses the corresponding key to “peel off” each encryption layer,
revealing all the attached data layer-by-layer.
7.3.3.1 Probing with a Single Path
For simplicity, let us first consider the case where probing is done through just one
(unknown) path. Here, each node knows which exact neighbor it will forward a given
probe to as next hop. But the sender does not know the public key of any node on this
path. Assume this path is represented by (src = v0, v1, v2, ..., vn−1, vn = dst). We also
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assume that the sender and the recipient securely share any information that either
of them uses in the protocol. We thus do not distinguish between the cryptographic
operations by the sender or the recipient. The probing protocol works as follows:
Algorithm 7.1: Create Probe (Sender)
Input: Probe ID I.
Output: Initial probe message ρ0.
1 Generate random x, κ, kβ, kγ ∈U Zq; let y ← gx;
2 s0 ← gκkβ ;
3 m← (pk0,⊥,⊥);
4 pl0←(ξ0,MAC(HM(s0), ξ0), ζ0), where
ξ0 = m⊕ PRG(HE(s0)), ζ0 = ⊥⊕ PRG(HE(s0));
5 Generate probe ρ0 = (a0, b0, c0, d0, pl0), where
a0 = y
kβkγ , b0 = gkβkγ , c0 = gkγ , d0 = gκ;
return ρ0.
Create Probe: The sender generates secrets (x, κ, kβ, kγ) that are shared with
the recipient via a secure channel. The probe contains the ElGamal ciphertext
(a0, b0) = E(y, 1), an element c0 containing part of b0, a random element d0, and the
payload pl0. Besides being part of the ciphertext, b0 acts as the DH-value of the
sender, used to establish a DH symmetric key with each hop. c0 and d0 are both used
for per-hop DHKE, so that the recipient can derive the symmetric keys. Specifically,
c0 is used to pass the common part of the per-hop DH-value to the next hop for
constructing the next hop’s own DH-value, while d0 is used to pass the current node’s
DH-value to the next hop for encryption into the payload. The DHKE with vi is
based on secret keys kβ and xi (and common randomizing terms), and for sender,
though purely for formality, x0 = κ. Both kγ and κ are to make the initial probe
indistinguishable from the ones that have already passed some hop(s). Note that both
the symmetric key encryption using PRG and the encrypted empty string ζ0 are to
facilitate padding, discussed later on.
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Algorithm 7.2: Process Probe (Intermediate Node)
Input: Node vi, probe (a, b, c, d, pl), data.
Output: Next probe message ρi.
1 Decrypt (a, b) using its own key pair to see if it is the recipient, and jump to
Algorithm 7.3 if so;
2 Generate random ki, xi ∈U Zq;
3 si ← bxi ;
4 m← (pki, d, data);
5 pli ← (ξi,MAC(HM(si), ξi), ζi), where
ξi = m⊕ PRG(HE(si)), ζi = pl⊕ PRG(HE(si));
6 Construct probe ρi = (ai, bi, ci, di, pli), where
ai = a
ki , bi = bki , ci = cki , di = cxi ;
return ρi.
Process Probe: Each intermediate node’s procedure starts from checking if it is the
recipient. This is done by trying to decrypt the ciphertext (a, b) = E(y, 1) using its
own set of private keys whose corresponding requests are expecting in-coming probes.
If the node is not the recipient, it proceeds to generate the next probe to be forwarded.
The first step is to derive its shared DH key si using b as the DH value of the sender.
si is then used to encrypt a new payload, which contains the previous payload, the
old element d as the DH-value of the previous hop (which is essential for the recipient
to decrypt the previous payload), and the queried data to be attached. Next is to
update all the group elements. The ciphertext (a, b) is re-encrypted using new key ki.
The common part of the DH-value, c, is also updated by key ki to reflect the update
on b. di stores the DH-value of the current node, which will be either wrapped within
the payload at the next hop if the next hop is still intermediate, or used for decryption
if the next hop is the recipient.
Decrypt Probe: Once a recipient receives a probe targeting itself, it starts decrypting
the onion-encrypted payload to obtain all the data. For each layer, the secret key is
derived by combining the corresponding node’s DH-value, either directly transmitted
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Algorithm 7.3: Decrypt Probe (Recipient)
Input: Probe (a, b, c, d, pl), shared keys x, kβ.
Output: Path p, per-hop data data = {data}.
1 while sizeof(pl) ≥ valid payload segment length do
2 s← dkβ ;
3 (ξ, ν, ζ)← pl;
4 Check if ν is a valid MAC of ξ under s; abort if not;
5 (pk, d′, data, pl′)← (ξ, ζ)⊕ PRG(HE(s));
6 Add pk to p, and add data to data;
7 d← d′, pl← pl′;
8 end
9 return (p,data).
from the last hop or obtained from the last layer (for previous hops), with the secret kβ
of the sender/recipient. The secret key is then used to decrypt the payload, revealing
the next layer of payload and DH-value, and the attached data of this layer. Eventually,
the path is reconstructed from the attached public keys, and all data are decrypted
layer-by-layer.
7.3.3.2 Probing with Multiple Next Hops
Now, let us consider the case where each node can forward a probe to multiple
neighbors to increase the probing success probability and path diversity. Forwarding
the same probe message to multiple neighbors would enable linkable attacks, if two
colluding nodes both receive the same message. For this reason, a new pair of (ki, xi)
should be generated for every neighbor that the probe is sent to. Due to the re-
encryption and the onion encryption at every hop, even if colluding nodes receive the
probe sent by the same sender, they cannot relate them or distinguish them from any
other probe in the network.
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7.3.3.3 Length-based Inference Attacks and Padding
One issue with the original onion routing protocol is that an intermediate node
can infer its relative location along the path by observing the length of the encrypted
message, if it knows or can estimate the length of the original message and/or the
size of each layer. To prevent such an attack, padding is commonly used to keep
all encrypted messages of constant length. In our scenario, padding can serve an
additional purpose. In payment routing, commonly the sender/recipient has a limit
on the length of an acceptable payment path. If a path is too long, both the risk
of a failed payment is high, and it may incur a high transaction fee at the sender.
For this reason, the sender can pad the onion-encrypted payload up to a pre-defined
limit. Each node attaches information by dropping the last pi bits of the previous
onion, where pi is the size of a layer of the payload and is known based on the message
format. The recipient can then detect paths exceeding the pre-defined length, if the
last layer of encryption does not contain the initial payload sent by the sender, and
discard such paths accordingly.
7.4 Security Analysis
7.4.1 Correctness
First, each node vi can identify whether it is the recipient of a given probe by trying
to decrypt the URE ciphertext (a, b) against its own set of key pairs that are awaiting
probes. If the decrypted value for any of the key pairs is 1, the probe belongs to the
corresponding probing request. During probing, each node attaches its local data
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onto the probe by encrypting it with the secret key si derived using DHKE with the
sender’s provided DH-value (element b in the URE ciphertext). Finally, the recipient
opens each layer of the onion by deriving si. Note that for the i-th hop (i > 0), it
satisfies that bi = c
kβ
i as well as di = c
xi
i−1. Therefore, we have si = b
xi
i−1 = c
kβxi
i−1 = d
kβ
i .
Since di is always encrypted in the onion of the next hop (or directly transmitted
to recipient at last hop), the recipient (knowing the shared secret kβ) can gradually
derive the secret keys to decrypt all layers and obtain all the data. Note that the
recipient does not need to decrypt the innermost layer, as any information there can
be directly shared between the sender and the recipient, and hence s0 is purely used
to achieve indistinguishability.
7.4.2 Data Integrity and Confidentiality
Since each piece of data attached to the probe is MACed and onion-encrypted, it
suffices to show that the secret key si of a non-compromised node cannot be obtained
by an adversary if both the sender and the recipient are non-compromised. Note that
the secret key si contains two secret components, the xi held by the non-compromised
node vi, and the kβkγ initially embedded by the sender. Without either of these two
pieces or the key itself (which is discarded after use), no adversary can derive si based
on the DDH assumption.
7.4.3 Sender, Recipient, and Sender-Recipient Privacy
Regarding sender and recipient privacy, we consider several cases. First, a com-
promised node not adjacent to either the sender or the recipient can only see some
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probe passing through, but cannot link it to either the sender or the recipient due to
the encryption. A node adjacent to the sender may try to infer if the previous hop
is the sender, but cannot tell since some other node that connects to the last hop
directly or via a path may have originated the probe. Similarly, a node adjacent to the
recipient cannot tell whether the probe is targeted to the next hop or some other node
afterwards. Furthermore, a node cannot know its own location with regard to either
the sender or the recipient in the network, since all probes are of the same length and
are re-randomized at every hop. Finally, since the adversary cannot tell whether any
probe can be linked to any sender or recipient, he also cannot tell whether a pair of
sender and recipient is communicating or not.
7.5 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our protocol. Since we are the
first to propose a protocol for the anonymous probing problem in networks, our only
reference solution is a modified version of the hybrid universal mixing (HUM) protocol
described in the original URE paper [43], which uses a different way for establishing
symmetric keys used for encryption. Below, we first describe the modified HUM
protocol, and then analyze the performance of these two protocols.
7.5.1 Modified Hybrid Universal Mixing [43]
In the HUM protocol, the authors proposed to use symmetric key encryption to
encrypt and re-encrypt the initial message, while using the URE protocol to deliver the
symmetric keys used by each hop for final decryption. This protocol can be modified
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to additionally use the symmetric keys to encrypt and re-encrypt the data each node
attaches to the probe. Assume that the maximum path length is L. The sender sends
out the following message as the initial probe:
ρ0 = (pl,E(pk, 1), vec),
where pl = (ξ,MAC(HM(s0), ξ),mrand), ξ = (pk0,⊥)⊕PRG(HE(s0)), mrand is a random
filler string of length (L− 1) · lseg with lseg = ldata + lkey + lMAC, and
vec = (E(pk, 1), . . . ,E(pk, 1),E(pk, s0))
contains (L− 1) copies of the encrypted value 1 plus an encrypted copy of the initial
secret key s0.
When a node vi receives a probe, it attaches its pki and data to the head of the
payload while dropping the last lseg bits, picks a new key si, and then encrypts the new
payload with si; the MAC is also computed and attached. It then encrypts si with
the help of the value E(pk, 1) at the head of vec (if the path does not exceed length
L), and then left-rotates all the components in vec. This can be done by multiplying
the first element of E(pk, 1) with si in ElGamal encryption. Finally, it re-encrypts
the middle component E(pk, 1) in the probe, as well as all the other components in
vec, using a new random key ki. If there are more than one next hop, then as in our
protocol, new keys need to be generated, and the entire message re-randomized, for
each of the next hops of the current node.
Identification of the recipient is also done by decrypting the middle component
E(pk, 1). After that, the recipient decrypts all the secret keys stored in vec from the
back, and uses all the keys to gradually decrypt the payload and obtain all the data.
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7.5.2 Analytical Comparison
Here we analytically compare the overheads of our protocol and the modified HUM
protocol. We assume that the network has a path length limit of L intermediate nodes,
and each probe has traversed a path of length P ≤ L on average. Size of a group
element including public/private keys is lkey = K bytes. We focus on the overhead for
processing 1 probe at each node, as the number of probes a node receives/forwards is
determined by the actual probing algorithm employed, which is out of the scope of
this study. We omit the generation of all public/private key pairs. Table 7.1 shows an
analytical comparison between the two protocols.
Scheme Our Protocol Modified HUM
Comp.
Sender (5, 0) (2L+ 2, 0)
Interm. (6, 1) (2L+ 3, 1)
Recipient (P + 1, 1) (P + 1, P )
Communications (2L+ 4)K (3L+ 2)K
Table 7.1: Overhead comparison for one probe. Computation is displayed as
(mod_exp,mod_inv), denoting the numbers of modular exponentiation and mod-
ular inverse operations respectively; communication overhead is measured by the
length of the probe header excluding data payloads and MACs but including the path
information (public keys of each hop).
7.5.3 Simulation Experiments
We implemented both protocols in Java. The ElGamal key size was 1024 bits
(128 bytes). A data segment contained 4 bytes of data and a 128-byte public key
identifying this hop. The MAC of a data query was 20 bytes using the HMAC-SHA-1
implementation of Java. The SHA1PRNG implementation of Java is used for the
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keyed PRG in order for reproducibility of the experiments. Each probe traversed the
maximum allowed hops before reaching the recipient. We ran our experiments on a
Linux PC with Quad-Core 3.4GHz CPU and 16GB of memory, and repeated each
experiment for 10, 000 times.
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(a) Probe creation time vs. # hops.
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(b) Probe processing time vs. # hops.
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(c) Probe decryption time vs. # hops.
Figure 7.1: Probe creation (sender), processing (intermediate node) and decryption
(recipient) execution times per probe.
Fig. 7.1 shows the average execution times for the creation, processing and de-
cryption of a probe, respectively. Clearly, the creation and processing times of our
protocol remain constant with increasing number of hops the probe can explore, while
those of HUM increase linearly. For decryption, both protocols have an increasing
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execution time, but ours is faster than HUM due to less number of modular inverse
operations.
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Figure 7.2: Probe size vs. # hops.
Fig. 7.2 shows the probe size versus the number of hops. HUM has a larger probe
size over ours due to the more number of ElGamal ciphertexts used to store all the
encryption keys, resulting in higher communication overhead in practice.
7.6 Discussions
Probing with anonymity: With our protocol, now the intermediate nodes will have
no way of knowing the sender and/or the recipient. Unfortunately, this complicates the
probing algorithm design, because each node now has limited information in deciding
where to forward a probe. For instance, simple broadcasting can lead to the case where
every copy of a probe will wander in the network until reaching the recipient, and
all the probes generated by a request will most likely overwhelm the entire network.
Two promising solutions are probabilistic forwarding and coordinate-based routing.
The former naturally preserves privacy, while the latter can be implemented using
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a privacy-preserving coordinate system to avoid breaking user anonymity [108]. We
plan to investigate these in our future work.
Other applications: Beyond PCN, our protocol may also find applications in a
wide range of other scenarios. For example, this protocol can be used to anonymously
construct a communication path towards a remote location through a dynamic sensor
network or a vehicular network, or to find a trust path in a trust-based social network.
7.7 Conclusions
In this study, we studied the problem of anonymous probing in PCN routing, the
last piece in building a fully privacy-preserving PCN payment protocol stack. We
proposed a cryptographic protocol to ensure both data security and user privacy
during probing-based network information gathering. Combined with existing probing-
based dynamic routing algorithms and privacy-preserving payment protocols, this can
achieve efficient payments with high success probability and full privacy preservation
for PCN. Our protocol is both lightweight and scalable. Comparing our protocol
with another possible protocol derived from hybrid universal mixing, our protocol
has constant probe creation and processing overheads, lower (although linear) probe
decryption overhead, and smaller communication overhead. Though we specifically
targeted the PCN, our protocol can be used in a broad range of other domains, such as
for anonymous data querying in vehicular networks, sensor networks, social networks,
and beyond.
203
Chapter 8
CONCLUSIONS
There is no doubt that IoT will transform the world. However, challenges exist
towards such a goal. At this time, the resource mismatch between IoT infrastructure
and applications is greatly hindering the applicability and acceptance of this entire
technology. In this dissertation, we studied smart resource allocation as an imme-
diate remedy to the resource issue in IoT, enabling best utilization of the existing
resources to provide performance improvements and guarantees for the IoT operator,
applications and users. In general, we explored three different dimensions of smart
resource allocation: 1) network resource allocation, 2) security deployment, and 3)
micropayment transactions.
Specifically, for the network resource allocation problem, we studied different
problems involving different layers in the network stack. The first problem considered
routing and engineering IoT data traffic in the network layer. We addressed the
challenge of using existing resources to meet all the traffic flows’ bandwidth, delay, reli-
ability and policy routing requirements. Since the problem was NP-hard, we proposed
an FPTAS which enforces all above requirements, while approximating the minimum
load factor on the links. The second problem considered both application hosting
and traffic routing and engineering. We considered one or multiple IoT applications
receiving data streams from distributed data sources. Each application could be par-
allelizable or non-parallelizable, and we considered either one or multiple applications.
We still considered the QoS (bandwidth, delay and reliability) requirements of the
applications. This problem was a generalization over the previous one, and we again
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proved its NP-hardness. Since there were four variants, we proposed FPTASs for three
of the variants, while for the forth one we proposed a randomized algorithm based on
one of the FPTASs. The third problem considered a distributed application scenario
with edge-deployed IoT microservices and an overlay network interconnecting these
microservices. We studied the microservice load balancing problem within this overlay
network, featuring a general model that abstracts the complex interdependencies
among microservices using a DAG. Of course, this problem was still NP-hard, and
hence we proposed another FPTAS for this problem, this time enforcing the load
balancing goal while approximating the worst-case QoS of the distributed application.
We used extensive simulation experiments to validate the superior performance of all
our proposed algorithms, compared to other heuristic solutions for each problem.
For the security problem, we studied how the IoT provider can optimally deploy
security functions given a limited cost budget. We used a stochastic model to capture
the dynamics in the IoT edge network, and used the CVaR abstraction to capture
the worst-case security risk of the system in face of the dynamics. An optimization
framework was proposed for the robust security deployment problem. We further
proposed optimization techniques to efficiently find the optimal deployment plan.
While we focused on optimizing the security risk under a simple static risk model and
based on shortest path routing, our optimization framework in general can incorporate
many other risk models and routing algorithms, and hence has much wider applications
than this specific context.
For the micropayment problem, we made two major contributions. The first
one was a distributed routing protocol that efficiently finds payment paths in a
blockchain-based PCN. This could enable fast and cost efficient transactions that
could support machine-to-machine payment transactions in IoT. We further proposed
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an anonymous protocol for path probing in PCN. This protocol novelly combined
Universal Re-encryption with the HORNET packet format, in order for a probe
message to anonymously carry sufficient information submitted by intermediate nodes
to establish a payment path. These two contributions, combined with the anonymous
payment processing protocol in PCN, can yield a high-performance and privacy-
preserving payment stack for machine-to-machine IoT micropayment transactions,
which is crucial in constructing a fully automated IoT ecosystem.
While the above contributions tackle different aspects of IoT, jointly they show
that smart resource allocation is a genuine and practical approach to addressing the
resource issue within the entire IoT ecosystem, specifically those network-related ones.
Continuous investment into the IoT infrastructure is the eventual solution to the
resource issue. However, these algorithms will still be crucially useful in addressing
the specific performance demands of future applications. The goal of this dissertation,
in addition to providing algorithmic solutions to specific problems in certain contexts,
is also to propose general and extensible models and frameworks that are able to
handle changes in the infrastructure, the applications, and the user patterns. On the
other hand, more work also needs to be done along the line, as more complicated
infrastructural technologies and applications are constantly being developed in IoT.
In the future work, part of our focus will be on extending our existing solutions
to new infrastructures and applications, including but not limited to hierarchical
edge networks, mobile augmented/virtual reality, and machine learning-based IoT
applications.
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